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Abstract

The productivity and efficiency of the banking system is pivotal to the attainment of
economic growth and development in both developed and developing economies, and is
of particular interest in the wake of financial sector reform and restructuring. Over the
last decade the Iranian banking industry has undergone substantial changes due to
increased government regulation and technological advances, all of which have resulted
in an extensive restructuring of the industry. Changes in policy have affected both stateowned banks (including commercial and specialised banks) and private banks in Iran.
The existing literature lacks any rigorous empirical analyses of the impact of these
reforms on the efficiency of financial institutions in Iran.

The main aim of this study has been to conduct an empirical investigation of financial
institutions in Iran during 2003 to 2008, with a view to assessing their technical
efficiency and productivity. By investigating technical efficiency and productivity
among financial institutions in Iran, this study addressed the following four questions:
a) What is the mean efficiency score of financial institutions in Iran; b) What is the total
factor productivity change for Iran’s financial institutions; c) Have financial reforms
been successful in improving the performance of the banking sector, and has the
performance of Iranian banks become more efficient after the regulatory changes; and
d) and what are the major sources of inefficiency in the context of Iran’s financial
institutions. Data envelopment analysis, which is a non-parametric approach, was
employed in this study to analyse empirically the technical efficiency and productivity
changes of financial institutions in Iran. For the first time in a developing country, this
study employed a Bootstrapped Malmquist technique under Variable Returns to Scale
xii

assumptions proposed by Simar and Wilson (1999) to analyse efficiency and
productivity changes in the banking industry. The bootstrap approach demonstrates that
the majority of estimates obtained in this study are statistically significant. A
comprehensive decomposition of the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index, developed by
O’Donnell (2010b), is applied in this thesis for the first time in a banking context to
analyse efficiency and productivity changes.

Based on our empirical results, from the intermediation perspective, it is found that the
industry efficiency level improved over the period 2003-2006, but declined
considerably after 2006. The findings also show that, while the state ownership of
public banks helped to reduce the extent of their inefficiency by providing banking
services to government-specified areas, the lack of independence of public banks, in
particular specialised banks, from government controls led to their considerable scale
and mix inefficiency particularly after the regulatory measures were introduced in 2005.
From a revenue point of view public banks were significantly more mix- and technically
inefficient than private banks, suggesting that the profitability maximization is the
highest priority of all private banks. Finally, the empirical results indicate that no matter
which approach is taken into consideration, scale inefficiency was a major source of
inefficiency among the Iranian banks, in particular public banks, indicating significant
room for scale optimization to facilitate higher levels of revenue and services.

The industry showed negative changes in productivity over the period 2007-2008. The
poor overall productivity performance of Iran’s financial sector after 2007 is a cause for
concern, as it is likely to constrain the growth and development of the overall economy.
As a consequence, the authorities will need to rethink their reform measures to deal with
xiii

the objective of stimulating more competition in the marketplace. In order to improve
scale and mix efficiency levels of public banks, the government needs to redesign their
reform measures with the objective of increasing public banks’ independence.

This thesis has made four significant contributions to the analysis of efficiency in
financial institutions. First, this is the first study to address the issue of efficiency and
productivity in Iran’s financial institutions using DEA and TFP indices for a period after
2003. After conducting an inclusive review, all previous studies of Iranian banks suffer
from neglect of the importance of market structure (all have been conducted under
constant returns to scale), productivity changes over time and the entry of new private
banks. Thus, this study conducts an in-depth assessment of the banking sector efficiency
and productivity by means of adopting different techniques. This study has employed a
larger category of financial institutions than have other studies. The sample data
included in this study comes from commercial banks, specialised banks and private
bank. All these categories were homogenous in terms of inputs and outputs and hence it
was possible to apply DEA methodology. Second, this is the first study to analyse
Iranian banking efficiency over a period riddled with significant financial reforms or
government interventions. Third, for the first time in a developing country, this study
employed a Bootstrapped Malmquist technique under Variable Returns to Scale
assumptions to analyse efficiency and productivity changes of a banking industry.
Finally, this study is the first to use the new decomposition of the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP
index to analyse efficiency and productivity changes in a banking context.

xiv

Chapter One
Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study
As exemplified by the global financial crisis, there is a growing consensus among
researchers that financial intermediaries play a fundamental role in the process of
economic growth by channelling limited financial resources into the economy (Levine,
1997; Crotty, 2009). There are a number of theories that describe and justify the
existence of financial institutions and their role in an economy (Beck et al. 1999; King
and Levine, 1993). The underlying point in the literature is that a well functioning
financial system makes the economy as a whole more capable, efficient and effective in
its usage of scarce resources. According to Fry (1988), financial institutions carry out
two basic economic functions. First, they provide money and administer the payment
system. Second, they generally perform as intermediaries and bring savers and
borrowers together. The World Bank (1989) stated that finance matters in an economy
since it creates services such as: i) a payment mechanism; ii) savings mobilization; iii)
credit allocation; and iv) limiting, pricing, pooling and trading risk stemming from the
process of saving mobilization and credit distribution. On the whole the basic
involvement of finance in the growth of an economy is that it can make trading goods
and services and the process of borrowing and lending less expensive and more
transparent, if the involved institutions are efficient.

The extent of the financial sector’s contribution to the efficiency of the economy as a
whole is connected to the degree of efficiency with which the financial system works.
1

The World Bank (1987) stated that one of the cornerstones of a growing economy is the
efficient use of resources. There are a number of implications arising from the
inefficient performance of financial institutions. First of all, when a firm is not efficient
the consequences will not only be for the firm’s profitability but also for its very
endurance in a competitive market. Inefficient firms will usually be driven out of the
market by more efficient firms and, in the long run, only efficient ones will survive.
Thus, as far as the management of a firm is concerned, it is essential to identify its
relative efficiency levels with regard to other firms’ performance in the market and to
the frontier of possibilities.

From a social point of view, a sub-optimal allocation of resources produces a ‘dead
weight’ loss, implying that society is consuming more resources than is technically
needed to attain the same level of output. In other words, more output can be produced
with the same magnitude of resources. Secondly, from a policy viewpoint, inefficiency
can give rise to waste of limited resources in the banking system itself, and in the way
such firms allocate funds more generally within the economy. This implies the necessity
robust monitoring role of financial institutions. The use of more efficient production
processes could result in higher growth rates and generate overall gains in the
productivity of these institutions and the economy as a whole.

1.2 Statement of the Problem and its Significance
This study is concerned with an in-depth assessment of financial sector efficiency and
productivity by means of employing different DEA-based TFP indices. The context of
this study is Iran, where no study has so far assessed the efficiency and productivity of
its financial institutions in a period when various economic reforms have been
2

introduced with the aim of improving the efficiency and productivity of financial
institutions. The importance of investigating the efficiency and productivity of Iran’s
banking system could be justified by the fact that, although Iran is a country that is
comparatively large and has experienced strong economic growth in recent years,
prospects for banking-system growth remain subdued. Iran has extremely rich mineral
resources, especially petroleum and natural gas. According to the World Factbook (CIA
2005), Iran has the third-largest proven oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia and
Canada, and the world's second-largest proven gas reserves after Russia. More recently,
until 2007 real GDP growth has been strong, averaging 6% since 2000-2001. Real GDP
expanded by 8% in 2007-2008 (CBI 2007a). However, the history of the Iranian
banking system, discussed in the next chapter, shows that there is considerable potential
to improve the performance of this sector.

Iranian banks are mainly state-owned (ten banks in total which include commercial
banks and specialised banks) supplemented by a small number of private banks (6
commercial banks). The Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran is also responsible
for the design and implementation of monetary and credit policies concerning the
general economic policy of the country. This bank is also entirely government owned.
All Iranian banks operate on Islamic principles. According to Asian Banker Research
(ABR, 2008), Iranian state-owned banks are among the largest Islamic banks in the
world. The state-owned banks have been the most successful in acquiring market share;
in contrast, most private banks only joined the market after 2001 and have not yet
caught up in market share with the government-owned banks.

3

During the last decade the industry has undergone extensive changes due to factors
including increased government regulation and technological advances. Changes in
policy have affected both state-owned and private banks. Generally, it appears that
state-owned banks were more noticeably affected by the Iranian government regulatory
initiatives launched in 2005, which obliged all banks to markedly reduce deposit and
loan interest rates. The government also imposed differing interest rates and conditions
on state-owned and private banks. For instance, state-owned banks were obliged to
assign higher priority in their lending operations to areas such as advanced technology
projects, small and medium enterprises, and housing projects for low income earners.
As a result, the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) of government-owned banks
increased dramatically after 2006. According to the Central Bank of Iran, CBI (2006),
the annual growth rate of government-owned banks’ NPLs was less than 30% before
2005; however, this figure increased markedly to 129% in 2006. CBI (2006) also stated
that the highest share of NPLs belonged to the manufacturing and mining (20.1%) and
construction (19.5%) sectors. Overall, it seems that political interference and a lack of
bank independence are the most long-standing problems in the system.

Thus, it is important to investigate the effect of government policies on the efficiency
and productivity of the Iranian banking industry. Despite a substantial number of studies
have been conducted on the efficiency and productivity of financial institutions in
various countries, only five studies have been carried out to assess the efficiency of the
Iranian banking system using the DEA approach. Only Hadian and Hosseini (2004) and
Hasanzadeh (2007) have compared the efficiency of Iranian banks, while other studies
of Iranian banks have only focused on the specific efficiency of bank branches, i.e.
Dadgar and Nemat (2007) and Hakimabadie et al. (2006). Hadian and Hosseini (2004)
4

examined the performance of 10 Iranian banks between 1997 and 1999, and their
empirical results revealed that the technical and allocative efficiency of specialised
banks was higher than that of commercial banks. Also, Hasanzadeh (2007) investigated
the technical efficiency of 14 banks between 1997 and 2003, and concluded that private
banks are in general more efficient than public banks which are owned by the
government (commercial and specialised banks). With regard to other studies that have
focused their analysis on the efficiency of specific branches, Haghighat and Nasiri’s
(2003) study of the Agriculture Bank, consisting of 172 branches, is the most
noteworthy. According to this study small and medium branches of this bank have
higher productivity than large branches, and most of them exhibited increasing returns
to scale for most of the years under study.

However, the existing literature has not paid adequate attention to empirical
investigation of the effects of this reform on the efficiency and productivity of the
Iranian banking industry during the pre- and post-regulation periods. Therefore, this
study makes an attempt to analyse the efficiency and productivity of Iran’s financial
institutions applying the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
methodology, which is one of the most widely used methods to analyse the efficiency
and management performance in decision-making units (DMUs). This technique
distinguishes between three different types of efficiency, namely technical, scale and
mix efficiencies, which other parametric methods fail to address. The DEA approach
also makes an overall and objectively determined efficiency index available that can be
used in the ranking of the DMUs. DEA does not hypothesise the functional form linking
inputs to outputs, instead, under this approach, one attempts to construct a production
possibility set from the units’ input-output correspondences which is enveloped by a
5

piecewise linear boundary. Hence, we run the risk of mis-specifying a model.
Furthermore, Sathye (2001) believes that DEA is a superior methodology in preference
to parametric ones, since it has been applied in prior studies when the sample size was
small. By comparing annual changes in the productivity of financial institutions, it is
possible to recognize discernable trends, if any, in the productivity of the banking
sector. The sources of productivity expansion, or degeneration, can be estimated by
decomposing the Malmquist and Hicks-Moorsteen TFP indices into their constituent
components, which indicate the extent to which the productivity change for each
institution is due to a shift in the efficient frontier or to a process of moving closer to, or
further away from, the efficient frontier.

Efficiency and productivity analysis has important ramifications not only for the
financial institutions themselves but also for regulatory authorities and ultimately for
society more broadly (Berger et al. 1993). Information obtained from such studies can
inform government policy makers by assessing the effects of various regulatory reforms
on the performance of these institutions. Management of these firms’ performance can
be enhanced by identifying the best and worst practices associated with high and low
efficiency, respectively.

1.3 Objectives of the Study
The main objective of this study is to conduct an empirical investigation of the banking
sector 1 in Iran, with a view to assessing their technical efficiency and productivity. By
investigating technical efficiency and productivity among financial institutions in Iran,
this study aims to address the following four questions:

1

The banking sector comprises commercial banks, specialised banks and private banks.

6

1) What is the mean efficiency score of financial institutions in Iran?
2) What is the total factor productivity change for Iran’s financial institutions?
3) Have financial reforms been successful in improving the performance of the
banking sector, and has the performance of Iranian banks become more efficient
after the regulatory changes?
4) What are the major sources of inefficiency in the context of Iran’s financial
institutions?
By answering and analysing these questions, some effective recommendations can be
made for policy makers and economic planners in Iran.

Accordingly, the first aspect of this study involves analysing the efficiency of financial
institutions in order to calculate their efficiency scores. This will provide answers as to
whether financial institutions in Iran are efficient or not, and how the regulatory changes
affected the efficiency of each sector. Second, this study explores the nature of
productivity changes by means of Bootstrapped Malmquist and Hicks-Moorsteen TFP
indices. Using these TFP indices, the productivity change over the period 2003-2008 is
measured, and changes in productivity are decomposed into efficiency changes and
technical changes. The main reasons these two different TFP indices have been used are
as follows; a) using these approaches, we can analyse the productivity changes under
VRS while the popular Malmquist indices assume Constant Returns to Scale (CRS); b)
the Bootstrapped Malmquist index gives us the opportunity to decompose technical
changes into changes of pure technology (frontier shifts), and changes in scale of
technology (changes in the shape of frontier), while using the traditional Malmquist
index one is unable to analyse these changes in the shape of technology; c) the HicksMoorsteen TFP index gives us this opportunity to decompose the efficiency changes
7

further into three different measures i.e. technical efficiency, scale efficiency and mix
efficiency changes. Through these decompositions, we will be able to identify the main
source of improvement or deterioration in the efficiency and, therefore, the productivity
levels of the financial institutions. By cross-tabulating efficiency scores to ownership
status (public versus private), the effect of ownership on the performance of the
financial institutions is also investigated.

1.4 Structure of the Study
This thesis is composed of seven chapters. Following the introductory chapter, the
remainder of this study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents an overview of
Iran’s banking system, including the history and development of this sector from its
beginning in 1890 to the present. This chapter starts by providing an overview of
financial institutions in Iran and by reviewing Iran’s financial development. Iran’s
financial development is also analysed together with some IMF studies which measure
Iran’s key financial indicators. The chapter concludes by reviewing a number of
important key indicators of Iran’s financial development such as: bank’s independence;
central bank claims on banks; non-performing loans; public debt; and the role of private
banks.

Chapter 3 contains a literature review canvassing the efficiency of financial institutions
in both developing and developed countries by summarising the most relevant and
frequently cited findings that contribute to an understanding of this study. In particular,
the literature review is divided into the following order: 1) financial sector efficiency
studies; 2) efficiency studies evaluating government policies; and 3) efficiency studies
addressing general research issues.
8

Chapter 4 discusses the methodology that is applied to extract and analyse the data. In
particular, this chapter presents a framework of measuring efficiency by the use of
DEA. The theoretical background of bootstrapped Malmquist and Hicks-Moorsteen
TFP indices, and how to measure them, is also reviewed in this chapter. The issue of the
specification of inputs and outputs employed in the evaluation of efficiency and
productivity, software, data and its sources is also discussed.

Chapter 5 reports the major results of the study. The results are analysed in a pattern
that is consistent with the methodology described in Chapter 4. In particular, the results
are classified into four main groups: first, the estimates of bootstrapped technical
efficiency scores for the banking sector and individual banks during the sample period
are described; second, using the bootstrapped Malmquist index, changes in productivity
over the period 2003-2008 are analysed, and its decompositions are also presented;
third, the technical efficiency, scale efficiency and mix efficiency scores of Iranian
banks are estimated using the Hicks-Moorsteen approach; and fourth, decomposition of
the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index is presented.

Chapter 6 presents the policy implications of the study. Policy recommendations in
accordance with this study are also highlighted in this chapter. The final chapter,
Chapter 7, summarises the study and the main findings from previous chapters. Specific
contributions made by this study and some limitations are outlined in this chapter. The
chapter concludes with some suggestions for future research.

9

1.5 Contributions of the Study
This thesis has made four significant empirical contributions to the analysis of
efficiency in financial institutions. First, this is the first study to address the issue of
efficiency and productivity in Iran’s financial institutions using DEA and TFP indices
for the period 2003-2008. In conducting an inclusive review, it was found that all
previous studies of Iranian banks failed to recognise the importance of market structures
(all have been conducted under CRS), productivity changes over time and the entry of
new private banks. Thus, this study conducts an in-depth assessment of banking sector’s
efficiency and productivity by means of adopting different techniques. This study has
employed a larger category of financial institutions than have other studies. The sample
data included in this study come from commercial banks, specialised banks and private
bank. All these categories were homogenous in terms of inputs and outputs and hence it
was possible to apply DEA methodology. Second, this is the first study to analyse
Iranian banking efficiency over a period riddled with significant financial reforms or
government interventions. Third, for the first time in a developing country, this study
employed a Bootstrapped Malmquist technique under VRS assumptions to analyse
efficiency and productivity changes in the banking industry. Finally, this study is the
first to use the new decomposition of the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index to analyse
efficiency and productivity changes in a banking context.
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Chapter Two
Background of Iranian Banking System

2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of Iran’s banking sector and its
evolution from its beginnings in 1890 to present. Iranian banks are mainly governmentowned banks supplemented by a small number of private banks, which include
commercial banks and specialised banks. Also, Bank Markazi Jomhori Islami Iran
(Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran) is responsible for the design and
implementation of monetary and credit policies with due regard to the general economic
policy of the country. 2 This bank is also entirely government owned. All Iranian banks
operate on Islamic principals. For a financial system to function well both the privateowned and government-owned banks should be efficient, productive and transparent in
their operations. Thus, in order to contextualise this study, it is important to review the
background of these institutions.

The importance of investigating the efficiency and productivity of Iran’s banking
system could be justified by the fact that, although Iran is a country that is
comparatively large and has experienced strong economic growth in recent years,
prospects for banking-system growth remain subdued. Iran has extremely rich mineral
resources, especially petroleum and natural gas reserves. According to the World
Factbook (WF, 2005), Iran has the third-largest proven oil reserves in the world after
Saudi Arabia and Canada, and the world's second-largest proven gas reserves after

2

To be discussed later in this chapter
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Russia. More recently real GDP growth has been strong, averaging 6% since 20002001. Real GDP expanded by 8% in 2007-2008 (CBI, 2007a). However, it seems that
there is considerable potential to improve the banking sector. The history of the Iranian
banking system shows that it has suffered from inefficiency from the beginning. Poor
management, political interference and a lack of bank independence are the most longstanding problems in the system.

The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides an overview of the
banking system in Iran. Section 2.3 presents the history and development of the banking
sector in Iran. Section 2.4 reviews Iran’s financial development, and finally, Section 2.5
presents some concluding remarks.

2.2 Overview of Iran’s Financial Institutions: 1890-Present
2.2.1 History and Development of the Banking Sector in Iran
According to Jones (1992), no banks existed in Iran before 1889, and only traditional
money borrowers (Sarrafs) provided some financial services. Between 1889 and 1928 a
British bank, called the Imperial Bank of Persia, served as the state bank and bank of
issue of Iran, and held an effective monopoly of the modern banking sector of the
country. The Bank was one of a large group of British overseas banks founded in the
nineteenth century which initiated banking and established branches all over Asia,
Australasia, Africa and South America (Jones, 1992).
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Jones (1992) stated that this bank was in fact the only modern bank in Iran by 1928,
apart from a Russian bank established in 1890. 3 Jones (1992) also mentioned that the
Imperial Bank of Persia had 24 branches in all the main Iranian cities, which assisted
retail and service markets; taking deposits, making advances, financing trade, and
dealing in foreign exchange. The bank also worked as the state bank, and its main duties
were issuing bank notes, importing silver for mintage into currency, keeping the
government's accounts and acting as a beneficiary of its profits, and making loans to the
government. However, it was not accountable for the implementation of monetary
policies. According to Jones (1986), the bank helped business enterprises by
encouraging a decrease in high traditional interest rates existing before 1914. Generally,
the bank had a significant and lasting effect on Iran’s banking system and contributed to
a modern banking system, facilitated trade, issued a paper currency; financed the
government; mobilized savings; and provided a cadre of skilled Iranian bankers.

Bostock and Jones (1998) explained that the establishment of the new Pahlavi Dynasty
by Reza Shah in the middle of the 1920s, was followed by attempts to modernize Iran.
In 1928 the first government-owned commercial bank (Bank Melli) was authorized to
act as Iran’s Central Bank. Consequently, the Imperial Bank lost its role as the state
bank, and in 1933 had to abandon its note-issuing powers. Consequently, the Imperial
Bank lost its market share very rapidly to Bank Melli and closed half its branches in the
1930s.

According to a Central Bank of Iran’s report (CBI, 2006b), due to the rapid expansion
of the banking network during the 1930s and 1940s, the banking system became one of
3 “Iran-Russia Loan Bank” was owned by the Tsar government of Russia which purchased the entire
shares of the bank. The bank was not successful in Iran and it finally ended its activities by the
government in 1922(CBI, 2006b).
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the fundamental foundations of the Iranian economy. The increasing number of banks
and development of banking activities required laws and regulations to supervise the
performance of banks and their direct banking operations. Thus, in 1953, “The Banking
Law” was prepared and the bill was approved by the joint commissions of the
parliament and the senate upon some revisions on 1955, and then was put into effect.

By the end of the 1950s, the need for an organization that would not be influenced by
competitive pressures which would carry out the functions of a central bank was
apparent. The following concerns were the main reasons for the establishment of an
independent central bank: “issuance of banknotes, provision of banking services for the
government, fostering the development of the money market; an organization not
involved in commercial activities that could adapt appropriate monetary, credit and
foreign currency policies with regard to the country’s general economic framework and
programs, mobilize financial resources, foster economic growth and address undesirable
shocks, and efficiently supervise banking activities” (CBI, 2006b, p.10). Consequently,
the first bill of the Banking and Monetary Act of Iran was approved in 1960, and a
state-owned central bank established to carry out appropriate activities for a five-year
experimental period.

The bill consisted of eighty-eight articles clarifying the Central Banks’ activities, and
separated the central banks’ functions, operations, and departments from that of Bank
Melli (the Banking and Monetary Act of Iran 1960). As a result, the central bank was
freed from its own commercial banking performance, but, was not independent in
setting monetary policies (Amuzegar, 1992). On account of some deficiencies in the
Banking and Money law of 1960, another Bill, the Banking and Monetary Act of Iran
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1972, was approved in 1972 (CBI, 2006b). Based on this law, the central bank was
responsible for regulating and putting into practice monetary and credit policy based on
the government’s general economic policy plan. Thus, the central bank is responsible to
provide the desired environment for economic growth of the country by implementing
appropriate monetary and credit policy, and to support government in accomplishing
stabilization and economic development programs (CBI, 2006b).

According to Mohammadi (2003), during the years just prior to the revolution in 1979,
Iran’s banking system extended quickly to meet the sharply increased volume of
internal and external trade that was created by the oil boom. Within a short period of
time, between 1972 and 1978, 10 new banks and 1291 branches of both old and new
banks were added to the banking system. By 1979 there were 36 banks (7 specialised
banks, 26 commercial banks, and 3 provincial banks) operating in Iran, including many
international jointly owned banks. However, the banking system was inadequately
experienced and capitalized to survive the bank runs of 1978–1979, when the
revolutionary movement imperilled the safety of depositors who started to withdraw
their assets from the banks (Mohammadi, 2003). Regrettably, as the literature in this
period is limited, it is not possible to provide a comprehensive view of the banking
system in the decade before the Islamic revolution.

Following the Islamic Revolution (1979) all banks and insurance companies were
nationalized. Amuzegar (1997) believes that this nationalization was because of two
main factors; Islamic republic ideology of controlling the economy’s authoritative
heights, and preventing a complete collapse of many private banks due to the transfer of
deposits abroad, problems in collecting huge debt, lack of public trust in banks, and the
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exodus of many of their owners and managers. Subsequently, the need of for powerful
supervision of the nationalized banks, achieving equality in granting credit facilities and
adopting a unified policy in other key areas, necessitated consolidation of the
nationalized banks. Therefore, in 1980 the 36 banks were merged into 9 banks that
included 6 commercial banks and 3 specialised banks. The total number of branches
was reduced from 8,275 to 6,581 by 1982 (CBI, 1990). Parallel with nationalization
studies were also made into the Islamization of the banking system, which concluded in
the reba-Free (no interest) Banking Law ratified by Parliament in 1983. As a result of
Islamization, the style of the banking system was changed from western-style to Islamic
banking, and foreign bank representative offices were all closed by 1980 (Amuzegar,
1997). 4

As a first step towards the liberalization of Iranian banking, the Money and Credit
Council authorized the establishment of Non-Banking Credit Institutions by the private
sector in May 1993 (EN, 2006). 5 They can be general or specialised (providing financial
services only for a specific economic sector). All standard banking products and
services can be offered by Credit Institutions with the exception that they are not
permitted to open current accounts, whose funds can be transferred through cheques.
Also, they are not permitted to issue cheque books. Currently, four private credit
institutions are providing financial services in Iran; Tose, Bonyad, Sina and Shahr. 6

4

Some branches of foreign banks were later re-opened for limited operations.
The Money and Credit Council was established in 1972. Making decisions pertaining to the general
guidelines of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and supervising monetary and banking affairs were its
responsibilities. It also was responsible for overseeing and approving the budget plan, employment
regulations and the CBI’s internal bylaws. Furthermore, the council was in charge of auditing the balance
sheet of the CBI and commenting on loans or credit guarantees and any other issues were referred to it by
the government. However, the government eliminated the Money and Credit Council in 2008 and the CBI
took on these responsibilities.
6
CBI website (2009), accessed 23/9/2009, http://www.cbi.ir/simplelist/1462.aspx.
5
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As a second step towards liberalization, the Iranian Parliament passed the Law on Free
Zone Banking in 1999. Accordingly, Iranian and foreign investors in Iran's Free Trade
Zones (Kish, Qeshm and Chabahar) can establish banking activities (EN, 2006).
Financial institutions can be listed in the form of banks, credit institutions and branches
of foreign banks. At this time, there are three branches of foreign banks in the Kish Free
Trade Zone.

The Iran-Europe Trade Bank was first inaugurated in Germany on January 2005 and
established a branch on Kish Island, southern Iran, with an initial capital of 160 Million
Euros. About 50% of the shares of the bank are owned by the Bank of Industry and
Mines, while Bank Mellat and Bank Tejarat account for a further 27% and 18% of
shares respectively with the remaining shares belonging to other banks including Bank
Refah. The British-based Standard Chartered Bank was the second bank to open a
branch in Kish in mid-2005. Standard Chartered Bank is a UK-based international bank
which is focused on the established and emerging markets of Asia, Africa, the Middle
East, the Subcontinent and Latin America. The Bahrain-based Future Bank, a joint
venture between Ahli United Bank, Bank Melli Iran and Bank Saderat, is the third one,
and which started its activities in 2007. These branches of foreign banks are considered
as brokers between the foreign banks and their branches in Iran. They carry out
operations required for international business in Kish Island.

As part of the third phase towards liberalization, the Parliament passed the
Establishment of Private Banks Act in April 2000 (EN, 2006). Legal entities whose
capital is owned in some way by the government, governmental companies, public
institutions or which are otherwise directly or indirectly run by the government were no
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longer allowed to own shares of private banks. In opposition to state-owned banks,
private banks are completely free in the allocation of their loans and have more
flexibility than the Central Bank has in setting interest rates on loans and deposits (EN,
2006).

Iran's banking system at the time of writing, is dominated by 11 state-owned
institutions, including seven commercial banks Melli (National Bank), Tejarat, Sepah,
Saderat, Mellat, Refah and Post Bank), four specialised banks (Tose Saderat (Export
Development Bank of Iran), Maskan (Housing Bank), Keshavarzi (Agriculture Bank),
and Sanato madan (Bank of Industry and Mines)), and six private banks (Parsian,
Pasargad, Eghtesad Novin, Saman, Sarmaye, and Karafarin). 7

Corresponding to the Fourth 5-Year Development Plan (2005 - 2010) all commercial
state-owned banks (except the National Bank and Sepah Bank) are scheduled for
privatization. 8 Accordingly, eighty per cent of the shares of these banks will be ceded to
the private sector, joint stock cooperative companies and non-state publicly-held
companies. These institutions will however, remain state-owned banks and under
government control. This might be a long-lasting process, as the authorities recognize
that state-owned banks will need additional capital and significant restructuring before
being sold (EN, 2006).

Besides the above-mentioned policies, the banking system and the overall economy
have also experienced other important policies, such as the unification of the exchange
rate, a significant reduction in official interest rates, and different monetary rules which
7
8

CBI website (2009), accessed 23/9/2009, http://www.cbi.ir/simplelist/1462.aspx.
Iran’s Fourth 5-Year Development Plan.
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will be discussed in this chapter. Iran's multi-tiered exchange rate system was replaced
by a unified single market driven exchange rate in 2002. The unified exchange rate led
to a temporary increase in the inflation rate, since the exchange rate subsidy on several
commodities was eliminated. Based on the above-mentioned evidence, the monetary
system has experienced a great deal of government interference and an unstable
environment which can weaken banks’ performance and management, and cause lower
efficiency in banks’ resource allocation (Rasoulof, 2008).

2.2.2 Islamic Banking Products
The pre-revolutionary banking system in Iran was dominated by western patterns and
practices. However, as discussed above, the law on Usury Free Banking Operations in
1983 was one of the main measures which effectively blocked foreign banking
operations from conducting business in Iran. The perceptions held about interest and
profit constitute the most basic elements defining Islamic finance, and, as such,
financial institutions in Iran.

2.2.2.1 Deposits
In line with Iranian laws and regulations, banks raise resources mainly through the
following two products:

Gharz-al-Hassaneh Accounts (Interest-Free Demand Deposits): these are in the form of
checking, time and savings accounts. There is no fixed-rate, guaranteed payment on
demand deposits. Holders of current accounts typically receive a cheque book, and use
these accounts chiefly to effect payment transactions. Banks offer incentives (up to 4%)

19

including one or several of the following; periodic prizes in cash or kind, service charge
discount, and priority in using banking facilities (EN, 2006).

Term Deposits (Investment Deposits): Banks are authorized to receive various kinds of
investment deposits; short-term (6 months) to long-term (1, 3 and 5 years). While banks
can use their capital together with Gharz-al-Hassaneh accounts, priority must be given
to investment deposits (depositor resources). The banks can also use a combination of
their own and depositor resources to provide facilities to their customers. The banks
guarantee the owners of term deposits their capital added to a “minimum return”. 9
Banks also charge a commission for their service. If deposits are withdrawn before the
minimum time required, no profits will be earned by depositors (EN, 2006).

However, both current and savings accounts are guaranteed, which does not completely
correspond to the views held by most Islamic researchers that the bank and the
depositors should share the risks (Ahmad and Kabir, 2007).

On the lending side, Iranian laws and rules divide banking products into two following
categories which are discussed in turn: participation contracts and constant profit
contracts.

2.2.2.2 Participation Contracts
Under Participation Contracts, the bank provides the funding required by its customer
(the whole or a part of) for a particular economic project. The profit of such activities is

9

Instead of the interest of the deposits.
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shared between the bank and the customer based on the terms of the related contract.
These contracts will be based on one of the following (EN, 2006):

1) Civil partnership: Under these contracts banks may become involved in a partnership
for a particular project, which will end with the completion of the project. The customer
co-invests in cash or kind. Profits for the project are shared. These types of contracts
can be in the sphere of production, commerce and service industry.

2) Legal partnership: Under legal partnership contracts, the bank grants part of the
capital of a new company, or takes a share in the enterprise’s equity of a company.
These contracts can be used in the fields of production, commerce and service industry.

3) Mozarebeh (Limited Trade Partnership): Under these contracts, the bank provides
initial funds which the customer uses for trading. Customers can be individuals and
companies. Usage of capital is limited to the field of trade and business.

4) Mozare'eh (Farm Leasing): Under these contracts, the bank leases farm land to the
customer (farmers) for a specified time. The farmers work on the farm land and related
profits are shared.

5) Mosaghat (Orchard Letting): Under these contracts, the owner of trees in a garden
(the bank) conveys maintenance and harvesting of the trees to fruit growers or other
farm entrepreneurs (the customers) and related profits are shared.
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2.2.2.3 Constant Profit Contracts
Under Participation Contracts, the bank provides the funding required by its customer
(the whole or a part of) for a particular economic project. As opposed to Participation
Contracts, the bank's profit is fixed as part of the contract, irrespective of the actual
profit or loss derived from the funded activity (EN, 2006).

Agsati (Instalment Sale) - Agsati is a contract whereby the bank first buys from
producers and then sells goods to the customer at a set price (on instalments at cost plus
profit under specific regulation).

Lease to Own (Lease with obligation to buy) – Under this contract it is agreed that the
lessee, if they meet the terms of the contract, will obtain the ownership of the leased
property at the end of the contract.

Forward Sales (Salaf) - This is a contract whereby the bank buys goods produced by
productive enterprises (the customers) paying the price in cash and receiving the goods
in the future.

Je'aleh (Service Contract) - Je'aleh refers to the obligation of a person (the customer) to
pay a specific sum or service fee in return for a certain favour as specified in the
contract. Thus, the bank provides the facilities required to develop a business, and is
allowed a service fee.
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Discounting - Banks are able to discount drafts and notes. Banks are also authorized to
use some of their own sources to make direct investments. These investments are not
regarded as facility, but work on the same principles as Participation Contracts.

In practice, the Islamization process of Iran’s banking system has not been as smooth as
banking reformers wished, and there has been a long debate about this matter among
reformer architects. “The framework for determining Sharia-compliance within the
Iranian banking system is not clearly defined as it is, for example, in Malaysia or the
GCC states” (BMI, 2009, p.18). 10 As a consequence the banks do not appear to have
separately constituted Sharia-boards, unlike Islamic banks in other countries. As the
interests of the deposits impair the role of Islamic principles in banking, the CBI
determines the annual “profit margins” instead of “interest”. Profit margins are based on
the profit-participation payments that are made by banks to depositors. Then again these
profits are also guaranteed, which does not fully correspond to the ideas held by the
majority of Islamic scholars that the bank and the depositors should share the risk of
investments.

Iranian banks are members of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), which prepares accounting, auditing, governance,
ethics and Sharia standards. However, Iranian institutions are absent from membership
of the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), which develops prudential standards for
Supervisory Review, Processes and Transparency/ Market Discipline (BMI, 2009).
After all, unlike in the rest of the Islamic world, the vast majority of the banking system
is owned by the government. Moreover, state ownership, sanctions imposed on Iran by
10

The GCC comprises six Persian Gulf states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and
Emirates.
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the US, and the lack of competition mean “that the Iranian banks do not have the levels
of sophistication attained by Islamic banks in other countries and, in particular,
Malaysia and Bahrain” (BMI, 2009, p.19).

2.3 Financial Development
2.3.1 Review of Iran’s Financial Development
The financial development index is a criterion for benchmarking performance and
evaluating priorities for reform in the banking sector. It is a many-sided concept,
encapsulating not only monetary aggregates and interest rates, but also regulation and
supervision, degree of competition, financial openness and institutional capacity. 11 A
number of international studies have provided a widespread review of the financial
development of different countries together with Iran, such as Creane et al. (2004),
Creane et al. (2007) and Beck et al. (2000). Because of the lack of literature on Iran’s
banking system, a summary of these studies can help in understanding Iran’s financial
development.

Creane et al. (2004) and Creane et al. (2007) conducted two comprehensive surveys for
the IMF in 2000-2001 and 2002-2003 to measure the financial development of 20
countries in the MENA region 12 including Iran. Creane et al. (2007) organized a survey
based on six themes, each of which is meant to capture a different aspect of financial
development: the development of the monetary sector and monetary policy, banking
11

Such as the strength of property rights, and the variety of markets and financial products that comprise
the financial structure of a nation.
12

The MENA region covers Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, the Syrian
Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.
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sector development, nonbank financial sector development, regulation and supervision,
financial openness, and institutional environment. Creane et al. (2007) developed
indices of financial sector development for the region and an alternative index with a
smaller set of variables for the world, to allow for comparability across regions and over
time.

Creane et al. (2007) then applied a comprehensive financial development index which is
a weighted average of the 35 different indicators. They assigned weights to each
indicator, and altered the set of weights assigned in various ways to check whether the
financial development index is robust to alternative weighting schemes. Creane et al.
(2007) grouped countries according to the composite index under five categories of
financial development (on a 0-10 point scale): very high (above 7.5), high (6.0–7.5),
medium (5.0–5.9), low (2.6–4.9), and very low (2.5 and below). The grouping of
countries into the five financial development categories was robust to the different
weighting schemes, although the relative ranking of countries within each grouping
changed slightly.

It was found that there is a considerable variation in the degree of financial development
within the MENA region. Some countries, such as Bahrain and Lebanon, were
reasonably well advanced, while a few others such as Iran, Libya and the Syrian Arab
Republic had significant room for improvement. As a group, MENA countries seemed
to perform relatively well on regulation and supervision as well as on financial
openness. However, they needed to do significantly more to strengthen the institutional
environment and develop the nonbank financial sector. Their findings showed that
corresponding to most other developing country regions, the MENA region performed
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well based on the alternative financial development index, but ranked far behind
industrialized countries and East Asia.

According to Creane et al. (2007), Iran’s scores were 1.6 for 2000-2001 and 2.5 for
2002-2003 among 20 MENA countries, corresponding to low levels of financial
development (see Table 2.1). Table 2.2 shows allocated scores for each theme for Iran
and other MENA countries. According to Table 2.2, Monetary Sector and Policy in Iran
is very lowly situated, with Iran and Libya having the lowest scores (0.5) in the region.
Monetary sector and policy consists of the following variables: Ratio of M2 to GDP,
indirect instruments of monetary policy, credit controls and directed credit, interest rate
liberalization, and Government securities. After this theme the Banking Sector stands at
the next lowest level based on six indices (1.9), indicating poor performance of the
banking system in the following areas: profitability, privatization, concentration in the
banking sector, interest rate spreads, presence of foreign banks, deposit money bank
assets/ banking sector assets, and reserve ratio.

The quality and extent of Banking Regulation and Supervision have the highest score
among all the indices. This theme tends to be relatively more highly ranked in all the
MENA countries. As mentioned by Creane et al. (2007), financial development, in
general, tends to be higher where banks comply with Basel (2004) capital adequacy
requirements (CAR). 13 Those banks which follow this must comply with the Basel
CAR. Iranian banks are also restructuring their financial management in line with the

13

The Capital adequacy ratio is the ratio which determines the capacity of a bank in terms of meeting its
time liabilities and other risk such as credit risk, market risk, operational risk, and others. It is a measure
of how much capital is available to support the banks' risky assets.
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Basel Ι Accord 14, and preparing the grounds for customization and implementation of
the Basel II Accord (CBI, 2009). 15 The index of Quality of Banking Regulation and
Supervision measures non-performing loans, independence of the central bank, Basel
capital adequacy ratio requirements, prudential monitoring of banks, transparency and
availability of financial and monetary data. This index of the banking system indicates a
medium situation (4.7).

Table 2.1: MENA Countries: Comprehensive Financial Development Index.
Countries
2000-2001
2002-2003
Bahrain
7.5
7.7
Lebanon
7.0
7.0
Jordan
6.8
6.9
Kuwait
6.7
6.8
United Arab Emirates
6.6
6.6
Saudi Arabia
6.2
6.4
Pakistan
4.8
6.0
Oman
5.9
5.9
Qatar
5.6
5.7
Tunisia
4.8
5.6
Morocco
4.8
5.5
Egypt
5.5
5.4
Sudan
3.3
4.7
Djibouti
3.3
4.1
Yemen, Republic of
3.8
3.9
Mauritania
3.2
3.5
Algeria
3.5
3.2
Iran, Islamic Rep. of
1.6
2.5
Syrian Arab Republic
1.2
1.1
Libya
1.2
1.0
Average
4.7
5.0
Note: Scale: 0–10; Very low = 2.5 and below, Low = 2.6-4.9, Medium = 5.0-5.9, High = 6.0-7.5, Very
high = above 7.5. The comprehensive financial development index of Creane et al. (2007) is a weighted
average of the 35 different indicators. For a detailed explanation of the indices see Creane et al.
(2004;2007).
Source: Creane et al. (2004) and Creane et al. (2007).

14

Basel I: International accord on capital measurement and capital standards, first proposed in 1988 by
the Basel Supervisory Committee.
15
Basel II: Basel II is the second of the Basel Accords, covering international convergence of capital
measurement and capital standards approved in 2004 by the Basel Supervisory Committee, proposed for
implementation from the beginning of 2008.
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Table 2.2: MENA Countries: Different Financial Development Indices.

Countries
Bahrain
Lebanon
Jordan
Kuwait
United
Arab
Emirates
Saudi
Arabia
Pakistan
Oman
Qatar
Tunisia
Morocco
Egypt
Sudan
Djibouti
Yemen,
Republic
of
Mauritania
Algeria

Financial
Development
Index

Banking
Sector1

Nonbank
Financial
Sector2

Regulation
and
Supervision

7.7
7.0
6.9
6.8

7.3
8.7
7.1
7.4

5.0
3.3
6.3
5.0

9.3
7.7
8.7
8.0

Monetary
Sector
and
Policy3
7.8
8.3
6.5
6.6

6.6

7.9

5.0

6.7

6.4

7.8

3.3

6.0
5.9
5.7
5.6
5.5
5.4
4.7
4.1

5.8
6.1
6.8
7.7
5.6
6.0
5.7
3.8

3.9
3.5
3.2

Financial
Openness

Institutional
Environment

4

5

8.0
7.0
8.0
8.0

8.9
5.2
5.4
5.4

5.8

8.0

5.9

8.0

6.4

8.0

4.2

6.3
5.0
0.7
4.7
4.7
6.3
0.7
1.3

7.7
8.3
6.7
5.3
7.3
5.3
3.7
5.0

7.4
4.2
5.7
4.5
6.8
5.6
6.2
6.0

4.0
8.0
8.0
5.0
4.0
6.0
7.0
7.0

3.9
4.8
6.3
5.0
3.8
3.2
4.5
2.0

4.1

0.7

3.3

5.0

9.0

2.2

3.8
2.5

0.7
3.0

3.0
3.5

3.9
4.4

5.0
4.0

4.5
2.3

Iran,
2.5
1.9
3.3
4.7
0.5
4.0
2.4
Islamic
Rep. of
Syrian
Arab
1.1
1.9
0.7
0.0
0.9
0.0
2.4
Republic
Libya
1.0
1.3
0.7
2.0
0.5
0.0
1.0
Average
5.0
5.5
3.3
5.7
5.1
5.9
4.2
Notes:
Scale: 0–10; Very low = 2.5 and below, Low = 2.6-4.9, Medium = 5.0-5.9, High = 6.0-7.5, Very high =
above 7.5.
1. The banking sector index covers different indices for profitability, privatization, concentration in the
banking sector, interest rate spreads, presence of foreign banks, deposit money bank assets/ banking
sector assets, and reserve ratio.
2. The nonbank financial sector theme explores whether nonbank financial institutions are present.
The banking regulation and supervision index includes variables such as non-performing loans,
independence of the central bank, Basel capital adequacy ratio requirements, prudential monitoring of
banks, transparency and availability of financial and monetary data.
3. The monetary sector and policy index consists of the following variables: Ratio of M2 to GDP, indirect
instruments of monetary policy, credit controls and directed credit, interest rate liberalization, and
Government securities.
4. The financial openness theme evaluates whether there are noteworthy restrictions on the trading of
financial assets or currency by foreigners or residents and whether the currency exchange system operates
smoothly and is comparatively free of interventions.
5. The institutional environment theme tries to evaluate the quality of institutions that are relevant to the
financial system.
Source: Creane et al. (2004) and Creane et al. (2007).
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Creane et al. (2007), also developed an alternative approach which is a simpler index
based exclusively on a few widely available quantitative data series, followed by an
index developed by Beim and Calomiris (2001). This alternative index enables analyses
of the development of financial systems within MENA countries over a longer period.
They also compared the MENA region to other regions.

Using Principal Components Analysis 16 (PCA), four variables commonly cited in the
literature as measures of financial development were combined: (1) ratio of broad
money (M2) to GDP; (2) ratio of the assets of deposit money banks to assets of the
central bank plus deposit money banks; (3) reserve ratio; and (4) ratio of credit to the
private sector by deposit money banks to GDP. These variables evaluate the size of the
financial sector, the importance and relative ease with which banks provide funds, and
the degree to which funds are provided to the private (as against the public) sector.
Also, Creane et al. (2007) averaged the data in 10-year panels to attain observations for
the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s to stabilize business cycle fluctuations across
trends. All scores were rescaled in the range of 0 to 10, with higher scores
corresponding to higher levels of financial development (see Table 2.3).

A comparison of the Comprehensive and Alternative Indices indicated that there is a
positive correlation in the values for the two indices across MENA countries. Moreover,
the rankings of MENA countries in financial development, under both the
comprehensive and the alternative indices, were tightly close to each other. The
alternative index shows that MENA countries mainly experienced financial
development during the 1960s to the 1990s. However, in the 1990s, a few countries
16

PCA was applied to generate an alternative set of weights. In this area, PCA examines the statistical
correlations across scores on the different indicators, and allocates the largest weights to those indicators
of financial development most correlated with the other indicators in the data set.
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experienced political instability or conflict which resulted in a deterioration of the
index.

Overall, the MENA region graded well below industrialized countries in financial
development, but above most other developing country regions. Except for sub-Saharan
African countries, financial development in all other regions has progressed
significantly more rapidly than in most of the MENA countries. Some MENA countries
such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia have achieved important advances in
financial development since the 1960s. In the remaining countries, the level of financial
development over these four decades has improved only slightly or, as in the cases of
Iran and Sudan, declined.

Finally, it is recommended by Creane et al. (2007) that one of the challenges for MENA
policymakers in moving away from financially repressive policies will be to create an
enabling structural environment for financial development, including reduced
government intervention in credit allocation and strengthened institutional quality,
particularly of the legal system. It is suggested that efforts should be concentrated where
financial development appears to have been the weakest. For some countries, such as
Iran, this means less governmental involvement in the financial system, including
cutting back on public ownership of financial institutions, minimizing monetary
financing of budget deficits, enhancing competition, investing in human resources,
promoting nonbank financial development, and strengthening the legal environment.
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Table 2.3: Alternative Financial Development Index, 1960s–90s.
Countries and Regions
1960s
1970s
Algeria
2.4
4.2
Egypt
1.7
1.9
Iran, Islamic Rep. of
3.8
3.3
Jordan
3.1
3.7
Kuwait
...
…
Lebanon
5.1
6.7
Mauritania
2.4
2.7
Morocco
2.6
2.8
Oman
…
2.6
Pakistan
2.7
2.9
Qatar
…
…
Sudan
2.5
2.1
Syrian Arab Republic
2.2
1.9
Tunisia
3.3
3.8
United Arab Emirates
…
2.9
Yemen, Republic of
…
…
MENA
2.9
3.3
Industrial countries
3.9
4.6
East Asia
1.8
2.9
Latin American and
2.4
2.9
Caribbean
South Asia
1.6
1.7
Sub-Saharan Africa
2.3
2.5
Source: Creane (2007, p.509).
Note: Scale: 0–10 where 0 is lowest and 10 is the highest.

1980s
5.0
3.5
2.4
5.3
5.7
9.6
3.0
3.0
2.8
3.0
…
1.5
1.8
4.5
3.8
…
3.9
5.1
4.1

1990s
2.7
3.8
2.4
5.4
5.0
6.4
2.6
4.0
3.3
3.1
4.2
0.9
2.3
4.8
4.3
1.3
3.5
5.9
5.7

3.0

3.4

2.4
2.3

2.7
2.1

Another IMF study by Beck et al. (2000) introduced a new database of indicators of
financial development and structure across countries and over time, using the IMF's
International Financial Statistics (IFS) to construct these indicators. The study was
updated and expanded on May 2009 covering the period between 1960 until 2007 and
consisting of more than 200 countries including Iran (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009).
They provide a variety of indicators that measure the size, activity and efficiency of
financial intermediaries and markets. A set of measures evaluate the size and activity of
central banks, deposit money banks and other financial institutions in relation to each
other and in relation to GDP. 17 The size indicators were divided into two groups; first,
relative size indicators to measure the importance of the financial sectors relative to

17

Other Financial Institutions are defined as a group of Insurance companies, Private Pension and
Provident Funds, Bank like Institutions, and Pooled Investment Schemes.
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each other (Central Bank, deposit money banks and other financial institutions); and
second, the absolute size indicators to measure their size relative to GDP.

The relative indicators are Central Bank Assets to Total Financial Assets, Deposit
Money Bank Assets to Total Financial Assets, and Other Financial Institution Assets to
Total Financial Assets. 18 Also, to analyse the relative importance of deposit money
banks in relation to central banks, another measure was applied. This indicator equals
the ratio of deposit money bank assets and the sum of deposit money and central bank
assets, and has been applied as a measure of financial development in many studies such
as King and Levine (1993a), King and Levine (1993b) and Levine, Levine et al. (1999).

Regarding absolute size measures, three indicators were introduced: Central Bank
Assets to GDP, Deposit Money Bank Assets to GDP, and Other Financial Institution
Assets to GDP. These indicators measure the importance of the performance of
financial services by the three financial sectors, relative to the size of the economy. The
assets consist of claims on the entire non-financial real sector, with government, public
enterprises and the private sector. Also, they include another measure of absolute size
based on liabilities. This measure is liquid liabilities to GDP and equals currency plus
demand and interest-bearing liabilities of all financial sectors (banks and other financial
intermediaries) divided by GDP. Liquid liabilities is a traditional measure of financial
depth and measures the overall size of the financial sector, without classifying different
types of financial sectors or uses of liabilities.

18

Total Financial Assets are described as the sum of central bank, deposit money bank and other financial
institutions assets.
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More than 20 indicators are applied to analyse these sectors. As shown in Figure 2.1,
the central bank has lost relative importance gradually from 1980 to 2007, whereas
other deposit money banks have gained relative importance with higher asset ratios.
Deposit money banks are now bigger than the central bank and other financial
institutions combined in Iran using this measure. This figure also shows that Central
Bank Assets to Total Financial Assets increased during the 1960s to the 1970s reaching
36% in 1970, and then decreased to 24% by 1997. This ratio increased again in the
1980s. However, Central Bank Assets to Total Financial Assets decreased steadily in
the 1990s, and further to 15% in 2005. The ratio of deposit money bank assets to central
bank and deposit money bank assets increased over time (except 1993-1996) and stood
at 80% by the end of 2005. All of these ratios experienced a significant change in 2002,
because of the exchange rate unification policy in this year which resulted in a
significant rise of central bank foreign assets. 19 According to Economic Report and
Balance Sheet (CBI, 2004, p.65), “the main reason for the rise in CBI’s net foreign
assets was the enhancement in foreign exchange reserves of the CBI as a result of
foreign exchange purchases from the government as envisaged in the budget.” The
foreign assets of the central bank increased by 101.6% in 2004 (CBI, 2004).

19

The unification of the exchange rate has also boosted monetary growth, further adding to inflationary
pressures (CBI, 2004).
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Figure 2.1: Relative Size Indicators – Central Bank vs. Deposit Money Banks and
other Financial Institutions.
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Source: Compiled by the author based on Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).

Two absolute size measures; Deposit Money Bank Assets to GDP, and Other Financial
Institution Assets to GDP, indicated almost the same fluctuations by 2002. After this
year, the ratio of Deposit Money Banks to GDP increased significantly from 0.203 in
2002 to 0.354 in 2007. This growth shows an increasing importance of the performance
of financial services by the deposit money banks (see Figure 2.2, and Table 2.4). The
ratio of Financial Institution Assets to GDP improved steadily after 2002. Liquid
Liabilities (M2) to GDP also rose slowly after 2004 (see Figure 2.2 and Table 2.4).
However, the ratio of Central Bank Assets to GDP fell considerably after 2003. Overall,
these measures show that the importance of deposit money banks services increased
during the period 2002-2007 (diverse from the Central bank) which is a positive sign for
the banking system.
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Figure 2.2: Absolute Size Indicators: Central Bank vs. Deposit Money Banks and
other Financial Institutions, and M2/GDP, 1997-2007.

Source: Compiled by the author based on Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).

To measure the activity of financial institutions and also to distinguish whether the
claims of financial intermediaries are in the public or the private sectors, Beck and
Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) measured two indicators concentrating on the private banks;
private credit by deposit money banks to GDP, and private credit by deposit money
banks and other financial institutions to GDP. The former includes claims on the private
sector by deposit money banks divided by GDP, while the later equals claims by both
deposit money banks and other financial institutions. These measures concentrate on
credit issued by intermediaries apart from the central bank, and measure the activity of
financial intermediaries in one of their most important functions; channelling savings to
investors. As shown in Table 2.4, these indicators show that Iran’s deposit money banks
have improved using this measure during the last decade. Moreover, they are
significantly more active than other financial institutions.
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In terms of the efficiency of commercial banks, Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009)
introduced two measures to capture this: Net Interest Margin (NIM) and Overhead Cost
(OC). The first one equals the accounting value of a bank's net interest income on total
assets, and the second equals the accounting value of a bank's overhead costs as a share
of its total assets. As shown in Figure 2.3, Overhead Costs decreased steadily after
2000. However, the NIM declined dramatically after 2000. On the topic of productivity,
Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) measured two indicators of productivity: Return on
Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). ROA is determined by dividing net income
by total assets, while ROE is determined by dividing net income by total equity. As
shown in Figure 2.3, both of these indicators show that the productivity of the financial
system decreased significantly after 2004. However, the mentioned measures are basic
and simplistic indicators of efficiency and productivity. In this study, a robust analysis
using DEA will be provided.

Figure 2.3: Efficiency Indicators of Iranian Banks, 1997-2006.
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Source: Compiled by the author based on Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).
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Figure 2.4: Iran’s Banks Productivity Indicators, 1997-2006.
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Source: Compiled by the author based on Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).

Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) also applied a concentration measure to identify
market concentration. This includes the ratio of the three largest banks’ assets to total
banking sector assets. Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) believe that this ratio has
importance in two ways. First, a highly concentrated commercial banking sector might
result in lack of competitive pressure to attract savings and channel them efficiently to
investors. Second, a highly fragmented market might be evidence of undercapitalized
banks. As can be seen in Figure 2.5, this measure has decreased during the last decade,
particularly after the entrance of private banks in 2001. However, this measure is still
very high, with about 70% of total assets belonging to the three largest banks which all
are government-owned banks; Bank Melli, Saderat Bank, and Mellat Bank (in 2006).
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Figure 2.5: Iran’s Financial Market Concentration, 1997-2006.
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Source: Compiled by the author based on Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).

As the stock and bond markets are a main component of financial markets, Beck and
Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) also measured the size and activity of stock and bond markets.
The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP is used as an indicator of the size of the
stock market. To measure the activity of the stock market, the ratio of stock market total
value traded to GDP is applied. It is defined as the total value of shares traded on the
stock market exchange divided by GDP. Also, as another indicator of the activity of the
stock market, they use the stock market turnover ratio, which is defined as the ratio of
the value of total shares traded and market capitalization. It measures the activity or
liquidity of a stock market relative to its size. Accordingly, a small but active stock
market will have a high turnover ratio whereas a large, on the contrary, less liquid stock
market will have a low turnover ratio. According to these measures the performance of
Iran’s stock market weakened significantly after 2004, and these changes can be seen in
Figure 2.6. The three mentioned ratios increased significantly after 2001. However, they
decreased during a period between 2004 and 2006. After 2006, the stock market
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turnover ratio and the ratio of stock market total value traded to GDP increased. Thus
these changes indicate that the performance of this market has improved relatively.
Figure 2.6: Three Main Indicators of Iran’s Stock Market, 1998-2007.
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Source: Compiled by the author based on Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).

Table 2.4: Different Indicators of Iran’s Financial Development (Ratios), 19972007.
Table 2.4 Continued
Year
Central bank
assets/total
financial
assets
Deposit
money bank
assets/total
financial
assets
Other
financial
assets/total
financial
assets
Deposit
Money Bank
Assets /
(Deposit
Money +
Central) Bank
assets

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

0.442

0.447

0.384

0.327

0.261

0.284

0.242

0.188

NA

NA

NA

0.413

0.393

0.439

0.466

0.519

0.503

0.558

0.615

NA

NA

NA

0.146

0.161

0.177

0.208

0.220

0.214

0.200

0.197

NA

NA

NA

0.483

0.468

0.533

0.588

0.665

0.639

0.698

0.766

0.803

0.833

0.860
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Table 2.4 Continued
Year

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Liquid
Liabilities /
GDP

0.369

0.400

0.366

0.332

0.358

0.329

0.344

0.334

0.343

0.353

0.376

Central Bank
Assets / GDP

0.209

0.204

0.183

0.144

0.123

0.109

0.116

0.095

0.079

0.067

0.064

Deposit
Money Bank
Assets / GDP

0.168

0.185

0.184

0.183

0.208

0.203

0.236

0.262

0.288

0.305

0.354

0.057

0.070

0.075

0.078

0.090

0.086

0.092

0.088

0.097

0.109

0.118

0.162

0.179

0.173

0.172

0.199

0.196

0.226

0.249

0.276

0.292

0.334

0.217

0.247

0.245

0.247

0.287

0.280

0.315

0.334

0.369

0.399

0.449

Bank Deposits
/ GDP

0.324

0.350

0.319

0.289

0.317

0.298

0.312

0.305

0.315

0.325

0.349

Financial
System
Deposits /
GDP

0.339

0.373

0.344

0.314

0.347

0.330

0.350

0.346

0.366

0.385

0.412

Bank Credit /
Bank Deposits

0.506

0.517

0.570

0.617

0.639

0.679

0.765

0.862

0.886

0.910

1.001

ROA (Return
on Assets)

0.008

0.005

0.019

0.033

0.052

0.048

0.052

0.044

0.026

0.027

NA

ROE (Return
on Equity)

0.101

0.077

0.094

0.135

0.165

0.198

0.366

0.405

0.240

0.242

NA

Concentration

1

0.978

0.968

0.968

0.951

0.945

0.753

0.745

0.718

0.691

NA

Other
Financial
Institution
Assets / GDP
Private Credit
by Deposit
Money Banks
/ GDP
Private Credit
by Deposit
Money Banks
and Other
Financial
Institutions /
GDP

Source: Compiled by the author based on Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).
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2.3.2 Other Indicators for Analysing Iran’s Financial Development
Besides the evidence provided above, other indicators can be used to identify the
significance of the financial sector in Iran. These areas are: bank independence, central
bank claims on banks, non-performing loans, public debt, and the role of private banks.

2.3.2.1 Evaluation of Bank’s Independence
The history of Iran’s banking system reveals that the central bank is not truly
independent and regulation is inadequate. As a result, the ability of banks to manage
their credit policies, specifically in government-owned banks, is limited. For instance,
because of the implementation of new rules on interest rates and lending operations,
government-owned banks are obliged to prioritize incomplete projects and to provide
capital for productive units (export sector, entrepreneurial projects, and technology
investments) (CBI, 2009, Article 9). Also, government-owned banks are obliged to give
priority in their lending operations to less developed regions: Mehr Housing Project 20,
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and advanced technology projects. Based on an
executive by-law approved in 2005for supporting the expansion of SMEs, the banking
system was obliged to allocate up to 20 per cent of its credits to SMEs (CBI, 2005b).
This percentage was extended to 35% in 2006 and 50% in 2007-2009. These directed
facilities were valued at Rls. 180 trillion in 2006 and Rls. 168 trillion by the end of 2007
(CBI, 2007a). However, Iran’s SMEs are very underdeveloped and these sorts of
investments, without an appropriate infrastructure, can increase the level of credit risk
(through inefficient allocation of resources) and mismanagement in the banking system.

20

Government commissioned agent banks offer loans to real estate developers to prepare land and begin
construction projects in an attempt to increase home availability for low income people (CBI, 2005b).
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Direct government obligations subject to a low deposit and loan interest rate, is further
evidence of the lack of in dependence of the Central Bank. According to Komijani
(2008), the government has employed this policy in a high inflation situation, and, as a
result, this has led to financial repression in Iran’s economy. Financial repression can be
generally defined as a set of government legal restrictions, like interest rate ceilings,
compulsory credit allocation and high reserve requirements, that generally prevent
financial intermediaries from functioning at their full capacity level. Hence, under a
negative real interest rate a form of financial repression is currently happening in Iran’s
economy, and it can affect financial intermediation and economic growth. Under this
situation, people invest their money in other markets. Table 2.5 and Figure 2.7 show the
increased negative interest rate in recent years.

Table 2.5: Inflation Rate, Nominal and Real Interest Rate Changes, 1991-2008.
Real interest rates
Change, %
1991
12.5
20.4
-7.9
1992
13.5
24.6
-11.1
1993
16.5
22.9
-6.4
1994
17
35
-18
1995
18
49.5
-31.5
1996
18
23.1
-5.1
1997
18
17.4
0.6
1998
18
18.1
-0.1
1999
18
20.1
-2.1
2000
18
12.6
5.4
2001
17.5
11.4
6.1
2002
16.5
15.8
0.7
2003
16.5
15.6
0.9
2004
16.5
15.2
1.3
2005
16
12.1
3.9
2006
14
13.6
0.4
2007
12
18.6
-6.6
2008
12
25.4
-13.4
Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various Years).
Years

Nominal interest rates, average

Inflation Rates
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Figure 2.7: Nominal and Real Interest Rate Changes 1991-2008.
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Source: CBI Compiled by the author based on CBI Economic Reports and Balance
Sheets (various Years).

However, according to IHS Global insight (2007, p.20) fear of military attack,
economic sanctions, worsening trade and financial relations with Europe, and strong
growth of housing prices, have already adversely affected other financial markets like
Iran’s stock market. As shown in Figure 2.8, prior to 2005 the stock market performed
well and the stock market turnover ratio increased significantly, but it has suffered a
severe decline in the past four years and experienced inefficiency after 2004. At the
same time because of high demand and profitability in the property and construction
market and particularly in the private residual accommodation, investors have turned
their attention to the real estate market, which was stagnant for the past few years before
2005 but housing prices have sharply increased between 2005 and 2007. According to
the CBI (2007a, p.7) the significant growth of investment in new buildings in urban
areas was largely due to the benign outlook for the housing market and increase in
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construction costs” during this period. Table 2.6 and Figure 2.9 show the strong growth
of building completions by the private sector in urban areas after 2001.
One may argue that the evidence mentioned above suggests that the lack of
independence of the central bank and other banks have resulted in the implementation
of financial policies that pay inadequate attention to their impact on the sensitivity of
financial markets and the current market structure. In general, these sorts of policies
increase market risk and lead to higher volatility in asset markets and adversely affect
the efficiency of financial institutions. This emphasizes the importance of our study, to
analyse the performance of the banking system in the period before and after the
regulations. As mentioned previously, the government has recently decided to privatize
government-owned banks, hence an evaluation of government interference in regulation
of the banks can provide results to assist policy makers in controlling financial market
volatility.

Table 2.6: Changes of Residential Building Completions 2001-2008, Per cent
Change.
Years
Building completions
2001
116984
2002
134837
2003
154254
2004
157462
2005
146000
2006
167689
2007
246823
2008
205,214
Source: Compiled by the author based on NPHC (various Years).
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Change, %
--0.152611
0.144004
0.020797
-0.07279
0.148555
0.471909
-0.16858

Figure 2.8: Stock Market Turnover Ratio, 1998-2007.
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Figure 2.9: Residential Building Completions, 2001-2008.
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Source: Compiled by the author based on NPHC (various Years).

2.3.2.2 Public Debt
Public debt in the banking system, including government and government-owned
institutional debt, increased from Rls. 65916 billion in 1996 to Rls. 280639 billion in
2007 (see Table 2.7). This expansion of banks’ claims raises the monetary base and
subsequently leads to a larger increase in the money supply and inflation. According to
Rasoulof (2008), not only can it decrease banks’ ability to make loans, but also banks
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can not comply with international standards like CAR in the Basel Accord. He argues
that the low capital adequacy ratio of government-owned banks is largely due to this
public debt. Table 2.7 shows the public debt values (in billion rials) to the central bank
and other banks between 1996 and 2007. Figure 2.10 also shows this stable increase in
banks’ claims on the public sector. As can be seen from Figure 2.10 this amount is
increased steadily between 2002 and 2005, and increased considerably after 2005.

Table 2.7: Claims of Government and Government-owned Institutions, (Billion of
Rials).
Years

Central bank

Other banks

Total

1996

51907

14009

65916

1997

59045

21659

80704

1998

72908

37068

109976

1999

75866

41250

117116

2000

75118

47667

122785

2001

82358

56100

138458

2002

131569

74648

206217

2003

136041

85860

221901

2004

132362

103579

235941

2005

123212

112395

235607

2006

131432

124788

256220

2007

131759

148877

280639

Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Reports on the Performance of Iran’s Banking System
(various years).

46

Figure 2.10: Total Public Debt, 1996-2007, Billion of Rials.
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Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Reports on the Performance of Iran’s Banking System
(various years).

2.3.2.3 Role of Private Banks in the Banking Sector
As mentioned before, one of the biggest reforms that the CBI has introduced to date is
the licensing of private banks after 2001 in an effort to increase competition and
diversification in the banking industry. To analyse the financial development of the
private banks, two vital ratios related to these banks can be considered: Private Banks’
deposits/ Total deposits in the banking system, and Private Banks’ claims on the nonpublic sector/ Total claims on the non-public sector. Tables of bank assets,
concentration, credits, and deposits of all Iranian banks are included for the purpose of
comparing the performance of them individually.

As shown in Table 2.8, the ratio of private banks’ deposits to total deposits in the
banking system increased significantly from 0.3 % in 2000 to 23.8% in 2008. This ratio
has been doubling each year since 2000 until 2005. According to the CBI (2007a) the
increase in the deposit level of private banks was mainly attributable to: the higher
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deposit rates they offered compared with that of public banks, increase of public
confidence in private banks, and the low attractiveness of investment in other markets
such as the Stock Exchange. 21 Also, as reported in the CBI (2006a), the reduction in the
provisional profit rate of participation papers was another reason from this increase
together with all the above mentioned reasons. The ratio of Private Banks’ claims on the
non-public sector divided by total claims on the non-public sector also increased
considerably from 0.2% in 2000 to 19.9% in 2008. Therefore, both of the provided
ratios indicate a significant increase for the private banks in Iran’s banking sector, over
this time. However, the contribution of private banks to the financial system is still
significantly lower than their state-owned counterparts.

Table 2.8: Ratio of Private Banks in Iran’s Banking Sector, 2000-2007.
Ratios
Private banks’
deposits/Total deposits
in the banking system.

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

0.3

0.7

1.6

3.4

7.0

12.0

15.7

19

23.8

0.5

1.2

3.8

6.9

10.8

13.4

16.1

19.9

Private banks’ claims
on the non-public
0.2
sector/Total claims on
the non-public sector.
Source: CBI (2008), Table 7.

In Table 2.9, the asset size of all banks is shown. Also, in order to simplify data
presentation, a ranking-table is provided (Table 2.10). Table 2.10 includes the ranking
of banks by total size in each year for a period between 1998 and 2007. As can be seen
in this table, five government-owned banks (out of seven government-owned banks)
have the highest level of assets in the market; National Bank, Sepah, Saderat, Tejarat,
and Mellat. The National bank has been the first in ranking during this period, and its

21 This has been discussed in section 2.3.2.1 Evaluation of Bank Independence.
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size is significantly greater than that of other Iranian banks. After the National Banks,
Saderat and Mellat banks have been mostly the second and third ranked respectively,
and, Tejarat Bank has been consistently the forth ranked. Refah Bank’s size has been
lower than that of the previously mentioned banks, but higher than that of Post Bank.
The Post Bank is significantly smaller than that of the other government and privateowned banks. This is due to the fact that the Post Bank was introduced as a state-owned
bank only in 2006. Before this the Post Bank had been performing as a financial Post
organization and rendering banking services via a postal network.

Among the specialised banks, Bank Keshavarzi (Agriculture Bank) and Bank Maskan
(Housing Bank) have the highest level of assets, respectively. Tose Saderat (Bank of
Export Development) ranked the last in 2007. Regarding private banks, Bank Parsian
has been the largest bank after 2004. This bank ranked 8th and Eghtesad Novin Bank
ranked 9th in 2007 among all Iranian banks. All private banks have been growing at a
considerable pace and their size has been doubling each year since inception. However,
the size of private banks is significantly smaller than that of the government-owned
commercial banks.

To measure the bank concentration index, a ratio of total assets of the three largest
banks in Iran to the total assets in the banking system in each year is calculated. As
shown in Table 2.11 the 3-bank concentration measure has decreased gradually during
the period 1998-2007, demonstrating a reduction of the market power of the large
banks.
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Table 2.9: Banks Total Assets, 1998-2007, Billion of Rials.
BANKS
OWNERSHIP
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
MELLI (National)
Gov-Com
74,708
86,274
99,251
118,093
173,775
215,200
SEPAH
Gov-Com
20,086
23,231
31,748
38,858
62,867
84,260
SADERAT
Gov-Com
30,899
43,375
48,379
52,476
122,132
149,607
TEJARAT
Gov-Com
22,400
30,776
39,809
66,933
88,157
115,269
MELLAT
Gov-Com
26,429
31,333
41,388
52,948
103,354
147,292
REFAH
Gov-Com
3,666
6,317
9,190
13,967
20,263
27,945
POSTBANK
Gov-Com
NE
NE
NE
856
2,317
17,296
KESHAVARZI
Gov-Spec
13,067
17,499
24,597
33,933
47,124
59,549
MASKAN
Gov-Spec
9,773
14,268
18,956
25,933
34,649
42,512
TOSE SADERAT
Gov-Spec
1,422
1,902
2,932
3,508
5,828
6,637
SANATO MADAN
Gov-Spec
3,191
3,337
5,228
5,560
7,771
9,953
KARAFARIN
Private
NE
NE
NE
591
1,771
3,435
SAMAN
Private
NE
NE
NE
224
978
2,410
PARSIAN
Private
NE
NE
NE
374
1,791
8,758
EGHTESAD NOVIN
Private
NE
NE
NE
303
909
2,709
PASARGAD
Private
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
SARMAYEH
Private
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Reports on the Performance of Iran’s Banking System (various years).
NE: Bank did not exist in this year.
Gov-Com: Government-owned commercial bank.
Gov-Spec: Government-owned specialised bank.
Private: Private bank.
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2004
290,700
127,968
176,606
171,283
206,557
41,328
2,346
88,964
63,441
12,049
18,742
6,544
5,926
31,415
6,780
NE
NE

2005
335,151
153,216
238,503
204,844
231,325
44,568
3,296
120,020
90,890
14,858
25,285
12,685
13,051
81,060
14,552
4,675
3,657

2006
407,862
212,798
301,755
243,460
294,465
52,970
4,260
146,016
120,856
19,096
35,045
18,473
26,209
117,316
41,341
22,074
5,877

2007
511,036
230,717
381,368
294,754
383,822
62,840
8,900
170,167
172,027
35,320
66,706
25,985
34,620
163,087
74,501
56,965
11,271

Table 2.10: Ranking of Banks by Asset Size in Each Year (1998-2007).
BANKS
OWNERSHIP
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
MELLI (National)
Gov-Com
1
1
1
1
1
1
SEPAH
Gov-Com
5
5
5
5
5
5
SADERAT
Gov-Com
2
2
2
4
2
2
TEJARAT
Gov-Com
4
4
4
2
4
4
MELLAT
Gov-Com
3
3
3
3
3
3
REFAH
Gov-Com
8
8
8
8
8
8
POSTBANK
Gov-Com
NE
NE
NE
11
11
9
KESHAVARZI
Gov-Spec
6
6
6
6
6
6
MASKAN
Gov-Spec
7
7
7
7
7
7
TOSE SADERAT
Gov-Spec
10
10
9
10
9
12
SANATO MADAN
Gov-Spec
9
9
10
9
10
10
KARAFARIN
Private
NE
NE
NE
12
13
13
SAMAN
Private
NE
NE
NE
15
14
15
PARSIAN
Private
NE
NE
NE
13
12
11
EGHTESAD NOVIN
Private
NE
NE
NE
14
15
14
PASARGAD
Private
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
SARMAYEH
Private
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Reports on the Performance of Iran’s Banking System (various years).
NE: Bank did not exist in this year.
Gov-Com: Government-owned commercial bank.
Gov-Spec: Government-owned specialised bank.
Private: Private bank.
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2004
1
5
3
4
2
8
15
6
7
11
10
13
14
9
12
NE
NE

2005
1
5
2
4
3
9
17
6
7
11
10
14
13
8
12
15
16

2006
1
5
2
4
3
9
17
6
7
14
11
15
12
8
10
13
16

2007
1
5
3
4
2
11
17
7
6
13
10
15
14
8
9
12
16

Table 2.11: Three-bank Concentration, 1998-2007.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Concentration
0.64
0.62
0.59
0.57
0.59
0.57
0.54
0.51
0.49
0.48
Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Reports on the Performance of Iran’s Banking System
(various years).

Regarding bank claims on the non-public sector, Tables 2.12 and 2.13 show a
substantive increase of banks’ credit performance, especially for commercial banks.
Before 2005 the government tried to control inflation using contractionary policies.
Consequently, the inflation rate decreased from 20.1% in 1999 to 12.1% in 2005.
However, after 2005, based on the application of new monetary policies and the pushing
of banks to provide facilities and credit to government supported activities, bank claims
on the non-public sector, and subsequently the inflation rate, increased extensively. For
example, National Bank Loans granted and due from the non-public sector grew by
50% to reach Rls. 316,052 billion in 2007, but only 18% in 2005 (see Tables 2.12 and
2.13). Also, for Bank Mellat this percentage increased from 9% in 2005 to 39% in 2007.
Facilities extended by Bank Maskan (Housing Bank) also increased in 2005 and 2006
by 53% (see Table 2.13). However, this bank reduced its credits by 24% in 2007.

Regarding private banks, Tables 2.12 and 2.13 indicate that these banks have developed
these facilities (loans granted and due from the non-public sector) significantly. As
shown in Table 2.8 the share of Private Bank claims on the non-public sector out of
Total claims on the non-public sector surged from 0.2 per cent in 2000 to 19.9 % in
2008. Loans granted and due from the non-public sector with Parsian Bank grew by
41% to reach Rls. 108,400 billion in 2007, and ranked eighth in the banking system.
Although the share of private banks kept increasing, they still make only a small
contribution in the banking system.
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Table 2.12: Loans Granted and Due from the Non-public Sector, 1998-2007, Billion of Rials.
BANKS
OWNERSHIP
2000
2001
2002
2003
MELLI (National)
Gov-Com
32,213
42,397
67,127
102,138
SEPAH
Gov-Com
12,927
17,436
28,624
47,978
SADERAT
Gov-Com
10,640
29,597
41,146
69,204
TEJARAT
Gov-Com
13,168
32,969
45,332
57,896
MELLAT
Gov-Com
20,525
28,256
56,674
97,236
REFAH
Gov-Com
4,706
8,672
10,794
16,547
POSTBANK
Gov-Com
NE
467
493
1,737
KESHAVARZI
Gov-Spec
18,716
25,708
34,472
44,578
MASKAN
Gov-Spec
16,739
21,465
29,258
35,079
TOSE SADERAT
Gov-Spec
1,555
2,220
3,490
4,363
SANATO MADAN
Gov-Spec
1,985
2,528
2,253
3,321
KARAFARIN
Private
NE
245
645
1,574
SAMAN
Private
NE
140
689
1,793
PARSIAN
Private
NE
1
621
6,297
EGHTESAD NOVIN
Private
NE
24
392
1,859
PASARGAD
Private
NE
NE
NE
NE
SARMAYEH
Private
NE
NE
NE
NE
Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Reports on the Performance of Iran’s Banking System (various years).
NE: Bank did not exist in this year.
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2004
143,055
73,594
85,008
87,426
142,691
30,026
771
60,389
42,949
7,402
8,155
3,974
4,227
22,205
4,767
NE
NE

2005
168,895
93,640
113,213
98,498
155,085
29,676
1,437
83,914
65,912
9,892
13,871
7,310
8,707
57,765
9,558
1,125
98

2006
210,835
143,990
152,732
127,814
190,100
34,129
1,783
98,405
100,801
1,057
20,953
11,312
1,377
76,746
28,512
11,275
1,224

2007
316,052
157,706
182,713
163,211
263,747
38,234
3,440
113,501
124,611
1,670
32,882
17,605
21,735
108,400
53,612
37,937
6,992

Table 2.13: Change of Loans Granted and Due from the Non-public Sector, 1998-2007, Per cent Change.
BANKS
OWNERSHIP
2001
2002
2003
2004
MELLI (National)
Gov-Com
0.32
0.58
0.52
0.40
SEPAH
Gov-Com
0.35
0.64
0.68
0.53
SADERAT
Gov-Com
1.78
0.39
0.68
0.23
TEJARAT
Gov-Com
1.50
0.37
0.28
0.51
MELLAT
Gov-Com
0.38
1.01
0.72
0.47
REFAH
Gov-Com
0.84
0.24
0.53
0.81
POSTBANK
Gov-Com
--0.06
2.52
-0.56
KESHAVARZI
Gov-Spec
0.37
0.34
0.29
0.35
MASKAN
Gov-Spec
0.28
0.36
0.20
0.22
TOSE SADERAT
Gov-Spec
0.43
0.57
0.25
0.70
SANATO MADAN
Gov-Spec
0.27
-0.11
0.47
1.46
KARAFARIN
Private
--1.63
1.44
1.52
SAMAN
Private
--3.92
1.60
1.36
PARSIAN
Private
--620.00
9.14
2.53
EGHTESAD NOVIN
Private
--15.33
3.74
1.56
PASARGAD
Private
--------SARMAYEH
Private
--------Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Reports on the Performance of Iran’s Banking System (various years).
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2005
0.18
0.27
0.33
0.13
0.09
-0.01
0.86
0.39
0.53
0.34
0.70
0.84
1.06
1.60
1.01
------

2006
0.25
0.54
0.35
0.30
0.23
0.15
0.24
0.17
0.53
-0.89
0.51
0.55
-0.84
0.33
1.98
9.02
11.49

2007
0.50
0.10
0.20
0.28
0.39
0.12
0.93
0.15
0.24
0.58
0.57
0.56
14.78
0.41
0.88
2.36
4.71

In terms of attracting deposits, four tables are provided: Tables 2.14, 2.15, 2.16 and
2.17. Table 2.14 contains total bank deposits for the period between 1998 and 2007.
Total deposits are the sum of demand, saving, long time, short time and other deposits.
Table 2.15 presents the growth rate of the banks’ total deposits for the same period.
Table 2.16 presents the total bank deposits of the three major banking groups;
commercial banks, specialised banks and private banks. This table also provides the
deposit market share of each group, which is defined as the total value of group deposits
divided by the total market value of deposits. Table 2.17 presents percentages of deposit
growth attributable to each specific banking group.

As shown in Table 2.16, total deposits in the banking system have increasingly grown
reaching 1,916,717 billion rials by 2007. However, the growth rate of total deposits in
the banking system decreased after 2005, and changed from 0.32 % in 2005 to 0.27% in
2007 (see Table 2.16). Commercial banks’ share of total deposits decreased
considerably from 87% in 2002 to 71% in 2007 (see Table 2.16). Table 2.16 indicates
that specialised banks lost 1.8% of their deposit market (was 14.3% in 2006) and held
only 12.5% of deposits of the banking system in 2007. This table shows private banks
have increased their share of market significantly from 0.2% in 2001 to 16.3% in 2007.

Table 2.17 indicates that 87.29% of deposit growth in 2002 was attributable to the
commercial banks, but, this dropped to 65.64% in 2007. Similarly, specialised banks
contributed 19.83% of deposit growth in 2004, but contributed only 6.07% of total
deposit growth in 2007. However, private banks raised their contribution dramatically
from 2.33% in 2002 to 28.29% in 2007 (see Table 2.17). Table 2.14 shows that Parsian
Bank and Eghtesade Novin Bank (both private banks) were the fifth and ninth banks in
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terms of attracting total deposits in 2007. National Bank was the first during the period
(1998-2007).

2.3.2.4 Non-Performing Loans
The Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) of Iranian banks, in particular government-owned
banks, have mainly been accumulated in recent years. At the end of 2001 NPLs were
Rls. 12,524 billion, this increased to Rls. 151,876 billion by the end of 2007. This rapid
accumulation of NPLs can be caused by bank weaknesses in investigating borrowers,
and weak assets management specifically after 2005 when these banks were obliged to
pay up to 20 per cent (in 2005 and 35% in 2006) of their credits to SMEs (CBI, 2007b).
According to the CBI (2006a, p.24), the highest share of non-performing loans extended
by Iranian banks to the non-public sector (in 2006) belonged to the "manufacturing and
mining" sector by 40.2% and "trade and services" sector by 32.6%, followed by the
"agriculture", and "housing" sectors by the respective shares of 16.8% and 6.9%. For
government-owned banks the highest shares of the NPLs belong to the "manufacturing
and mining" sector by 20.1% and "construction" by 19.5%.

Generally, NPLs deteriorate measured against: the effectiveness of resource allocation,
risk management, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR), number of loans and deposits,
banks’ international rating and effectiveness of services provided. Table 2.18 and Figure
2.11 show the increase in government-owned banks’ NPLs after 2001. As shown in
Table 2.18 the growth rate of government-owned banks’ NPLs increased dramatically
between 2003 and 2007, and reached 129% in 2006. However, the growth rate of NPLs
decreased in 2007 to 18.3%.
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Table 2.14: Total Deposits, 1998-2007, Billion of Rials.
BANKS
OWNERSHIP
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
MELLI (National)
Gov-Com
35887
45343
72971
88661
127915
153202
SEPAH
Gov-Com
17598
21515
26235
33804
47262
56737
SADERAT
Gov-Com
21271
25263
32967
61275
99199
140674
TEJARAT
Gov-Com
18598
25401
33085
45156
60867
76131
MELLAT
Gov-Com
37417
24455
37195
45047
70905
98856
REFAH
Gov-Com
2683
4044
6937
11662
16898
23173
POSTBANK
Gov-Com
NE
NE
NE
204
302
16896
KESHAVARZI
Gov-Spec
4216
6690
11895
16976
24846
34246
MASKAN
Gov-Spec
2979
4150
14020
21217
28337
34054
TOSE SADERAT
Gov-Spec
789
1113
1310
1351
2166
2550
SANATO MADAN
Gov-Spec
155
157
1159
1001
1537
1536
KARAFARIN
Private
NE
NE
NE
375
1539
3007
SAMAN
Private
NE
NE
NE
155
732
2011
PARSIAN
Private
NE
NE
NE
45
1410
7334
EGHTESAD NOVIN
Private
NE
NE
NE
29
606
2291
PASARGAD
Private
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
SARMAYEH
Private
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Reports on the Performance of Iran’s Banking System (various years).
NE: Bank did not exist in this year.

57

2004
194899
72849
169157
92688
118632
30814
1633
50008
49996
4006
3997
5855
4861
27766
5047
NE
NE

2005
227165
93844
216084
114369
149285
34922
2065
70455
71467
4819
6314
11387
11646
68809
12048
893
12.007

2006
285553
147921
266213
145925
199830
46493
3200
92290
100170
9811
12683
16550
22370
103094
34832
16716
1741

2007
356782
140734
344882
193116
266087
56051
7470
101173
114144
6412
18194
22138
29720
141607
62547
48897
6763

Table 2.15: Growth Rate of the Banks’ Total Deposits, 1999-2007.
BANKS
OWNERSHIP
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
MELLI (National)
Gov-Com
0.26
0.61
0.22
0.44
0.20
SEPAH
Gov-Com
0.22
0.22
0.29
0.40
0.20
SADERAT
Gov-Com
0.19
0.30
0.86
0.62
0.42
TEJARAT
Gov-Com
0.37
0.30
0.36
0.35
0.25
MELLAT
Gov-Com
-0.35
0.52
0.21
0.57
0.39
REFAH
Gov-Com
0.51
0.72
0.68
0.45
0.37
POSTBANK
Gov-Com
NE
NE
NE
0.48
54.95
KESHAVARZI
Gov-Spec
0.59
0.78
0.43
0.46
0.38
MASKAN
Gov-Spec
0.39
2.38
0.51
0.34
0.20
TOSE SADERAT
Gov-Spec
0.41
0.18
0.03
0.60
0.18
SANATO MADAN
Gov-Spec
0.01
6.38
-0.14
0.54
0.00
KARAFARIN
Private
NE
NE
NE
3.10
0.95
SAMAN
Private
NE
NE
NE
3.72
1.75
PARSIAN
Private
NE
NE
NE
30.33
4.20
EGHTESAD NOVIN
Private
NE
NE
NE
19.90
2.78
PASARGAD
Private
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
SARMAYEH
Private
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Reports on the Performance of Iran’s Banking System (various years).
NE: Bank did not exist in this year.
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2004

2005

2006

2007

0.27
0.28
0.20
0.22
0.20
0.33
-0.90
0.46
0.47
0.57
1.60
0.95
1.42
2.79
1.20
NE
NE

0.17
0.29
0.28
0.23
0.26
0.13
0.26
0.41
0.43
0.20
0.58
0.94
1.40
1.48
1.39
NE
NE

0.26
0.58
0.23
0.28
0.34
0.33
0.55
0.31
0.40
1.04
1.01
0.45
0.92
0.50
1.89
17.72
144

0.25
-0.05
0.30
0.32
0.33
0.21
1.33
0.10
0.14
-0.35
0.43
0.34
0.33
0.37
0.80
1.93
2.83

Table 2.16: Total Bank Deposits, Changes, and Deposit Market Shares, 1998-2007.
Indices
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Total market value of the deposits, in billion
141593
158131
237774
326958
484521
652698
Total bank deposits changes, in billion
--16538
79643
89184
157563
168177
Total bank deposits changes, %
--0.1168
0.503652 0.375079 0.481906 0.3471
Commercial bank deposits, in billion
133454
146021
209390
285809
423348
565669
Specialised bank deposits, in billion
8139
12110
28384
40545
56886
72386
Private bank deposits, in billion
0
0
0
604
4287
14643
Commercial bank deposits/total deposits
0.943
0.923
0.881
0.874
0.874
0.867
Specialised bank deposits/total deposits
0.057
0.077
0.119
0.124
0.117
0.111
Private bank deposits/total deposits
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.009
0.022
Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Reports on the Performance of Iran’s Banking System (various years).

2004
832208
179510
0.275028
680672
108007
43529
0.818
0.130
0.052

2005
1095584
263376
0.316479
837734
153055
104795
0.765
0.140
0.096

2006
1505392
409808
0.374054
1095135
214954
195303
0.727
0.143
0.130

2007
1916717
411325
0.273234
1365122
239923
311672
0.712
0.125
0.163

Table 2.17: Share of Total Deposits Changes, Per cent Change, 1999-2007.
Bank Shares of changes in Total Deposits
Commercial bank share of total deposits changes, %
Specialised bank share of total deposits changes, %
Private bank share of total deposits changes, %

1998
-------

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

75.989

79.566

85.687

87.291

84.626

64.065

59.634

62.810

65.638

24.011

20.434

13.636

10.371

9.216

19.843

17.104

15.104

6.070

0.000

0.000

0.677

2.337

6.158

16.092

23.262

22.085

28.291

100

100

100

100

Bank shares of deposits changes, %
--100
100
100
100
100
Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Reports on the Performance of Iran’s Banking System (various years).
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Table 2.18: Government-owned Banks’ NPLs, 2001-2007, Billion of Rials.
Year s

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

NPLs in billion rials

12524

15924

20046

30526

55928

128297

151876

NPLs Growth, %

---

0.271479

0.2588

0.5227

0.8321

1.2939

0.1837

Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Reports on the Performance of Iran’s Banking
System (various years).

Figure 2.11: Government-owned Banks’ NPLs after 2001. Billion of Rials.
Government-owned banks' NPLs
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Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Reports on the Performance of Iran’s Banking
System (various years).

2.3.2.5 Central Bank’s Claims on Banks
As indicated in Table 2.19 the claims on banks, in particular government-owned
banks, increased dramatically after 2005 increasing from Rls. 23542 billion in
2003 to Rls. 137694 billion in 2007. According to the CBI (2007c), the large
increase in central bank’s claims on banks is due to the lower interest rate on
deposits, and also pushing banks to provide direct facilities to government
supported activities as mentioned previously.

Table 2.19: Central Bank’s Claims on Banks, 2003-2007, Billion of Rials.
Years

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

CBI’s Claims on banks

23542

21493

35916

54887

137694

Source: Compiled by the author based on CBI Annual Review (different years).
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2.4 Summary
This chapter has presented an overview and evaluation of Iran’s banking sector
from its beginning in 1890 to the present. Today, Iran's banking system is
dominated by 11 state-owned institutions, including seven commercial banks, four
specialised banks, and six private banks. History shows that the banking system
has suffered from inefficiency from the beginning for reasons such as poor
management, political risk and lack of banks’ independence, which are the most
long-standing problems in the system. In other words the monetary system has
experienced a great deal of government interference, and, consequently, banks
could not maintain their management independence to be profitable and efficient.

Iran’s financial development was also analysed together with some IMF studies
which measure Iran’s key financial indicators; Creane et al. (2004), Creane et al.
(2007) and Beck et al. (2000). Findings of these studies show that Iran is placed
well below the industrialized countries, sub-Saharan Africa countries and MENA
countries over the last four decades. These results indicate a poor performance of
the banking system and a inadequate performance of government in this sector.
Another IMF study by Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) introduced a new
database of indicators of financial development and structure across countries and
over time. More than 20 indicators are applied in this study to analyse Iran’s
financial sector. The results indicated that Iran’s central bank has lost its relative
size gradually between 1980 and 2007, whereas other deposit money banks gained
relative importance versus the central bank with a higher asset ratio. Deposit
money banks are bigger than the Central Bank and other financial institutions in
Iran. The results also showed that Iran’s deposit money banks have improved in
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channelling savings to investors during the last decade. Moreover, they are
significantly more active than other financial institutions.

Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) introduced a number of indicators to measure
the efficiency and productivity of the financial sector. The results showed that
both of these indicators deteriorated dramatically over the period, especially after
2004. However, they used very basic and simplistic measures of efficiency and
productivity. In this study, I will provide a more robust analysis using Data DEA.
Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) also analysed market concentration. They found
that market concentration decreased during the decade, particularly after the
entrance of private banks in 2001. However, this measure is still very high, and
about 70% of total assets still belong to the three largest banks which are all
government-owned banks; Melli Bank, Saderat Bank, and Mellat Bank (in 2006).

Additional key indicators in different areas was also analysed to identify Iran’s
financial development. These areas are: bank independence, central bank claims
on banks, non-performing loans, public debt, and the role of private banks.
Different aspects of bank independence were investigated, and it was concluded
that the lack of independence of the central bank and other banks has resulted in
the making of financial policies without paying adequate attention to their Impact
on the sensitivity of financial markets and current market structure.

In general, a variety of financial indicators were analysed in this chapter, and it
can be concluded that the banking industry in Iran is underdeveloped and faces
several weaknesses. A number of these structural factors are related to the
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ownership of banks by the government. The allocation of credit and rate of return
is set by the government annually. Lack of competition, weak supervision,
inefficiency, and mismanagement are some of these weaknesses. The banking
industry is undercapitalized; the risk-weighted capital adequacy of the banking
system is 7.2% for private banks and 5.5% for state-owned commercial banks,
compared with 8% as an international standard. Islamic banking experience in
Iran shows that its importance lies in political power, and cultural meaning, and
not due to its viability as a modern banking system. It cannot integrate with global
banking. Also, the Central Bank, as a supervisory agency for the banking system
is not independent and is focused on compliance with government directives
rather than risk assessment. The lack of experience of banks in the financing of
industrial, long-term investments and other productive projects is another
weakness of the system. Therefore, this conclusion emphasizes the importance of
investigating the main factors of inefficiency of Iran’s banking system. The
following chapter details the procedure of estimating the efficiency scores and
productivity for Iran’s banking system by using DEA.
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Chapter Three
Empirical Literature Review on the Usage of DEA

3.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, there is no consensus in the banking
literature on the preferred approach for estimating efficiency in this sector.
Generally, there are two modelling methods adapted in the literature dealing with
comparative performance measurement; parametric and nonparametric methods.
Since the focus of this study is on the application of DEA to financial institutions,
the studies noted here are mostly limited to those in which there has been an
application of the DEA approach to financial institutions. The differences and
importance of DEA in relation to the parametric approach will be discussed in the
methodology chapter.

DEA, as a mathematical programming technique, is a method that utilizes nonparametric, linear programming to construct frontiers to which the companies
under scrutiny are compared and their relative efficiency measured. It was first
developed by Charnes et al.(1978) and heralded the beginning of many papers on
the issue. For instance, Seiford (1995) listed over 400 articles concerning DEA
until 1995, and Emrouznejad et al. (2008) declare that the number of relevant
publications has stabilized at approximately 226 per year, between 1995 and
2003. Emrouznejad et al. (2008) also state this number again increased to
approximately 360 per year during 2004–2006. These figures indicate that, in the
spirit of a product life cycle, a maturity phase for DEA began in or around 1995
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and continued considerably. In view of this, Emrouznejad et al. (2008) indicated
that about 4000 publications have been published until 2007. As to its applications
in the banking system, Molyneux et al. (1996) mention that Sherman and Gold
(1985) were the first to apply this method to investigate efficiency within the
banking sector, and Emrouznejad et al. (2008) mention this literature has been
extended by 135 articles until 2007.

In this chapter, a review of the empirical literature is discussed under the
following four main sections. Section 2.2 provides an overview of financial sector
efficiency studies. A review of efficiency studies evaluating government policies
is presented in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 reviews efficiency studies addressing
general research issues, followed by a summary in Section 2.5.

3.2 Overview of Financial Sector Efficiency Studies
The literature on the efficiency of financial institutions using DEA has expanded
rapidly during the last few decades. As indicated by Berger and Humphrey
(1997), who investigate 130 parametric and non-parametric studies in 21
countries, a large number of DEA studies have been predominantly undertaken in
developed countries, especially for the United States. According to their study,
Seventy five per cent of the studies focused on US financial institutions, while
twenty per cent looked at financial institutions in other developed countries such
as Norway, Spain and the UK. Only five per cent of the studies were carried out in
developing countries until 1997, focusing in particular on India, Mexico and
Tunisia. Emrouznejad et al. (2008), who conduct a comprehensive survey of the
first 30 years of scholarly literature in regard to DEA, state that the most
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published DEA applications arose in the US, UK, and other developed nations.
Ataullah and Le (2006) also stated that because of the widespread use of DEA in
developed countries, it has also become a popular method in evaluating financial
institutions among banking researchers of other nations like developing countries.
The existing literature on bank efficiency in developing countries focuses chiefly
on the efficiency disparities among banks with different ownership status and
asset size. This is because the banking systems in these countries are still in their
infancy, and markets are usually characterized by high state ownership, newly
privatized domestic banks, and rapid entry of foreign banks. The policy issues
examined in these studies usually address questions regarding privatization of
public banks, elimination of restrictions for domestic and foreign bank entry and
their operations, and the existence of scale economies related to consolidations
and acquisitions. However, there is scant literature on the efficiency of Iranian
banks, and existing studies have been conducted in Farsi. 22

In general, research on financial institution efficiency has mostly focused on using
institution efficiency estimates:

1- to evaluate government policies, for instance, by assessing the effects of
privatization, mergers and market structure on industry efficiency;
2- to address general research issues by, for example, determining how efficiency
varies with different frontier approaches, output definitions, and time periods.

Hence, this structure will be used in the following sections to review the DEA
method, specifically in the evaluation of efficiency of financial institutions.

22

Only some have published by English abstract.
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3.3 Informing Government Policy toward Financial Institutions
The discussion contained in this section is divided into three subgroups: (1)
Deregulation and liberalisation; (2) management quality and institution failure;
and (3) the effect of mergers and privatizations.

3.3.1 Deregulation and Liberalisation
Deregulation is the elimination or simplification of government rules and policy
that restrict the operation of market forces. It is typically undertaken to improve
the performance of the market being deregulated. Deregulation will profit society
and may cause price reductions by raising the efficiency and allocation of
resources. Also, it can lead to service expansion for customers, if competition is
adequate. Given that a primary aim of deregulation is to enrich efficiency, the
results have been mixed, and the review of efficiency studies exposes the fact that
deregulation might not always improve efficiency and productivity. Some
empirical studies on financial institutions have provided some support for a
positive relationship between deregulation and efficiency. For instance,
productivity growth during the deregulation of the Norwegian banking industry
was studied by Berg et al. (1992). A DEA approach and Malmquist indices were
employed to analyse the period 1980-1989. The empirical results clearly
demonstrated that Norwegian banks had experienced improved efficiency and
productivity after deregulation. It was also showed that deregulation had caused
less dispersion of productivity levels within the industry.

Sturm and Williams (2004) investigated the impact of deregulation on Australian
banking efficiency. This study considered the impact of foreign bank entry on
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banking efficiency in Australia during the post-deregulation period 1988-2001.
Using DEA, Malmquist Indices and a stochastic frontier analysis, they found that
foreign banks were more efficient than domestic banks. Furthermore, bank
efficiency increased after deregulation, and capture competition as a result of
diversity in bank types was important to develop efficiency enhancement.

Chen and Lin (2007) investigated the performance of nine Australian domestic
commercial banks after taking financial supervision into account in 1998, within
the framework of DEA and Malmquist indices. According to their finding, in
relation to American banks, Australian banks had a better average efficiency after
the 2001 post-financial reforms period. Also, Return on Assets (ROA), which is a
vital financial measure of performance, positively improved for Australian banks.
It was also found that overall technical efficiency for all Australian banks rose
gradually after 2000.

Using the Indian banking industry as a case study, Ataullah and Le (2006)
proposed and tested hypotheses regarding the possibility of a relationship between
bank efficiency and three elements of economic reform, namely, fiscal reforms;
financial reforms; and private investment liberalisation, in developing countries.
They calculated bank efficiency using DEA, and the relationship between the
measured efficiency, different bank-specific characteristics and associated
environmental factors using OLS and GMM estimations. Their results showed an
improvement in the efficiency of banks, especially that of foreign banks, after the
economic reforms. They also found a direct relationship between the level of
competition and bank efficiency. However, a negative relationship between the
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presence of foreign banks and bank efficiency was found, which they attributed to
a short-run increase in costs as a result of the introduction of new banking
technology by foreign banks.

Chen et al. (2005) investigated the impact of deregulation on Chinese banking
efficiency from 1993-2000. Cost, technical and allocation efficiency were
estimated using DEA, and the level of efficiency was measured both before and
after the 1995 deregulation program. The results revealed that the deregulation
applied in 1995 had a major impact initially on the overall efficiency of Chinese
banks. However, in the third and fourth years of post-deregulation, efficiency
levels gradually decreased. Therefore, this policy had enhanced the performance
of Chinese banks, especially in the early deregulation period. In another
application of the DEA approach, Akhtar (2002) analysed the x-efficiency of 40
commercial banks in Pakistan, 19 domestic and 21 foreign banks, for the year
1998 after liberalisation. In this study, private banks in Pakistan became known as
the most technical and allocative efficient banks compared to their counterparts;
public and foreign banks. The results also supported the on going process of
privatisation of public sector banks in Pakistan.

However, in some cases, deregulation appears to have led to deterioration in
measured productivity rather than an improvement. For example, regarding the
negative aspect of the relationship between deregulation and efficiency, the effects
of X-inefficiency on Taiwan's banking industry was investigated by Chen (2001)
using DEA. He found that banks' X-inefficiency largely dropped off in Taiwan;
falling from an average X-inefficiency level of 3.9% in 1988 to 2.0% in 1997.
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Mukherjee et al. (2001) investigates productivity changes of 201 large US
commercial banks over the initial post-deregulation period, from 1984 to 1990, by
means of DEA. They measured productivity growth using Malmquist productivity
indices, and estimated the contributions of technical change, technical efficiency
change, and scale change to calculate productivity growth. They found overall
productivity growth at a rate of about 4.5% per year on average; however,
productivity dropped by 7.61% between 1984 and 1985, and by 0.33% between
1988 and 1989.

Applying a DEA and Malmquist Productivity Index, Sufian (2006) investigated
the efficiency and productivity of Malaysian banks during the post deregulation
period of 1998-2003. He found that Malaysian banks exhibited the highest mean
overall efficiency score in 2000. It was found however, that Malaysian banks’
mean overall efficiency scores declined steadily in 2003, which could be
attributed to the intensification of competition and sluggish loan growth.

Some studies have emphasized both negative and positive aspects. For instance,
Rizvi (2001), in another application of the DEA and Malmquist approaches,
analysed efficiency and productivity of the banking sector in Pakistan in the postreform period of 1993-1998. The sample consisted of 37 scheduled commercial
banks, including 18 domestic banks and 19 foreign banks, operating in Pakistan.
The study showed that both efficiency and productivity measurements declined
after the reform. At the institutional level it was found that foreign banks were
comparatively less efficient than domestic banks, and most of the inefficiencies in
the system were attributable to the poor performance of foreign banks, especially
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in the latter years. Within domestic banks the performance of nationalised banks
and privatised banks had improved. However, the study concluded that the
reforms were successful to the extent that, overall, they helped in improving the
working of domestic banks, due to increased competition.

3.3.2 Management Quality and Institution Failure
According to Berger and Humphrey (1997), for most studies, the failure of banks
is directly related to having a great number of problem loans, a low capitalisation,
a weak or negative cash flow and poor management quality. They also state that it
might be expected that institutions would exhibit low efficiency prior to failure,
and that management quality would be positively correlated to efficiency. Both of
these priors are supported in other studies which focused upon these issues. The
number of bank failures in banks with a low efficiency level is much higher than
institutions with higher efficiency levels; Berger and Humphrey (1992);
Cebenoyan et al (1993); and Hermalin and Wallace (1994). Besides, Kraft et al.
(2006) maintain that management quality is positively related to cost efficiency,
and Pruteanu-Podpiera (2008) also emphasise on that the quality of operational
cost management is a regularly important determinant of the risk of bank failure.
Thus, based on the above, analysis of management factors is a critical factor in
this research.

As analysts often view the quality of bank management as the main factor in
determining whether a bank fails or survives, Siems (1992) presented a model that
quantitatively assesses bank management quality by applying DEA. His theory
considers a bank’s essential financial intermediation functions (which is,
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attracting deposits to make loans and investments) to calculate a scalar measure of
efficiency. Siems’ (1992) analysis confirmed that management's role is vital to a
bank's survival. Management quality scores for surviving institutions are
considerably better than those for failed banks, at least up to two and one-half
years before their failure. Banks whose managers weakly allocate resources, and
do not take into account the needs of their customers and markets, have a greater
chance of failing.

Loukoianova (2008) analysed the efficiency and profitability of Japanese banks
between 2000 and 2006. Using a DEA approach, banks’ cost and revenue
efficiency were analysed. The results demonstrated that Japanese bank
profitability is low compared to that in other advanced countries; and there was
sizeable potential for efficiency achievements. These related to cost-sharing
arrangements (among regional banks), consolidation of regional banks (with
major or other regional banks). Achieving these targets required better
management of risk and resource allocation.

Generally, research on the causes of bank failure has concentrated on developed
countries, mainly the United States. Comparatively little empirical work has
examined developing countries. Daley et al. (2008) examined the efficiency of
banks in Jamaica between 1992 and 1998. They found that real GDP growth, size,
and managerial efficiency were the most important factors causing the failure of
banks.
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Applying the DEA approach, Das and Ghosh (2006) examined the performance of
the Indian commercial banking sector during the post reform period 1992-2002.
They linked the variation in measured efficiencies to a set of variables, which are
bank size, ownership, capital adequacy ratio, non-performing loans and
management quality. Das and Ghosh (2006) concluded that poor management
quality appeared to have a constantly positive and significant impact on technical
inefficiency approximations. The empirical results also showed that technically
more efficient banks are those that have less non-performing loans. In general,
well-capitalized banks are expected to have better credit risk management
systems, and therefore able to control their loan loss provisioning.

3.3.3 The Effect of Mergers and Acquisitions
In response to fundamental changes in regulation and technology, the financial
industry is undergoing an extraordinary wave of consolidation. Hence, a growing
body of the empirical literature has evaluated the efficiency gains from mergers
and acquisitions to evaluate government policies. The DEA approach has mostly
been employed to investigate the impact of the consolidation on the performance
of the financial industry. However, there are mixed results, both positive and
negative, from consolidation. There are different ways in which mergers and
acquisitions can improve efficiency. First, the larger firms resulting from the
consolidation may gain access to cost-saving technologies or spread their fixed
costs over a larger base, thus reducing average costs. Second, efficiency gains
may also arise from the development of economies of scale and scope by entering
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new markets and selling their products to a wider customer base. Lastly,
consolidation may advance managerial efficiency. 23

Sufian and Majid (2007) employed a three-year DEA-based analysis to investigate
the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the efficiency of Singapore banking
groups. The results showed that mergers had given rise to a higher mean overall
efficiency. They also found that bank profitability had positive impact on bank
efficiency, while poor loan quality had negative influence on bank performance.

Using the same approach Sufian (2007b) investigated the effects of mergers and
acquisitions on Malaysian banks' technical efficiency and scale efficiency. The
results indicated that mergers resulted in a higher mean technical efficiency of the
Malaysian banking industry post-merger. In five out of the seven merger cases
analysed, the empirical findings suggested that the acquirers were comparatively
more technically efficient. Results from this study also showed that the acquiring
banks' mean technical efficiency improved from the mergers in five out of the
seven merger cases examined.

The efficiency of Malaysian banks during the post-merger period were also
investigated by Sufian and Majid (2005) using the DEA approach. They analysed
the impact of risk and non-performing loans on Malaysian bank efficiency during
this period. The results indicated that the merger process had largely benefited
small and medium sized banks while large banks suffer from scale inefficiency,
and consistently operating at declining returns to scale.

23

For a general discussion of benefits and costs of mergers, see Andrade et al. (2001).
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Worthington (2001) applied a two-part process to investigate the role of efficiency
in merger and acquisition activity in Australian credit unions during the period
1993-97. The measures of efficiency were estimated using the DEA approach. In
the first part, panel data was used in a probit model to relate pure technical
efficiency, in conjunction with other managerial, regulatory and financial factors,
to the probability of merger activity, either as an acquiring or acquired unit. The
results indicated that loan portfolio diversification, management ability, earnings
and asset size are a major influence on the probability of acquisition, although the
primary factor of being acquired is smaller asset size. The second part used a
Tobit model adapted to a panel framework to analyse post-merger efficiency. It
was found that Mergers had improved both pure technical and scale efficiency in
the credit union industry.

From a negative perspective, Amela et al. (2004) argue that mergers and
acquisitions can initiate adverse social costs and harm customers. One form of
these social costs refers to some financial products like deposits and small
business lending which are mainly local; mergers and acquisitions among
operators with large market shares might cause unpleasant price changes, and
harming consumers. Second, mergers and acquisitions might play a role in
redirecting the focus of some participants away from small business lending,
which relies on soft information at the local level, to less custom-made products
that are relatively easier to manage within large organizations. 24 Amel et al.

24

For a general discussion of the benefits and costs of mergers, see Andrade et al. (2001). For the
effects of mergers on deposit rates, see Prager and Hannan (1998), and Focarelli and Panetta
(2003). For the effects on loan rates, see Sapienza (2002). For the effects of consolidation on risk,
see Berger et al. (1998).
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(2004) also maintain the efficiency gains resulting from better management might
be indefinable in large and complex institutions.

Two studies of credit union mergers; Ralston et al. (2001) and Fried et al. (1999),
found some post-acquisition service improvements in target firms, but no
variation, on average, among acquirers. They indicated that about 50% of
acquirers and 20–50% of targets suffered from a decline in service quality after
consolidation. As mentioned before, Sufian and Majid (2005) also indicated that
the merger process in Malaysian banks largely benefited small and medium sized
banks while large banks suffer from scale inefficiency, and consistently operating
at declining returns to scale.

Using a paned-based SFA approach Lang and Welzel (1999) investigated all
Bavarian cooperative banks for the years 1989-1997, which includes information
on 283 mergers. They analysed cost effects of small-scale mergers in German
banking. The empirical results showed that positive scale and scope consequence
from a merger take place only if the merged unit closes part of the former branch
group. Banks which had been acquired by others were less efficient than the
average bank in the same size class, but they showed the same efficiency as the
acquiring firms. For the post-merger period, their empirical results provided no
evidence for efficiency gains from merging.

Drake and Hall (2003) utilised DEA to evaluate the technical and scale efficiency
of the Japanese banking system using a cross-section sample. In this study,
efficiency analysis was carried out across individual banks, bank types and bank
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size groups. The empirical results showed that there were economies of scale for
smaller banks but not for the large ones. Although larger banks exhibited the
lowest levels of technical inefficiency, they also had the least to gain in terms of
potential X-efficiency gains from mergers. Furthermore, the results suggested that
the levels of pure technical efficiency tended to get worse with size up to the
middle ranking banks in the post merger period. Finally, they concluded that
mergers between relatively small banks would need to be cautiously planned and
managed to ensure that any potential cost savings from economies of scale are not
eroded by improved levels of X-inefficiency.

Amela et al. (2004) reviewed the most important studies that cover the most
important sectors of the financial industry (commercial and investment banks,
insurance and asset management companies) in the most industrialized countries
over the last 20 years. They uncovered that consolidation in the financial sector
benefited relatively small size banks, but there was little evidence that mergers
produced economies of scale or gains in managerial efficiency or resulted in cost
reduction of the large banks.

Table 3.1: Summary of Findings from Previous Studies.
Table 3.1 Continued
Author
Country
Berg
et
al. Norway
(1992)

Years
1980-1989

Approach
DEA and
Malmquist

Main conclusions
Norwegian banks had experienced
improved efficiency and productivity
after deregulation.
Bank efficiency has increased after
deregulation and competition was
important to improve efficiency
development.
In relation to American banks,
Australian banks had a better average
efficiency after the 2001 postfinancial reforms period.

Sturm
and
Williams (2004)

Australia

1988-2001

DEA,
Malmquist
and SFA

Chen and
(2007)

Australia

1998-2004

DEA and
Malmquist

Lin
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Table 3.1 Continued
Author
Country
Ataullah and Le India
and
(2006)
developing
countries

Years
1992-1998

Approach
DEA, OLS
and GMM

Main conclusions
Efficiency of banks in developing
countries, especially foreign banks,
after the economic reforms were
improved.

China

1993-2000

DEA

Deregulation
enhanced
the
performance of Chinese banks,
especially in the early deregulation
period.

Akhtar (2002)

Pakistan

1998

DEA

After liberalization, private Banks
became more technical and allocative
to
their
efficient,
compared
counterparts.

Chen (2001)

Taiwan

1988-1997

DEA

X-inefficiency has largely declined in
Taiwan over the last 10 years after
deregulation.

Mukherjee et al.
(2001)

US

1984-1990

DEA and
Malmquist

Productivity dropped by 7.61%
between 1984 and 1985 and by 0.33%
between 1988 and 1989.

Sufian (2006)

Malaysia

1998-2003

DEA and
Malmquist

The strengthening of competition
deteriorated performance of the small
and
medium
sized
banks
performances.

Rizvi (2001)

Pakistan

1993-1998

DEA and
Malmquist

The reforms were successful to the
extent that they helped in improving
the working of domestic banks, due to
increased competition.

Loukoianova
(2008)

Japan

2000-2006

DEA

Weakness of management led to a
lower level of efficiency in Japanese
banks compared with other banks.

Jamaica

1992-1998

DEA

Das and Ghosh
(2006)

India

1992-2002

DEA

GDP growth and size, and managerial
efficiency were the most significant
factors contributing to the failure of
banks.
Poor management quality appeared to
have a constantly positive and
significant impact on technical
inefficiency approximations.

Sufian (2007)

Singapore

1998-2004

DEA
window
analysis

The results showed that mergers had
given rise to a higher mean overall
efficiency.

Sufian (2007b)

Malaysia

1998-2004

DEA
window
analysis

Merger resulted in a higher mean
technical efficiency of the Malaysian
banking sector post-merger.

Sufian and Majid
(2005)

Malaysia

2000-2004

DEA

Merger process had largely benefited
small and medium sized banks while
large banks suffer from scale
inefficiency.

Chen
(2005)

Daley
(2008)

et

et

al.

al.
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Table 3.1 Continued
Author
Country
Worthington
Australia
(2001)

Years
1993-1997

Approach
DEA

Main conclusions
Mergers had improved both pure
technical efficiency and scale
efficiency in the credit union
industry.

Lang and Welzel
(1999)

Bavaria
(State,
Germany)

1989-1997

SFA

Positive scale and scope consequence
from a merger take place only if the
merged unit closes part of the former
branch group.

Drake and Hall
(2003)

Japan

1997

DEA

Larger banks are generally found to
be operating above the minimum
efficient scale and to have limited
opportunity to gain from eliminating
X-inefficiencies.

Source: As described above.

3.4 Research Issues Related to Financial Institutions
Many studies in efficiency analysis have been focused on methodological and
measurement issues. Research issues include the study of: (1) the similarity of
efficiency results derived from various frontier models, (2) the sensitivity of
efficiency results when various output measures are applied, (3) the relationship
between efficiency and internal bank-specific variables, (4) methodological
issues.

3.4.1 Comparing Different Efficiency Techniques
Although many studies have been conducted regarding the average efficiency of
depository financial institutions using the frontier techniques, not many studies
have compared the efficiency rankings of firms across techniques. Accordingly, a
number of researchers have compared the efficiency ranking of banking firms
using nonparametric and parametric techniques. A number of studies support a
robust relationship between the findings of different techniques, while others find
only weak relationships.
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Using two competing frontier methods in the financial economics literature, DEA
and SFA, Choi et al. (2007) investigated the performance of 519 agricultural
banks in the US constructed for the period 1996-2005. Cost efficiency measures
of agricultural banks obtained from SFA and DEA were regressed on various
bank-specific characteristics to explain the cost efficiency differences of these
banks. The results of this study indicated that bank-specific characteristics could
explain DEA efficiency scores better than SFA efficiency measures, and that
inconsistency issues related to the two approaches was not serious. Cost
efficiencies were positively connected to profitability while negatively related
with the raw cost inefficiency measure. The results also showed that older
agricultural banks tended to be more efficient, and bigger banks tended to be less
efficient.

Fiorentino et al. (2006) investigated the stability of efficiency scores obtained
with SFA and DEA methods for all German universal banks between 1993 and
2004. They analysed whether efficiency measures yielded constant results in
relation to five criteria; levels, rankings, identification of extreme performers,
stability over time and correlation to standard accounting-based measures of
performance. They found that non-parametric methods are sensitive to
measurement error and outliers. They also found that annually estimated
efficiency scores are obviously less consistent over a period of twelve years, in
particular for parametric methods.

Using DEA, Malmquist Indices and SFA, Sturm and Williams (2004) investigated
the efficiency of both foreign and domestic banks and the dynamics of efficiency
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changes in Australia in the post-deregulation period 1988–2001. They also found
that foreign banks were more efficient than domestic banks. Furthermore, their
results demonstrated that bank efficiency was increased after deregulation, with
competition resulting from an expanded variety of bank types an important factor
increases efficiency.

There is greater similarity in bank efficiency rankings when, rather than
comparing nonparametric with parametric techniques, the comparison is between
different techniques within one of these categories. For instance, two parametric
techniques; SFA and TFA (Thick frontier approach), were evaluated by Hassan
and Hunter (1996) to analyse the efficiency of Japanese multinational banks in the
United States. Both approaches resulted in almost identical conclusions. They
found that domestically owned U.S. banks were considerably more cost effective
than Japanese banks operating in the U.S.

3.4.2 Comparing Different Output Measures
The specification of inputs and outputs varies across data availability in different
studies; with several combinations of inputs and outputs having been employed to
analyse the performance of financial institutions.

As Worthington (2000) and Berger and Humphrey (1997) note, the majority of
studies have employed the intermediation approach to conduct their efficiency
analysis because data is more readily available, and it also involves the use of
different categories of deposits, loans, financial investments and borrowing.
Under this approach, financial institutions are viewed as intermediating funds
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between savers and investors. Thus, operating and interest expenses are included
as inputs, whereas loans and other major assets are counted as outputs. For
instance, using DEA, Sathye (2001) applied the intermediation approach to
estimate the X-efficiency of Australian banks. He estimated the technical and
allocative efficiency of Australian banks and compared them with similar banks in
Europe and U.S. The results showed that Australian banks were ranked in the
lower level of efficiency vis-à-vis American and European banks. Also, the
inefficiency of Australian banks was attributed to the wasting of inputs (technical
inefficiency) rather than choosing the incorrect input combinations (allocative
inefficiency). Domestic banks were found to be more efficient than foreign owned
banks in Australia.

Sufian (2007c) applied the intermediation approach to analyse the performance of
Malaysian non-bank financial institutions during the post crisis period 2000-2004.
Accordingly, he modelled Malaysian non-bank financial institutions as multiproduct firms, producing two outputs and employing two inputs. The empirical
results indicated that these institutions experienced productivity regress of 2.3%
and that this productivity regress was largely attributable to Technological Change
(-5.9%) rather than Technical Efficiency Change (+5.1%). In addition, 60% of
Malaysian non-bank financial institutions showed signs of productivity regress,
ranging from 1.3% to as high as 45.8%.

In some of studies, the Production approach has been employed, in which banks
are mainly regarded as providers of services to customers. The input set under this
approach includes physical variables (e.g., labour, material, space or information

82

systems) or their associated costs, since only physical inputs are required to
perform banking services. Output under this approach includes services provided
to customers and can be measured by the number and type of transactions,
documents processed or specialised services supplied over a given time period. In
the case of non-availability of detailed transaction, this can be substituted by data
on the number of deposit and loan accounts (Inui et al., 2008). However, there are
no studies that have employed the production approach alone; generally it has
been used in conjunction with other methods.

For instance, using DEA, Sufian (2007a) examined the relative efficiency between
domestic and foreign banks in the Malaysian banking system by applying both the
production and intermediation approaches. The author attempted to investigate the
consistency of the estimated DEA efficiency scores by examining its relationship
with traditional measures of bank performance. The results from the DEA analysis
showed that Malaysian Islamic bank efficiency declined in 2002 and improved a
little in years 2003 and 2004. The domestic Islamic banks were slightly more
efficient compared to foreign Islamic banks. The findings from the correlation
coefficients proved the dominance of scale in determining the technical efficiency
of Malaysian Islamic banks. The findings also suggested that profitability is
significantly and positively correlated to all efficiency measures.

Two other approaches, rarely used in the literature, are the Value-added approach
and the Operating approach. The Value-added approach is another approach that
identifies those balance-sheet categories (assets or liabilities) as outputs that
contribute to bank value added, i.e., business associated with the consumption of
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real resources. Overall, the major categories of deposits (e.g., demand, term and
saving deposits) and loans (e.g., mortgages and commercial loans) are regarded as
outputs because they are responsible for a significant proportion of value added
(Das and Ghosh, 2006). Under the Operating or income-based approach, banks
are viewed as business units with the final objective of generating revenue from
the total cost incurred from running the business (Inui et al., 2008). Accordingly,
it defines banks’ output as the total revenue (interest and non-interest) and inputs
as total expenses such as interest and operating expenses (Das and Ghosh, 2006).
However, neither of these two approaches has been independently applied for the
estimation of financial institution efficiency.

A number of studies have used a number of different approaches to compare the
results from DEA models. For example, Worthington (2000) in a study of
Australian

building

societies,

utilised

three

different

approaches,

i.e.

intermediation approach, value-added approach and operating approach, to
conduct a DEA analysis over the period 1993 to 1997. The results obtained
indicated that most credit unions had experienced productivity gains during the
last years of the period mainly due to technological progress rather than efficiency
improvements. The result also indicated that productivity expansion, which had
happened due to a growth in efficiency over the period tended to be as a result of a
development in scale efficiency, while efficiency gains were most pronounced in
building societies with a high ratio of net interest income and noninterest income
to total assets, a low operating expense ratios, and relatively high expenditures on
marketing and promotion.
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Inui et al. (2008) also applied the intermediation approach, value-added approach
and operating approach within the framework of one-stage SFA investigating the
pattern of changes in efficiency and productivity of the Japanese and Korean
banking sectors for the period 1991-2005. Results from intermediation approach
indicated that productivity had declined overall during the sample period for the
banks in both countries, the operating approach produced mixed results for the
two countries. However, the value-added approach indicated positive TFP growth
for the banks in both countries.

3.4.3 Association between Efficiency and Internal Bank-Specific
Variables
Several approaches can be found in the literature for analysing efficiency
measures. A number of studies have focused on the effect of internal bankspecific

factors

such

as

bank

size/asset

size/liability

structure,

ownership/organisation structure, and institutional age. Regarding the effect of
ownership on an institution’s performance, previous research has shown different
results between developed and developing economies. In general, domestic
institutions in developed countries were found to be more efficient than their
foreign-owned counterparts. For instance, Chang et al. (1998) performed a
comparative analysis of the productive efficiency of foreign-owned and U.S.owned multinational commercial banks operating in the U.S. over the time period
1984 to 1989. A multi product translog stochastic cost frontier model was applied
to estimate cost inefficiency scores, while ordinary least squares and Tobit
regressions were utilized to recognize key factors associated with the inefficiency.
Their findings showed that foreign-owned multinational banks operating in the
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US were considerably less efficient than were their U.S.-owned counterparts.
They also found that large multinational banks carrying fewer foreign assets were
more efficient.

On the contrary, most of the literature comparing bank efficiency across different
ownership groups in developing countries reveal that foreign banks are more
efficient than domestic banks. For example, Sathye (2003) measured the
productive efficiency of banks India using DEA. Efficiency scores for three
groups of banks, that is publicly-controlled, private and foreign banks were
measured. It was found that the efficiency of privately-owned banks was lower
than that of foreign banks. Chen et al. (2005) also examined the cost, technical
and allocative efficiency of 43 Chinese banks using DEA over the period 1993 to
2000. They found that foreign ownership was significantly and positively related
with the level of bank efficiency, while government ownership had the contrary
effect on Chinese banks after financial liberalization. Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998)
also examined bank efficiency in Croatia using the stochastic frontier approach
between 1994 and 1995. They found that newly organized private banks more
efficient than were state-owned institutions.

Regarding the relationship between bank size and bank efficiency no consistent
picture appears from previous empirical studies, as the results are mixed. For
example, Mester (1996) and Avkiran (1999) did not identify any significant
relationship between size and efficiency. Also, Mendes (1999) found no clear
relationship between size and cost efficiency. However, in another application of
DEA to analyse pre and post deregulation eras in China, Chen et al. (2005) found
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that large banks and small banks were relatively more efficient than medium-sized
banks. In addition, Ataullah et al (2004) examined the relationship between bank
size and technical efficiency. Using DEA they provided a comparative analysis of
the evolution of the technical efficiency of commercial banks in India and
Pakistan during 1988-1998. They found positive relationships between the size
and efficiency of banks in both the input–output models. In addition, it was found
that the gap between the pure technical efficiency of different size groups had
declined over the years. It was also found that banks are relatively more efficient
in generating earning assets than in generating income. This was attributed to the
presence of high non-performing loans.

Using The DEA, Ketkar et al. (2003) examined the relative efficiency of 39 Indian
publicly-owned, privately-owned and foreign-owned banks from 1990 to 1995.
They concluded that size was positively correlated to the pure technical
efficiency, and also foreign banks appeared to be the most efficient group. Using
the distribution free approach (DFA), Rogers (1998) utilized a balanced panel of
8386 US commercial banks over the years 1991 to 1996 to estimate cost and
profit frontiers. He assessed the capability of small banks by examining their Xefficiency relative to larger institutions. Small banks were found to be less profit
efficient than larger institutions, but more cost efficient. This result highlights the
argument of Cole and Gunther (1995) that larger banks can be assumed to possess
more flexibility in financial markets and are better able to diversify credit risk.
Paxton (2007) used DEA and SFA to create a nonparametric frontier of
technically efficient firms based on a sample of 350 semi-formal financial
institutions in Mexico in 2001. He found that larger banks were more efficient.
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A number of studies have related efficiency measures to different bank-specific
variables at the same time. For instance, using DEA Das and Ghosh (2006)
investigated the performance of the Indian commercial banking sector, and several
efficiency estimates of individual banks were evaluated during the post reform
period 1992–2002. Three different approaches (intermediation approach, valueadded approach and operating approach) were employed to distinguish how
efficiency scores vary with changes in inputs and outputs. The variations in
calculated efficiencies were linked to a set of variables, i.e., bank size, ownership,
capital adequacy ratio, non-performing loans and management quality. Their
findings suggested that medium-sized public sector banks performed reasonably
well and were more expected to operate at higher levels of technical efficiency.
Also, those banks that had, on average, less non-performing loans were
technically more efficient.

On the issue of efficiency and institutional age, some studies examine whether age
is related to efficiency. Employing DEA Isik (2008) investigated the technical Xefficiency and productivity growth of de novo banks in comparison with
established banks in Turkey. 25 One-year-old banks demonstrated 8% higher
efficiency than more established banks. However, the X-efficiency score of de
novo banks declined gradually after the age of 6, and dropped lower than that of
established banks by years 9 and 10. Isik and Hassan (2003a) also state that age
and efficiency are negatively related. They mention that older Turkish banks
might be associated with more bureaucracy and clumsy formal organizational
forms, rather than with learning by doing.

25

Novo Banks are those banks that are younger than or equal to 10 years of age.
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Mester (1996) applied the stochastic cost frontier approach to investigate the
efficiency of banks operating in the Third Federal Reserve District in the U.S.
Mester (1996) included the bank’s age in their efficiency analysis and suggested
that the higher efficiency of older banks might be due to the fact that de novo
banks have higher start-up costs, such as establishing customer relationships. In
agreement with the learning by doing hypothesis, Mester (1996) obtained that
inefficient banks tend to be younger even though de novo banks were excluded
from the study due to their high start-up costs.

However, some studies like Canhoto and Dermine (2003) produced different
results. Under a DEA method Canhoto and Dermine (2003) investigated the
impact of deregulation on technical efficiency over time (1990–1995) across
groups of banks from different generations, both old and new, in Portugal. The
new banks were found to be more efficient than old banks, with an average
efficiency score of 77 per cent compared to 62 per cent for the old banks. They
also found that the technical efficiency change for the new banks was higher than
that for old banks, thus indicating a superior improvement in efficiency over time.
Table 3.2 summarises the findings of the above studies reviewed.

Table 3.2: Different Techniques, Output Measures and Internal Bankspecific Variables.
Table 3.2 Continued
Author
Country
Choi
et
al. US
(2007)

Years
1996-2005

Approach
DEA and SFA

Main conclusions
Bank-specific characteristics could
explain DEA efficiency scores
better
than
SFA
efficiency
measures.

Fiorentino et al.
(2006)

1993
2004

DEA and SFA

Non-parametric
methods
are
sensitive to measurement error and
outliers.

Germany

and

89

Table 3.2 Continued
Author
Country
Sturm
and Australia
Williams (2004)

Years
1988–2001

Approach
DEA,
Malmquist
and SFA

Main conclusions
Overall consistency between these
two approaches toward measuring
bank efficiency.

Hassan
and
Hunter (1996)

Japanese
in US

1995

SFA and TFA

Domestically owned U.S banks
were considerably more cost
effective than Japanese banks
operating in the U.S.

Sathye (2001)

Australia

1996

DEA
Intermediation

Australian banks were ranked in the
lower level of efficiency vis-à-vis
American and European banks.

Sufian (2007c)

Malaysia

2000-2004

DEA
Intermediation

Malaysian
non-bank
financial
institutions had a productivity
regress and it was largely attributed
to Technological Change rather
than Technical Efficiency Change.

Sufian (2007a)

Malaysia

2001-2004

DEA,
Production
and
intermediation
approach

The domestic Islamic banks were
more efficient compared to the
foreign Islamic banks, although
only slightly so.

Worthington
(2000)

Australia

1993-1997

DEA,
intermediation
, value-added
and operating
approach

Most of Australian building
societies
had
experienced
productivity gains in the last years
of the period.

Inui et al. (2008)

Korea

1991-2005

DEA, SFA,
intermediation
, value-added
and operating
approach

Mixed results of efficiency and
productivity
from
different
approaches.

Chang
(1998)

US

1984-1989

SFA, Tobit
and OLS

India

1997-1998

DEA

Foreign-owned multinational banks
operating in the US were
significantly less efficient than
were their US-owned counterparts.
Efficiency of privately-owned
banks was lower than that of
foreign banks.

China

1993-2000

DEA

Foreign
ownership
was
significantly and positively related
with bank efficiency level, while
government ownership had the
contrary effect on Chinese banks
after financial liberalization.

Croatia

1994-1995

SFA

Newly organized private banks
were more efficient than were stateowned institutions.

et

al.

Sathye (2003)

Chen
(2005)

et

al.

Kraft
and
Tirtiroglu (1998)
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Table 3.2 Continued
Author
Country
Chen
et
al. China
(2005)

Ataullah
(2004)

Approach
DEA

Main conclusions
Large banks and small banks were
relatively more efficient than
medium-sized banks.

al

India and
Pakistan

1988-1998

DEA

a positive relationship between the
size and the efficiency of banks.

al.

India

1990-1995

DEA

The size was positively correlated
to the pure technical efficiency, and
also foreign banks appeared to be
the most efficient group.

Rogers (1998)

US

1991-1996

DFA

Small banks were found to be less
profit
efficient
than
larger
institutions, but more cost efficient.

Paxton (2007)

Mexico

2001

DEA

Larger banks were more efficient.

Das and Ghosh
(2006)

India

1992-2002

DEA,
intermediation
, value-added
and operating
approach

Medium-sized public sector banks
performed reasonably well and
were more expected to operate at
of
technical
higher
levels
efficiency.

Isik (2008)

Turkey

1981-1996

DEA and
Malmquist

Overall, older banks were more
efficient than new banks.

Canhoto
and
Dermine (2003)

Portugal

1990-1995

DEA

Efficiency and technical efficiency
changes of new banks were higher.

Ketkar
(2003)

et

Years
1993-2000

et

Source: As described above.

3.4.4 Methodological Issues
There have been a large number of studies to evaluate both parametric and
nonparametric frontier models and estimations in this field. Since the focus of this
study is on an application of DEA to financial institutions, the methodology
studies noted here are mostly limited to those in which there has been an
application of the DEA approach to financial institutions. Consequently,
methodological issues will be analysed in the following topics: Efficiency
measures, Constant vs. Variable Returns to scale, and, Input-Output orientation.
The majority of the studies focus on the technical efficiency of banks to indicate
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whether a bank uses the minimum quantity of inputs to produce a given quantity
of outputs, or to maximize the output quantity given a certain quantity of inputs.

For instance, Pasiouras (2008b) used a sample of 715 banks from 95 countries and
two-stage DEA to present international evidence on the impact of regulations and
supervision approaches on banks’ technical efficiency during 2003. They applied
DEA to estimate technical and scale efficiency in the first stage, and, in the
second stage, Tobit regression was used to investigate the impact of several
regulations on banks’ technical efficiency. DEA results showed that the average
bank in the sample could raise its overall technical efficiency by 33.20% and pure
technical efficiency by 29.20% while it had a deviation of 5.5% from its efficient
size of scale. Drake et al. (2006) assessed the relative technical efficiency of
institutions operating in Hong Kong’s banking system using the DEA. Finally,
high levels of technical inefficiency for many institutions, considerable variations
in efficiency levels and also differential impacts of environmental factors on
different size groups were obtained.

In Greece, using DEA, Pasiouras (2008a) investigated the efficiency of
commercial banks over the period 2000–2004. Their results showed that the
differences between the efficiency scores achieved through the profit-oriented and
intermediation approaches are in general small. Also, he stated that those banks
which had expanded their operations out of the country appeared to be more
technically efficient than those operating at only the national level. Besides,
higher capitalization, loan activity, and market power increased the efficiency of
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banks. The number of branches impacted on efficiency positively and
significantly, but the number of ATMs did not have this effect.

Still on the subject of efficiency measures, when price data for the inputs and/or
outputs are available it is also possible to estimate cost and/or profit efficiency
measures. Cost efficiency (economic efficiency) refers to the ability of a bank to
use the optimum mix of inputs given their respective prices. This is the product of
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Accordingly, cost efficiency shows
the ability of a bank to provide services without wasting resources as a result of
technical or allocative inefficiency. Some studies have presented measures of
DEA cost efficiency e.g. Sathye (2001), Isik and Hassan (2002) and Isik and
Hassan.(2003a).

Under DEA, Sathye (2001) calculated the X-efficiency (technical and allocative
efficiency) and cost efficiency scores of Australian banks in 1996 using a sample
of 29 out of 32 locally incorporated banks. The results showed that the efficiency
of Australian banks is below the world mean efficiency and banks needed to
improve it further in an attempt to achieve world best practice. Consequently, it is
recommended that the banks need to reduce the ratio of operating expenses to
both total assets and operating income. Banks could do it by encouraging
customers to use telephone banking and Internet banking, which have been found
to be cost effective ways for the delivery of financial services.

Employing the DEA method, Isik and Hassan (2002) estimated the cost efficiency
of Turkish banks over the 1988–1996 period. They found that overall cost
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efficiency is 72%, implying that about 30% of bank resources were wasted during
the production of banking services. Their study also indicated that the production
efficiencies of the industry constantly fell over time, which could be as a result of
increases in the cost of funding and growth of the banks during the last years of
the period. Also, they decomposed overall cost efficiency into its allocative and
technical efficiency components. The results suggested that the main source of the
cost inefficiency in the Turkish commercial banking sector was caused by
technical inefficiency rather than allocative inefficiency (managerial inefficiency).
As regulation was typically given as a major source of allocative inefficiency,
poor management was usually associated with technical inefficiency.

In another study of Turkish commercial banks between 1988 and 1996, Isik and
Hassan (2003a) explore the impact of ownership, market structure, government
control

and other bank characteristics on bank efficiency. Isik and Hassan

(2003a) employed a DEA approach and found that public and foreign banks
outperform private banks in terms of cost efficiency and technical efficiency, but
public banks dominate both these banks in terms of allocative efficiency. It is
suggested that one possible reason for the ‘superiority’ of public ownership in
allocative efficiency is that public banks benefited from lower factor prices
compared with both domestic and foreign private banks, particularly in terms of
labour. The results also indicated that banks with a more educated work force are
more cost efficient.

Concerning productivity growth, Fethi and Pasiouras (2010) stated that about 40
studies in this area, attained estimates of total factor productivity growth which

94

almost all of these studies employed a DEA-like Malmquist index to attain this
purpose (e.g. Sathye (2002); Casu et al. (2004)). Using this index one is able to
decomposed technical efficiency measure into technological change (that is a shift
in the best practice frontier) and technical efficiency change.

Using Malmquist indices, Sathye (2002) calculated productivity changes in
Australian banking during the period 1995-1999. A balanced panel data set of 17
banks was used. It was found that technical efficiency and total factor productivity
declined 3.1 per cent and 3.5 per cent respectively during the study period.
However, the mean score of technical efficiency and TFP were positive.
Furthermore, in respect of six banks (i.e. Adelaide bank, ANZ, Bank of Tokyo,
Citibank, HSBC, and Macquarie Bank) the mean efficiency change was more than
unity. Eight out of the 17 Australian banks in the panel did not indicate
productivity increases during the period. Finally, it was recommended that banks
must continue to rationalise their fee structure and bring down operating expenses.
Casu et al. (2004) evaluated the cost and profit efficiency and productivity change
of Italian financial institutions during the 1990s, using both DEA and SFA
approaches and Malmquist indices. The impact of growth strategies on cost and
profit efficiency were investigated in this study. The results indicated that Italian
banks had benefited from a constant improvement in profit efficiency, while they
had not experienced an apparent increase in cost efficiency. This improvement in
overall productivity is related to a sharp increase in pure technical efficiency
(+33% over the period) rather than in scale efficiency (1% over the period).
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Generally, the Malmquist Index approach is a chained index approach, which
measures changes in efficiency relative to a base year. Then, production frontiers
for a base year and following years are measured and each firm’s movement in
efficiency relative to these frontiers are estimated. However, the Malmquist
approach has a limitation when applied to unbalanced panel data. As Coelli
(1996) emphasized, the panel must be balanced, meaning all firms must be
observed in all time periods. Thus, in the case of Iranian banks, this index can be
applied for a period after 2003, where the panel is balanced.

Moreover, Wheelock and Wilson (1999) proposed an alternative decomposition of
the Malmquist index in the case of the US banks for a period between 1984 and
1993. They estimate changes in technology by changes in the VRS estimate, and
further decompose the technical changes into pure technical change and changes
in the scale of efficiency. They also employed a bootstrap technique to estimate
confidence intervals for Malmquist indices. Wheelock and Wilson (1999) showed
that the growing inefficiency of US banks in the period 1984-1993 can be largely
attributed to the general failure of banks to adopt technological improvements.
Gilbert and Wilson (1998) also employed the same technique and studied the
effect of deregulation on the productivity of Korean banks between 1980 and
1994. The index of changes in pure technology indicates that after deregulation
Korean banks altered their mix of inputs and outputs considerably, leading to
improvements in productivity. The index of change in the scale of technology
suggested that the most efficient scale size was increasing over time.
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While it seems that in many empirical applications the bootstrap approach is more
appropriate than the traditional Malmquist, it has not been widely used in other
applied studies, presumably due to the lack of user-friendly software. In this study
I apply the FEAR package in R, which was introduced by Wilson (2006) to
estimate technical efficiency, the different components of the Malmquist
productivity index, and their confidence intervals.

Concerning Constant and Variable Returns to Scale assumptions, DEA can be
applied by assuming either Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) or Variable Returns
to Scale (VRS). Charnes et al. (1978) proposed an input orientation model and
assumed CRS. This model yields a score that specifies the Overall Technical
Efficiency (OTE) of each bank. CRS is only suitable when all firms are operating
at an optimal scale. However, factors like imperfect competition and some
constraints on the banking system may cause a firm not to be operating at its
optimal scale. Consequently, the use of the CRS specification when some DMUs
are not operating at optimal scale, will cause measures of technical efficiency
which are confounded by scale efficiencies. So, Banker et al. (1984) suggested the
use of VRS, which decomposes OTE into two components; pure technical
efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE). The first one relates to the ability of
managers to utilize firms’ given resources, while the second one refers to
exploiting scale economies by operating at a point in which the production
frontier exhibits CRS.

In most of the studies, DEA models are applied using the assumption of VRS.
However, some studies utilise CRS rather than VRS. For instance, Noulas (1997)
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indicates that by assuming CRS, one can compare small and large banks. He
claims that in a sample where some large banks are present the use of the VRS
assumption provokes the possibility that these large banks will seen to be
efficient. Avkiran (1999) also states that under the VRS assumption, each unit is
compared only against other units of a similar size, instead of against all units.
Therefore, the VRS assumption may be more appropriate for large samples.
Accordingly, many studies reported the results obtained under both CRS and VRS
assumptions, such as Canhoto and Dermine (2003) and Percin and Ayan (2006).

Canhoto and Dermine (2003) used Malmquist TFP index to investigate the
performance of the banking system after privatization and the entry of new banks
over the period 1990-1995 in Portugal. They estimated efficiency scores under
both the CRS and VRS hypotheses. They reported that the CRS efficiency
measure increased from 59% in 1990 to 84% in 1995. Also, the VRS results
showed a similar growth of efficiency scores over the period. Moreover, it was
found that the new banks attained the highest mean CRS efficiency of 77% (VRS
efficiency was 86%) compared to 62% (VRS efficiency was 73%) for the old
commercial banks. So, the reported increase in technical efficiency could be due
to the fact that banks are becoming more efficient and/or to the fact that the
benchmark technology is changing.

Percin and Ayan (2006) also applied DEA and Malmquist assuming both CRS
and VRS to measure and evaluate the efficiency of commercial banks in Turkey
over the period 2003-2004. They found that in 2004, 11 of the 31 banks were
efficient under CRS, while 16 of them were efficient under the VRS assumption.
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Also, for the year 2003, 16 of the 31 banks were efficient under CRS while 23 of
them were efficient under the VRS assumption. This means that the banking
system was improving in terms of input management and scale efficiency. Also,
Malmquist index results showed that there was an increase of bank's efficiency
changes over the time period of 2003-2004.

In terms of input-output orientation, technical efficiency can be estimated under
either an input-oriented or output-oriented approach. According to Coelli et al.
(2005) the input-oriented technical efficiency measures address the question: “By
how much can input quantities be proportionally reduced without changing the
output quantities produced?” (p.137). Quite the opposite, the output-oriented
measures of technical efficiency address the question: “By how much can output
quantities be proportionally expanded without altering the input quantities used?”
(p.137). Because of the assumption that bank managers have higher control over
inputs (for example on personnel, expenses, etc) rather than outputs (for example
loans, income, etc), the input-oriented approach has usually been employed to
estimate the efficiency of banks. However, there are also some studies that adopt
the output-oriented approach, such as Ataullah et al. (2004); Ataullah and Le
(2006). Some studies use both approaches such as Casu and Molyneux (2004),
and Beccalli et al. (2006). It should be mentioned that the input-oriented and
output-oriented measures provide equal value under the CRS assumption, but they
are not similar when VRS is assumed. However, Coelli et al. (2005) declare that
since DEA does not suffer from statistical problems, the choice of an appropriate
orientation is not as vital as for econometric approaches.
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Casu and Molyneux (2004) employed a two-stage DEA approach under both the
input and output assumptions to investigate the efficiency of European banks
between 1993 and 1997. They found that there was a slight improvement in
efficiency levels through time (+6.3% in relation to the input-based approach and
+6.6% in relation to the output-based approach), and also efficiency differences
across European banking markets appeared to be chiefly determined by countryspecific factors. Beccalli et al. (2006) employed DEA and SFA under both input
and output-orientations to estimate measures of bank cost efficiency for a sample
of European banks listed in 2000. Following their empirical results, DEA
efficiency scores presented greater variability that SFA, and efficiency ranged
between 70% and 90% indicating an average inefficiency of around 15%. Table
3.3 summarises the findings of the above studies reviewed.

Table 3.3: Methodological Issues.
Table 3.3 Continued
Author
Country
Pasiouras
International
(2008b)
study

Years
2003

Approach
DEA

Main conclusions
Overall technical efficiency and
pure
technical
efficiency
increased.

Hong Kong

2003

Slacks-based
DEA

High
levels
of
technical
inefficiency
for
many
institutions, and considerable
variations in efficiency levels.

Pasiouras
(2008a)

Greece

2000-2004

DEA, profitoriented and
intermediation
approaches

Those
banks
which
had
expanded their operations out of
the
country
were
more
technically efficient than those
operating only at the national
level.

Sathye (2001)

Australia

1996

DEA,
Cost
efficiency

Cost efficiency of Australian
banks is below the world mean
efficiency.

Isik and Hassan
(2002)

Turkey

1988–1996

DEA,
Cost
efficiency

About 30% of bank resources
were
wasted
during
the
production of banking services.

Drake et
(2006)

al.
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Table 3.3 Continued
Author
Country
Sathye (2002)
Australia

Years
1995-1999

Approach
DEA-like and
Malmquist
approach

Main conclusions
Total
factor
productivity
declined, but, the mean score of
technical efficiency and the TFP
were positive.

Italy

1990s

DEA,
Malmquist
and SFA

Italian banks benefited from a
constant improvement in profit
efficiency, while they have not
experienced an apparent increase
in cost efficiency.

Wheelock and
Wilson (1999)

United
States

1984-1993

DEA
and
Malmquist
assuming
VRS

Growing inefficiency of US
banks in the period 1984-1993
can be largely attributed to the
general failure of banks to adopt
technological improvements.

Gilbert
and
Wilson (1998)

Korea

1980-1994

DEA
and
Malmquist
assuming
VRS

After deregulation Korean banks
altered their mix of inputs and
outputs considerably, leading to
improvements in productivity.

Canhoto
and
Dermine (2003)

Portugal

1990-1995

DEA,
Malmquist,
CRS and VRS

CRS and VRS efficiency of new
and old banks increased.

Percin
and
Ayan (2006)

Turkey

2003-2004

DEA,
Malmquist,
CRS and VRS

All approaches and indices
showed increased efficiency and
productivity over time.

Casu
and
Molyneux
(2004)

Europe

1993-1997

DEA,
Input
and
output
orientations

There was a slight improvement
in efficiency levels through
time(under both assumptions)

Beccalli et al.
(2006)

Europe

2000

DEA, SFA,
Input
and
output
orientations

DEA efficiency scores than
presented greater variability that
of SFA.

Casu et
(2004)

al.

Source: As described above.
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3.5 Summary
Over the years many studies have used DEA to analyse financial sector efficiency.
The literature on the efficiency of financial institutions in the US and other well
developed countries is considerable. However, specific studies are lacking for
most developing countries, including Iran. As mentioned in the first chapter, no
study of Iranian banks has been conducted in English, and other studies (in Farsi)
have taken a superficial view on this topic and contain major weaknesses.

The literature review related to efficiency of financial institution was divided into
two sections a) the application of efficiency to evaluate government policies, b)
application of efficiency to address general research issues. In the former section
the relationship of efficiency measures and different types of financial reforms
and deregulation were investigated. Also the effect of deregulation is included in
this part. In the second section, several efficiency techniques, output measures,
internal bank specific variables and methodologies issues were highlighted and
analysed.

Given that a primary aim of deregulation has been to enrich efficiency, the results
have been mixed. The review of efficiency studies exposed the fact that
deregulation and economic reforms do not guarantee improved efficiency and
productivity. The majority of studies showed that efficiency had improved after
financial liberalisation, especially in small size and private banks. This is because
the main aim of financial liberalisation is to enhance the level of competition
amongst the institutions and to exert more pressure on the efficient utilisation of
their resources. However, regarding mergers, there is little evidence to suggest
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that it produces economies of scale or gains in managerial efficiency or results in
cost reduction. In this content, the financial policies adapted for Iran’s banking
system, its economic reforms and regulations are investigated in this study.

As mentioned previously the classification and choice of inputs and outputs in the
DEA approach depend on the availability of data; many studies choose several
combinations of inputs-outputs to test for the sensitivity of their results. The
majority of studies have employed the intermediation approach to conduct their
efficiency analysis because it involves the use of different categories of deposits,
loans, financial investments and borrowing, and, also, the data are more available
using this approach. However, identification of inputs and outputs is very
important in assessing banking unit performance, and the results may vary due to
the selection of different input-output mixes. Consequently, utilising and
comparing the results from DEA using a number of different approaches seems to
be appropriate. Thus, following a number of studies, two principal approaches, i.e.
intermediation approach and operating approach, are applied in this study to
conduct a DEA analysis.

To explore and analyse the main effective factors explaining efficiency variations
among different firms, a number of studies applied regression models (two-stage
DEA) such as Tobit and OLS to explain the variation of efficiency scores and
identify the key factors associated with efficiency. However, a conceptual issue
has been raised Xue and Harker (1999) that efficiency scores produced by DEA
models are clearly dependent on each other in the statistical sense. This
dependency is due to the fact that the DEA efficiency score is a relative efficiency
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index, not an absolute efficiency index. Because of the existence of this inherent
dependency among efficiency scores, independence within the sample, which is
one fundamental model assumption required by regression analysis, is violated.
Consequently, the standard procedure becomes invalid. Besides, in this study,
because of the very small sample size, it was not feasible to apply any kind of the
regression models. Hence, in this study a univariate cross-tabulation approach will
be used to examine how technical efficiency varies by ownership. Accordingly,
this thesis divided them in three groups of commercial banks, specialised banks
and private banks. These groups are also representing the largest, medium-sized
and smallest banks, respectively. So, in this study, the effect of banks’ size on
their efficiency has not been separately analysed. The existing literature differs on
the relationship between ownership of the institutions and efficiency. Foreign
banks and private banks are found to be more efficient than domestic banks in
developing nations. In terms of size of the firms, some of the studies do not detect
any significant relationship between size and efficiency. However, in number of
studies new firms are found to be more efficient than old firms.

Although productivity changes over time can be expected to influence bank
efficiency, not many studies addressed this issue. Some studies employ the
Malmquist index to assess financial sector productivity over time. Although the
results are generally mixed, it is found that productivity improves over most
periods of investigation. However, the Malmquist approach cannot be used for
unbalanced panel data. It means that all firms must be observed in all time
periods. Thus, in the case of Iranian banks I apply this index for a period, between
2003 and 2008, where the panel is balanced. Another problem with almost all the
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studies that applied the traditional Malmquist is that they only consider the CRS
assumption and the effect of scale inefficiency is ignored and vice versa. In this
study, however, DEA and the Malmquist TFP index are employed VRS. Besides,
for the first time in the banking context the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index is used to
analyse efficiency and productivity which is free from any assumptions
concerning firm optimising behaviour, the structure of markets, or returns to scale.
It will be discussed in the next chapter.

In sum, the contributions of this study to the existing literature are
a) to add to the empirical literature on the efficiency of financial institutions for a
developing country, Iran, and
b) to extend the literature by deriving more accurate measures of efficiency,
productivity and their determinants in the case of financial institutions.
The studies reviewed above mostly adopted DEA in carrying out their analysis.
This study also adopts DEA to assess technical efficiency and productivity in
Iran’s financial institutions.
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Chapter Four
Methodology

4.1 Introduction
Traditional ways of measuring the performance of financial institutions use
financial ratios; however, such measures do not capture the long-term
performance of institutions (Sherman and Gold, 1985). In recent years, there has
been development on the way to measure the performance of financial institutions
using the frontier analysis method; see Rangan et al. (1988); Favero and Papi
(1995); Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998); Canhoto and Dermine (2003); Das and Ghosh
(2006). Under frontier analysis, institutions that perform highly are separated from
those that perform poorly. This type of division is undertaken either by applying a
parametric or non-parametric frontier analysis to firms within an industry. Both
parametric and non-parametric approaches have some advantages and
disadvantages. However, there is not any consensus in the literature about the
preferred method of analysis.

In this study, a non-parametric DEA model is implemented. The most relevant
advantage of this approach in the context of this study is that it works well with
small sample sizes. As there are only seventeen banks in Iran’s banking system,
the banking industry is less matched to parametric (econometric) analyses
techniques which mostly have been used to analyse the banking systems of
developed countries such as the United States, where there are a tremendous
number of financial institutions. There are also other important advantages of
DEA that will be discussed in this chapter, e.g. we do not need to state a specific
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form for the production function; there is no restriction on the functional form of
the production relationship; and it is able to use data on various inputs and outputs
and show the magnitude of inefficiency.

This chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 presents a framework for
measuring efficiency by the use of DEA. Different DEA model is formulated
under CRS and VRS technologies and input/output-oriented assumptions. The
measurement of scale efficiency and nature of return to scale are also discussed in
this section. Section 4.2 presents the treatment of slacks and provides different
models to minimize input and output-slacks. Section 4.3 focuses on the theoretical
background of the Malmquist indices. A formulation of the bootstrapping
technique is presented in section 4.4. New decomposing of total factor
productivity index which is presented by O’Donnell (2008, 2010b) is also
provided in section 4.5. This section also provides a review of efficiency concepts
which includes technical efficiency, scale efficiency, mix efficiency, residual
scale efficiency and residual mix efficiency. Section 4.6 compares DEA and
parametric approaches, and section 4.7 deals with the specification of inputs and
outputs employed in the evaluation of efficiency and productivity. Finally the last
section, 4.8, summarises the chapter.

4.1.1 Efficiency Measurement Using DEA
DEA was first developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) as a linear
programming technique to assess the comparative efficiency of homogenous
operating units. This technique constructs a non-parametric piecewise surface, or
efficient frontier, and efficiency measures of decision making units (DMUs) are
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then estimated relative to this frontier. DMUs that lie on the efficient border are
the best practice institutions and retain a value of one, while those DMUs which
are enveloped by the efficient frontier and lie below this border are relatively
inefficient and have values between 0 and 1. Smaller efficiency scores highlight
less relative efficiency of DMUs. The main objectives of DEA are to identify
best-practice and worst-practice DMUs, and to find the best ways for
improvement of a unit’s efficiency and performance. The envelopment solution to
a DEA model generates two useful consequences.

Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) (1978) applied and extended the economic
aspect of linear programming, which was introduced by Farrell (1957) twenty
years earlier. In the period post-1978, both theoretical and practical aspects of
DEA developed rapidly. According to Emrouznejad et al. (2008), there were 4000
publications using the DEA technique in different areas until 2007. As to its
applications in the banking system, Molyneux et al. (1996) argued that Sherman
and Gold (1985) were the first to apply this method to investigate efficiency
within the banking sector.

Charnes et al. (1978) (CCR model) assumed the existence of both CRS and input
orientation in calculating resulting technical efficiency indices. The CRS
assumption can be appropriate when all firms are functioning at an optimal scale.
Nevertheless, due to imperfect competition, government control or regulation,
financial limitation etc., a DMU may not actually perform at its optimal scale.
Thus, the use of a CRS specification, when production is not at its optimal level,
will yield distorted technical efficiency scores. Therefore, subsequent studies,
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such as Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) (BCC model) and Färe et al. (1983),
suggested an extension to account for the VRS assumption. The use of the VRS
specification enables calculation of technical efficiency free of these scaleefficiency distortion effects. While CRS is a required condition for competitive
markets, it is recognized in the Iranian banking system that the market is not
competitive; therefore, VRS captures the situation more accurately. Consequently,
in the present study VRS will be adopted.

4.1.2 Constant Returns to Scale Assumption under an InputOriented Model
The input-oriented CRS model can be described as follows. First, assume there is
data for N inputs and M outputs for each of I firms. For the i − th firm, N and
M are represented by the column vectors

xi

and qi , respectively. The N ×1

input matrix, X , and the M ×1 output matrix, Q , represent the data for all I
DMUs. To ensure that the efficiency measure of each of the N DMUs is
maximised a measure of the ratio of all weighted outputs over all weighted inputs
should be obtained for each DMU, such as u′qi / v′xi ; where u is a M ×1 vector
of output weights and v is a N ×1 vector of input weights. To select optimal
weights the following mathematical programming problem must be solved:

max u ,v (u′qi / v′xi ),
st

u′qi / v′xi ≤ 1,

j=
1, 2,..., I ,

(4.1)

u, v ≥ 0
So, under this constraint, all efficiency measures must be less than or equal to one,
and finding values for u and v can maximize the efficiency measure of the i − th
DMU. However, one problem with this special ratio formulation is that it has an
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infinite number of solutions. For instance, if (u*, v*) is a solution, then
( β u*, β v*) is another solution. So, to avoid this problem, the constraint v′xi = 1 is

imposed, which provides a multiplier form of the DEA model:

max µ ,v ( µ ′qi ),
v′xi = 1,
µ ′q j - v′x j ≤ 0,

st

j=
1, 2,..., I ,

(4.2)

µ , v ≥ 0,
To underline the point that this form is a different linear programming problem, u
and v are changed to μ and v. Finally, using the dual linear programming (LP)
problem, an equivalent envelopment form of this LP problem can be derived as
follows:

minθ ,λ θ ,
st

− qi + Qλ ≥ 0

(4.3)

θ xi − X λ ≥ 0
λ ≥0

where λ is a I ×1 vector of constants, and θ is a scalar. The value of θ implies
the technical efficiency score for the i − th firm. To estimate the value of θ for
each firm the linear programming must be solved I times, once for each firm in
the sample. As Farrell (1957) shows θ ≤ 1 , and if θ =1 the production point lies
on the efficient frontier and the firm is technically efficient. Due to fewer
constraints in contrast to the multiplier form, this envelopment form is generally
the preferred form to solve.

4.1.3 Variable Returns to Scale Assumption
VRS linear programming can be simply formed by adding the convexity
constraint I1′λ = 1 to the envelopment form, to provide:
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min θ ,λ θ ,
st

− qi + Qλ ≥ 0

θ xi − X λ ≥ 0
I1′λ = 1
λ ≥ 0,

(4.4)

Where I1 is a I ×1 vector of unity. This technique structures a convex hull of
linear segments that envelop production points more compactly, hence presenting
the technical efficiency measures which are greater than or equal to those using
the CRS model.

4.1.4 Estimation of Scale Efficiency and the Nature of Returns to
Scale
To calculate the scale efficiency index for each firm, both CRS and VRS models
must be solved. Then, the technical efficiency measure obtained from a CRS
model will be decomposed into two components: scale inefficiency and pure
technical inefficiency. If the technical efficiency measure obtained from VRS and
CRS models are unequal, this means that the firm has scale inefficiency. This
inefficiency can be calculated by the equation below, as defined by Coelli (2005):

TE
=
TEVRS × SE
CRS

(4.5)

Accordingly, the CRS technical efficiency measure is decomposed into pure
technical efficiency (VRS TE) and scale efficiency (SE). However, this measure
of scale efficiency does not specify whether the DMU is operating under
increasing (IRS) or decreasing (DRS) returns to scale. Hence, the next stage in the
analysis is to run the linear programming problem assuming non-increasing
returns to scale (NIRS), through substituting the convexity constraint N1′λ ≤ 1 for
N1′λ = 1 . If there is a difference in the efficiency score in this stage and the one
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obtained from the VRS model, then it can be argued that the phenomenon of
increasing returns to scale exists. If the NIRS technical efficiency score is equal to
the VRS value then decreasing returns to scale is applicable.

4.1.5 Output-Orientated Model
It is also possible to calculate technical inefficiency as being any proportional
increase in output production given a certain amount of inputs. Whether to use the
input orientation or the output orientation depends on the DMU’s objective. Is it
after securing as much output as possible from a fixed amount of input, or does
the firm want to minimise the input usage to achieve a given output level? Under
the CRS assumption both of these approaches lead to the same efficiency scores,
but when VRS is assumed the results will be different. However, Coelli (1996)
notes that both of them estimate a similar efficient frontier and, accordingly, they
identify the same efficient DMUs, with only the efficiency scores of the
inefficient DMUs being different. Moreover, he argues that “given that linear
programming cannot suffer from such statistical problems as simultaneous
equation bias, the choice of an appropriate orientation is not as crucial as it is in
the econometric estimation case” (Coelli, 1996, p.23).

The output-oriented model is very similar to an input-oriented model. As an
example, the output-oriented VRS model is presented below:

maxφ ,λ φ ,
st

− φ qi + Qλ ≥ 0,
xi − X λ ≥ 0,
I1′λ = 1

(4.6)

λ ≥ 0,
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Where φ − 1 is the proportional increase in outputs when the input level is held
constant, and 1 ≤ φ ≤ ∞ . Thus, 1/ φ defines the TE score, which is between 0 and
1.

4.2 The Treatment of Slack
Thus far, this chapter has described a basic DEA model where a CRS technology
is assumed, and also a (more general) VRS DEA model. Moreover, the inputoriented and output-oriented versions of these models have been outlined.
However, as stated by Coelli et al. (2005), the piecewise linear form of the nonparametric frontier in DEA can lead to an efficiency measurement problem. This
problem arises because sections of the piecewise linear frontier run parallel to the
axes. Thus, a number of the “efficient” DMUs could reduce their amount of inputs
and still produce the same output. This is known as input slack in the literature.
For the same reason, once one considers a case involving multiple inputs and
outputs the possibility of the related concept of output slack also arises. Therefore,
besides the Farrell measure of technical efficiency, any non-zero input or output
slacks should be reported to accurately measure the technical efficiency of a firm
in a DEA analysis. Thus, to identify efficiency slacks, some authors like Ali and
Seiford (1993) have proposed a second stage linear programming problem which
is defined by:

min λ ,OS , IS - ( M 1′OS + N1′ IS ),
st

- qi + Qλ - OS =
0,
(4.7)

θ xi - X λ - IS = 0,
λ ≥ 0, OS ≥ 0, IS ≥ 0,
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where M1 is an M×1 vector of one and N1 is a N×1 vector of one. OS is an M×1
vector of outputs slacks and IS is a N×1 vector of input slacks. One should notice
that θ in this second-stage linear programming is not a variable, and the value of θ
is taken from the fist-stage result of DEA. Also, this stage must be solved for all I
DMUs involved. If OS and IS are both equal to zero then DMU is efficient (in a
Farrell (1957) sense). But, positive OS or IS at the optimal solution means that the
corresponding input or output of the DMU can improve further.

However, as stated by Coelli et al. (2005), there are two major difficulties related
to this second-stage linear programming. First, this LP maximizes the sum of
slacks rather than minimises them. As a result, it identifies the furthest efficient
point, not the nearest efficient point. Consequently, it may not always identify a
representative projected point on the efficient frontier, and therefore may only
point out unsatisfactory peers and targets. Next, this LP is not invariant to units of
measurement. So, the conversion of the units of measurement (for instance about
labour input from days to hours while leaving other units of measurement
untouched), could cause the detection of different efficient frontiers and, hence,
different slacks and λ -values.

Coelli (1998) proposed a multi-stage model that can avoid the problems inherent
in the two-stage method. This method includes a sequence of radial DEA models,
and so is more computationally demanding than one-stage and two-stage models.
But, the multi-stage method “identifies efficient projected points which have input
and output mixes as similar as possible to those of the inefficient points, and that
is also invariant to units of measurement” (Coelli 1998, p.148). The multi-stage

114

method for the case of a CRS input-orientated DEA model is described as
follows:

Step 1: Conducting a radial LP of the form

minθ ,λ θ ,
st

− qi + Qλ ≥ 0

θ xi − X λ ≥ 0
λ ≥ 0,

(4.8)

Where λ is a I ×1 vector of constants and θ is a scalar. This LP must be done for
each of the I firms and achieve the θ for each firm (I θ for I firms).

Step 2: Maximizing the sum of any remaining slacks;

min λ ,OS , IS - ( M 1′OS + N1′ IS ),
st

- qi + Qλ - OS =
0,
cxi - X λ - IS = 0,

(4.9)

λ ≥ 0, OS ≥ 0, IS ≥ 0,
where cx i is the input vector of the i -th firm which has been contracted by being
multiplied by the θ achieved in Step1.

Using this model one is able to obtain a) the “efficient set” of firms, which have
no slacks and a technical efficiency score of θ =1, and b) the set of all firms which
have at least one non-zero slack variable named “have-slacks set” by Coelli
(1998). The LPs in Steps 1 and 2 are the LPs conducted in the standard two-stage
DEA method (Equation 4.7). In subsequent steps, in order to attain a projected
point on the efficient frontier, each firm in the “have-slack set” will be taken, and
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also a sequence of radial movements will be conducted (from the Step 1 projected
point). The efficient set must be used as the reference set in all the LPs.

Step 3: conducting a sequence of N LPs where in each LP contraction in only one
of the inputs is allowed. If the contraction is reached then potential slack exists in
that input. Thus, the aim of this step is only identifying the input dimensions in
which some slack may exist and no actual change in the projected point occurs in
this step. The LP for the j-th input of the i-th firm is indicated as follows:

minθ ,λ θ
st

− qi + Qe λ ≥ 0

θ cxij − X ej λ ≥ 0

(4.10)

cxi≠ j − X e≠ j λ ≥ 0

λ ≥ 0,
Where

cxi≠ j denotes the j-th input of the i-th firm which has been contracted by

being multiplied by the θ attained in the first step, X ej is the 1 × Ie vector of the jth inputs of all efficient firms,

cxi≠ j is the (N−1) × 1 vector of inputs of the i-th

firm (without the j-th input) which has been contracted by being multiplied by the
≠j

θ obtained in Step 1, and Xe is the (N−1) × Ie matrix of inputs of all efficient
firms (without the j-th input). Ie refers to the number of efficient firms (identified
in Step 2), qe is the matrix of outputs of these efficient firms and λ now has
dimension Ie × 1.

Step 4: Running an LP seeking a radial reduction in all inputs identified as having
potential slack (in the last step).The LP is expressed as:
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minθ ,λ θ
st

− qi + Qe λ ≥ 0

θ cxis − X es λ ≥ 0

(4.11)

cxins − X ens λ ≥ 0

λ ≥ 0,
where the superscript “s” refers to the subset of those inputs which have potential
slack and superscript “ns” shows the remainder of the inputs. It should be noted
that the start point for this radial reduction is the projected point obtained in
Step1, which is the point (qi,cxi).

Step 5: Taking the projected point identified in Step 4 (for the i-th firm) and
repeating Steps 3 and 4 until no slack remains in any input. It is due to this reason
that after conducting the radial reduction in Step 4, it is possible that some input
slack might still remain in some dimensions.
Step 6: Taking the projected point identified in Step 5 (for the i-th firm) and
repeating Steps 3 to 5, but with a difference that this step radial expansion in
output slack dimensions will be conducted until no output slack remains. The
ultimate projected point will be on the efficient surface. Afterwards, the peers of
the firm can be achieved from the λ vector of the final projected point and the
slacks can be computed by subtracting the final projected point from the projected
point obtained in Step 1.

As previously discussed, under the multi-stage approach the final projected point
obtained will be invariant to the unit of measurement. This consequence results
directly from the observation that a single radial movement is units-invariant and
117

so a number of radial movements will also be units-invariant. Therefore, the use
of the multi-stage method over other alternatives is recommend by Coelli et al.
(2005), and will be applied in this study using DEAP software version 2.1. The
output- orientated and VRS cases of these models are minor variants of the
methods outlined above.

4.3 Malmquist Index
A DEA model only presents measures of the efficiency of firms relative to the
“best-practice” firms in the sample. However, concentrating only on efficiency
estimates can provide an incomplete view of the performance of banks over time.
It is for this reason that changes in distance function values over time could be
caused by either 1) movement of banks within the input-output space (efficiency
changes), or 2) progress/regress of the boundary of the production set over time
(technological changes). The Malmquist index is the most popular tool to provide
a quantitative measure of productivity change, and decompose this productivity
change into technical and technical efficiency changes. The Malmquist Technical
factor productivity index is defined using distance functions. These distance
functions allow us to describe a multi-input and multi-output production
technology,

without

instructing

behavioural

objectives

such

as

profit

maximization or cost minimization (Rao and Coelli, 1998).

Fethi and Pasiouras (2010), in a comprehensive survey covering 196 studies
which had applied operational research and artificial intelligence techniques in the
assessment of bank performance, reveal that almost all studies that obtained
estimates of total factor productivity growth employed a DEA-type Malmquist
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index. This result demonstrates that the Malmquist index has widespread use in
examining total factor productivity growth.

To measure productivity change between periods t1 and t2 , consider N firms
which produce q outputs using p inputs over T-time periods. A generic firm in
period t1 employs input xt to produce output yt , whereas in period t2 quantities
1

1

of input and output are xt and yt , respectively. The production possibilities set
2
2
at time t is:
St =

{( x, y )

| x can produce y at time t} ,

(4.12)

where x is an input vector, x ∈  n+ , and y is an output vector, y ∈  m+ , at time t.
This can be described in terms of its sections. For example:

yt2 ( xit1 ) =
{ y ∈  m+ ( x, y) ∈ St }

(4.13)

that is its corresponding output feasibility set. Based on Shephard (1970), the
output distance function for firm i at time t1 is:

{

}

Dito1 t2 ≡ inf θ > 0 yit1 / θ ∈ yt2 ( xit1 ) .

(4.14)

The distance function Dito1 t2 measures the distance from the i-th firm's position in
the input-output space at time t1 to the boundary of the production set at time t2 ,
where inputs remain constant and θ is a scalar equal to the efficiency score. When

t1 and t2 are equal, then it will be a measure of efficiency relative to technology at
the same time, and Dito t ≤ 1 . When t1 and t2 are not equal, Dito1 t2 can be <,>, or =1.
Based on Färe et al. (1992) the Malmquist index between periods t1 and t2 can be
defined as:
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 Ditoct
M (t1 , t2 ) =  oc1 2
 Dit t
 11
o
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  Ditoc t
  oc2 2
  Dit t
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(4.15)

which is a geometric mean of two Malmquist productivity indices for t1 and t2 as
defined by Caves et al. (1982). If M > 1 , then there has been positive total factor
productivity change between periods t1 and t2 . If M < 1 , then there have been
negative changes in the total factor productivity. M = 1 indicates no change in the
productivity.

However, Simar and Wilson (1999) argue that the production possibility set St is
never observed and consequently, all distances defined are unobserved. Hence the
Malmquist productivity index and the distance functions mentioned above must
be estimated. This, in sequence, requires estimation of the production set, St , and
the output feasibility set, y ( x) . Burgess and Wilson (1995) describe that the
estimated production set can be written as:

St =( x, y ) ∈  m+ + n y ≤ Yt γ , x ≥ X t γ , 1γ =
1, γ ∈  N+

{

}

(4.16)

Where Yt = [ y1t , y2t ,..., yNt ] and yit denotes (m ×1) vector of observed outputs, and
X t = [ x1t , x2t ,..., xNt ] and



xit denotes (n ×1) vector of observed inputs. 1 and γ are

vector of ones and intensity variables, respectively. Hence, the corresponding
output feasibility sets can be described as:

{

}


ytc ( x) =y ∈  m+ y ≤ Yt γ , x ≥ X t γ , γ ∈  N+ , and

(4.17)



ytv ( x) =y ∈  m+ y ≤ Yt γ , x ≥ X t γ , 1γ =
1, γ ∈  N+ .

(4.18)

{

}
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Substituting 
ytc ( x) and 
ytv ( x) for yt ( x) in Equation (4.13) leads to estimators of the
distance functions which can be computed by solving the following linear
programs:

{


oc
−1
(D
)=
max λ λ yit1 ≤ Yt2 γ i , xit1 ≥ X t2 γ i , γ i ∈  N+
it1 t2

}



ov
(D
) −1 =
max λ λ yit1 ≤ Yt2 γ i , xit1 ≥ X t2 γ i , 1γ =
1, γ i ∈  N+
it1 t2

{

(4.19)

}

(4.20)



oc
ov
where D
features the assumption of CRS and D
allows for VRS. Given
it1 t2
it1 t2
estimates of the distance functions, estimates of the Malmquist index can be
constructed by substituting the estimators for the corresponding true distance
function values in (4):

oc   
D
Ditoc2 t2 
o
it1 t2





M i (t1 , t2 ) =

oc   
oc 
D
D
 it1 t1   it2 t1 

(4.21)

Alternatively, following Färe et al. (1992), this total factor productivity change
can be decomposed into two components:


oc
oc   
D
D
Ditoc1 t1 
it2 t2
it1 t2

o




M i (t1=
×
, t2 )


oc
oc   
oc 

Dit1 t1
 Dit2 t2
  Dit2 t1 


 Eff

(4.22)

Tech

where the term outside the square root sign, Eff , is an index of relative technical
efficiency change, and shows how much closer (or farther away) a firm gets to the
best practice frontier. It can be >, < or = unity depending on whether the
considered firm improves, stagnates, or declines. The second component, Tech , is
the technical change component which measures how much the frontier shifts, and
points out whether the best practice firm, relative to which the evaluated firm is
compared, is improving, stagnating, or deteriorating. It can be >, < or = unity
depending on whether the technical change is positive, zero, or negative.
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Färe et al. (1994) demonstrate that the technical change component can be
decomposed into two factors: pure technical efficiency change and changes in
scale efficiency;
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 PureEff
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(4.23)

and Scale are measures of pure efficiency change and change in

 Eff  PureEff × Scale .
scale efficiency, respectively, and=

Tech

remains

unchanged from (4.22), and gives a measure of change in technology.
While Tech signifies that the CRS frontier shifts over time, pure efficiency change
and scale efficiency change correspond to VRS frontiers from two different
periods.

On the other hand, Simar and Wilson (1998a) state that if a generic firm's position
in the input-output space remains fixed between time t1 and t2 , and the only
change that happens is in the VRS estimate of technology (e.g. shift upward), then
the Tech presented in (4.23) would be equal to unity, indicating no change in
technology. The only way that the Tech in Equation (4.23) would show a change
in technology is if the CRS estimate of the technology changes. Hence, it is
concluded by the authors that in such a circumstance, the CRS estimate of the
technology is statistically inconsistent. Since the VRS estimator is always
consistent under the assumptions of Kneip et al. (1996), they propose an
alternative decomposition of the Malmquist index to estimate changes in
technology ( Tech ) by changes in the VRS estimate;
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 ScaleTech

where Tech is further decomposed into pure technical changes,  PureTech , and
changes in the scale of technology,  ScaleTech , and Tech =  PureTech
×  ScaleTech .

 PureTech measures pure changes in technology and is the geometric mean of two

ratios which measure the shift in the VRS frontier estimate relative to the bank's
position at time t1 and t2 . When  PureTech is greater than unity, it indicates an
expansion in pure technology. Specifically, it shows an upward shift of the VRS
estimate of the technology.  ScaleTech provides information regarding the shape of
the technology by describing the change in returns to scale of the VRS technology
estimate at two fixed points, which are the firm’s locations at times t1 and t2 .
When  ScaleTech is greater than unity, this indicates that the technology is
moving farther from constant returns to scale and the technology is becoming
more and more convex. When this index is less than unity it gives us an idea that
the technology is moving toward constant returns to scale, and  ScaleTech equal to
unity shows no changes in the shape of the technology.

A similar decomposition of the Malmquist index is also proposed by Ray and
Desli (1997). They combine changes in the scale of efficiency and changes in the
scale of technology into a single term (SCH). However, Simar and Wilson (1999)
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state that Ray and Desli’s SCH confuses changes in the shape of the technology
and changes in scale efficiency experienced by the production unit. Färe et al.
(1997) agree that Ray and Desli’s alternative decomposition of Malmquist
incorrectly measures changes in scale efficiency. Other kinds of decompositions
and components of the Malmquist index are described by Fried et al. (2008), who
conclude that the choice of appropriate decompositions is dependent on the
research question. Accordingly, in this study, the comprehensive decomposition
of Simar and Wilson (1998a) is employed with the aim of providing additional
insight into productivity and technical change in the banking industry in Iran.

However, the DEA approach for estimating distance functions when constructing
Malmquist indices is problematic. As DEA is a non-parametric approach, it does
not allow for random errors and does not have any statistical foundation, hence
making it inadequate for testing statistical significance of the estimated distance
functions, or for conducting sensitivity analyses to examine their asymptotic
properties; see Lovell (2000), Coelli et al. (2005), and Simar and Wilson (1998b,
1999, 2000). The inherent problem with the mainstream DEA analysis is that
distances to the frontier are underestimated if the most efficient firms within the
population are not included in the sample. Analysis in this situation leads to
biased frontier estimation from the sample and results in distances to all other
units being measured relative to this biased frontier. Undoubtedly, uncertainty is
carried through to parameters such as the Malmquist indices of TFP changes
which are estimated from DEA distance functions.
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To solve this problem, Simar and Wilson (1998b, 2000) define a statistical model,
the bootstrap simulation method, which allows for determining the statistical
properties of the non-parametric estimators in the multi-input and multi-output
case, and hence for constructing confidence intervals for DEA efficiency scores.
In their later study, Simar and Wilson (1999) demonstrate that the bootstrap
technique can also be employed to estimate confidence intervals for Malmquist
indices. The most important practical implication of their conclusion is that
statistical inference becomes possible for Malmquist indices.

4.4 Formulation of the Bootstrap
Simar (1992) and Simar and Wilson (1998b) are pioneers in using the bootstrap in
frontier models to obtain non-parametric envelopment estimators. The idea behind
bootstrapping is to approximate a true sampling distribution by mimicking the
data-generating process. The procedure is based on constructing a pseudo sample
and re-solving the DEA model for each DMU with the new data. Repeating this
process many times enables us to build a good approximation of the true
distribution. Simar and Wilson (1998b) show that the statistically consistent
estimation of such confidence intervals very much depends on the consistent
replication of a data-generating process (DGP). In other words, the most
important problem of bootstrapping in frontier models relates to the consistent
mimicking of the DGP. 26 They argued that this problem refers to the bounded
nature of the distance functions. Since the distance estimation values are close to
unity, re-sampling directly from the set of original data (the so-called naive

26

See Simar and Wilson (2000) for a thorough analysis based on Monte Carlo evidence.
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bootstrap) to construct pseudo-samples will provide an inconsistent bootstrap
estimation of the confidence intervals.

Hence, to overcome this problem, they propose a smoothed bootstrap procedure.
They use a univariate kernel estimator of density of the original distance function
estimates (for efficiency scores in that case), and then construct the pseudo data
from this estimated density. However, to estimate the Malmquist indices, we have
panel data instead of a single cross-section of data with the possibility of temporal
correlation. Thus, Simar and Wilson (1999), in adapting the bootstrapping
procedure for Malmquist indices, propose a consistent method using a bivariate
kernel density estimate via the covariance matrix of data from adjacent years.
However, the estimated distance functions D
and D using a kernel estimator
it t
1 1

it 2 t 2

are bounded from above unity and it is noted by Simar and Wilson (1999) that a
bivariate kernel estimator value under this condition is biased and asymptotically
inconsistent. To account for this issue, Simar and Wilson (1998b, 1999) adapt a
univariate reflection method proposed by Silverman (1986). 27 Therefore, to
achieve consistent replication of the DGP taking all of these features into account,
one must use the smoothed bootstrap. Repeatedly re-sampling from the
Malmquist indices via the smoothed bootstrap results in a mimic of the sampling
distribution of the original distance functions (a set of bootstrap Malmquist
indices), from which confidence intervals can be constructed. On the whole, this
process can be summarized as follows:

27

This method is based on the idea of “reflecting” the probability mass lying beyond unity where,
in theory, no probability mass should exist.
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o (t , t ) for each bank (i = 1,..., N ) in
1. Calculation of the Malmquist index M
1 2
i

each time ( t1 and t2 ) by solving the linear programming models (4.19) and
(4.20) and their reversals.
2. Construction of the pseudo data set

, y );i
{( x=
*
it

*
it

}

1,...,
=
N ; t 1, 2 to create

the reference bootstrap technology using the bivariate kernel density
estimation and adaption of the reflection method proposed by Silverman
(1986).
3. Calculation of the bootstrap estimate of the Malmquist index

M io (t1 , t2 ) for each bank (i = 1,..., N ) by applying the original estimators to

*

the pseudo sample attained in Step 2.
4. Repeating Steps 2 to 3 for a large number of B times (in this study
B=2000) to facilitate B sets of estimates for each firm.
5. Construct the confidence intervals for the Malmquist indices.

The basic idea designed for construction of the confidence intervals of the
o (t , t ) − M o (t , t ) is unknown and can
Malmquist indices is that the distribution of M
1 2
1 2
i
i

o (t , t ) , where M o (t , t ) is the
be approximated by the distribution of *
M io (t1 , t2 ) − M
1 2
i
i
1 2

true unknown index,

o (t , t )
M
1 2
i

is the estimate of the Malmquist index,

and *
M io (t1 , t2 ) is the bootstrap estimate of the index. Hence, aα and bα defining
the (1 − α ) confidence interval:
o (t , t ) − M o (t , t ) ≤ a ) =
Pr(bα ≤ M
1−α
α
1 2
1 2
i
i

(4.25)

can be approximated by estimating the values aα* and bα* given by:
o (t , t ) ≤ a* ) =
Pr(bα* ≤ *
M io (t1 , t2 ) − M
1−α
α
i
1 2

(4.26)
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Thus, an estimated (1 − α ) percentage confidence interval for the i-th Malmquist
index is given by:
o (t , t ) + a* ≤ M o (t , t ) ≤ M
o (t , t ) + b*
M
α
α
i
1 2
i
1 2
i
1 2

(4.27)

A Malmquist index for the i-th firm is said to be significantly different from unity
(which would indicate no productivity change), at the α % level, if the interval in
Eq. (16) does not include unity.
It should be mentioned that using the calculated bootstrap value in Step 4,
we can also correct for any finite-sample bias in the original estimators of the
Malmquist indices. We only need to apply a simple procedure outlined by Simar
& Wilson (1999) as follows:

o (t , t ) is:
The bootstrap bias estimate for the original estimator M
1 2
i

b
ai Bs 
M o (t , t )  B −1 ∑ *
M io (t1 , t2 )(b) − 
M io (t1 , t2 )
=
 i 1 2 
b =1
B

(4.28)

Thus, a bias-corrected estimate of M io (t1 , t2 ) can be computed as:
o (t , t ) 
M
M io (t1 , t2 ) − b
ai Bs  
M o (t , t ) 
=
i
1 2
 i 1 2 
= 2
M io (t1 , t2 ) − B −1 ∑ *
M io (t1 , t2 )(b).
B

b =1

(4.29)

However, as explained by Simar & Wilson (1999), this bias-corrected estimator
may have a higher mean-square error than the original estimator, and hence it will
be less reliable. Overall, the bias-corrected estimator should only be considered if
the sample variance

*

s 2i of the bootstrap values

M (t , t )(b)}
{
*

o
i

1

2

is less than a

b =1,..., B

third of the squared bootstrap bias estimate for the original estimator, that is;
*

(

)

2

o
 
 .
bias
B  M i (t1 , t 2 ) 


3

s 2i < 1

(4.30)
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This procedure can be achieved using commands malmquist.components and
malmquist in the FEAR software program.

The above methodology for Malmquist indices can be easily adapted to the
efficiency scores. Only the time-dependence structure of the data which is taken
into account for the Malmquist indices must be changed by replacing t1 and t2 with
the period considered. The procedure can be done using command boot.sw98
using FEAR.

In this study, therefore, the Simar and Wilson (1998a) approach is employed to
measure the Malmquist index and its components - changes in pure technical
efficiency, changes in scale efficiency, pure changes in technology and changes in
scale of technology - to provide a more inclusive and robust analysis of
productivity and technical change in the banking industry of Iran. For the first
time in the context of a developing country, the bootstrap simulation method
(Simar & Wilson, 1998b; 2000) is also employed to determine whether the
computed changes in productivity are real or not.

4.5 O’Donnell’s Approach to Decomposing the TFP Index
To avoid the problems with the Malmquist TFP index, mentioned previously,
O’Donnell (2008, 2010b) also proposed a new way to decompose multiplicatively
complete total factor productivity indices into measures of technical changes and
various measures of efficiency change, without any assumptions concerning firm
optimising behaviour, the structure of markets, or returns to scale for a multipleinput multiple-output case.
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O’Donnell (2008) showed that completeness is an essential requirement for an
economically-meaningful decomposition of the TFP change. He demonstrated
that the Malmquist index of Caves, et al. (1982) is not complete, and this fact
implies that, apart from special cases such as constant returns to scale, it is a
biased measure of TFP change. Consequently, O’Donnell (2010b) argued that the
popular Fare et al. (1994) decomposition of the Malmquist index generally leads
to unreliable estimates of technical change and/or efficiency change.

Completeness of the index number: as mentioned by O’Donnell (2008), there are
basically two main approaches in the literature decomposing total factor
productivity growth. First, studies that define general measures of efficiency and
technical change, and then combine them to create a TFP index, such as, Balk
(2001). Second, those studies that begin with a recognizable TFP index followed
by trying to decompose it in a meaningful way, such as Fare et al. (1994), Ray and
Mukherjee (1996) and Kuosmanen and Sipiläinen (2009). O’Donnell (2008)
mixes the main characteristics of both approaches. He begins with input and
output aggregator functions which are consistent with index number theory
axioms, and subsequently builds up to measures of efficiency and technical
change, and then, finally, to recognizable TFP indices. These types of TFP index
numbers are held to be complete. O’Donnell (2008) shows that due to the manner
of the construction of such TFP indices, it is possible to decompose them easily
into meaningful measures of technical change and efficiency change. O’Donnell
(2008) demonstrates that the group of complete TFP indices contains Fisher,
Konus, Törnqvist, and Hicks-Moorsteen indices. However, the popular Malmquist
index of Caves, et al. (1982) is not included in this class. Two types of
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completeness related to the ratio-type and difference-type index frameworks, are
defined by O’Donnell (2008):

Ι. Multiplicative Completeness:
Let us assume TFP ( xt , yt , xs , ys ) is an index number that determines the
difference in TFP between period s and period t using period s as a base. Then,
TFP ( xt , yt , xs , ys ) is multiplicatively complete if and only if it is possible to
express it in the following form
TFP ( xt , yt , xs , ys ) =

Y ( yt ) X ( xt )
.
Y ( ys ) X ( xs )

(4.31)

In this form, Y and X are non-negative non-decreasing linearly-homogeneous
functions.

ΙΙ. Additive Completeness:
TFP ( xt , yt , xs , ys ) is assumed to be an index number that determines the
difference in TFP between period s and period t using period s as a base. Then,
TFP ( xt , yt , xs , ys ) is additively complete if and only if it is possible to express it in
the following form:
TFP ( xt , yt , xs , ys ) = Y ( yt ) − Y ( ys ) − X ( xt ) + X ( xs ) .

(4.32)

In this form Y and X are non-negative non-decreasing functions complying with
the translation property Y (λ y )= λ + Y ( y ) and X (λ x)= λ + X ( x) .

O’Donnell (2010b) explained that since the Malmquist TFP index of Caves et al.
(1982) is neither additively nor multiplicatively complete, it may be an unreliable
measure of TFP change.
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Using an artificial data set, O’Donnell (2008) illustrated that the Hicks-Moorsteen
TFP index, irrespective of the returns to scale and scope properties of the
production technology, is able to be significantly and understandably decomposed
into any number of measures of technical and efficiency changes:
1/ 2

t ,t +1
MB

TFP

 D t +1 ( x t +1 , y t +1 ) D t ( x t , y t +1 ) 
=  o t +1 t +1 t t o t t +1 
 Do ( x , y ) Do ( x , y ) 

1/ 2

 DIt +1 ( xt , y t +1 ) DIt ( x t , y t ) 
 t +1 t +1 t +1 t t +1 t 
 DI ( x , y ) DI ( x , y ) 

(4.33)
Although Caves et al. (1982) offered the application of Malmquist output and
input quantity, they did not use ratios of these indices to develop a complete TFP
index. Their indices are complete if and only if the technology is of a restrictive
form (O'Donnell, 2008, p.10). Fare et al. (1998, p.136) illustrate that the outputoriented Malmquist index given by (4.21) matches the Hicks-Moorsteen index
given by 4.31, if and only if the technology is inversely homothetic and shows
constant returns to scale. However, using O’Donnell’s (2010b) approach one can
use the Hicks-Moorsteen index instead of the Malmquist index without assuming
CRS technology.

4.5.1 O’Donnell’s Decomposition of the TFP Index
To empirically measure the components of productivity change, we first need a
precise definition of productivity, and then a productivity index number formula
that is consistent with this definition.

In the case of a multiple-input multiple-output firm, O’Donnell (2010b) uses the
usual definition of total factor productivity following Jorgensen and Grilliches
(1967), and Good et al. (1997); the ratio of aggregate output to aggregate input;
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TFPnt =

Ynt
.
X nt

(4.34)

In this equation, TFPnt indicates the TFP of firm n in the period t, Ynt ≡ Y ( ynt ) ,
and X nt ≡ X ( xnt ) that Ynt and X nt are aggregate output and aggregate input
respectively. This definition logically makes possible TFP indices that can be
articulated as the ratio of an output quantity index to an input quantity index (a
measure of output growth divided by a measure of input growth). Index numbers
constructed in this way are named multiplicatively complete and can be shown to
satisfy important axioms from index number theory.

To show that all multiplicatively-complete TFP indices can be decomposed into a
measure of technical change and several measures of efficiency change, let us
depict the TFP of a multiple-input multiple-output firm in two-dimensional
aggregate quantity space. The basic idea is shown in Figure 4.1. In this figure,
TFPnt is given by the slope of the line that passes through the origin (0,0) and
point A. In the same way, TFPms , which shows the TFP of firm m in period s, is
given by the slope of the line passing through the origin and point Z. Let the
angles between the horizontal axis and the lines passing through points A and Z
be lower-case a and z respectively. So,
TFP
=
nt

Ynt
= slope OA
= tan a
X nt

(4.35)

TFP
=
ms

Yms
= slope =
OZ tan z
X ms

(4.36)

=
TFPms ,nt slope
=
OA / slope OZ tan a / tan z
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(4.37)

TFPms ,nt is a TFP index which measures the change in TFP between the two firms
n and m.

Figure 4.1: Total Factor Productivity Change.

Source: O’Donnell (2010b, p.530), edited by the author.

Thus, we are able to write a multiplicatively-complete TFP index as the ratio of
(tangent) functions of angles in aggregate quantity space. O'Donnell (2010b) used
this approach to conceptualise different alternative components of TFP change.
For instance, assume e denotes the angle between the horizontal axis and the line
passing through the origin and any non-negative point like E. Subsequently, it is
obvious that the change in TFP between firm m and firm n can be decomposed as:
=
TFPms ,nt tan
=
a / tan z (tan a / tan e)(tan e / tan z )

(4.38)

Within this framework, an unbounded number of points, like E, can be used to
produce a decomposition of a multiplicatively-complete TFP index.
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4.5.2 Efficiency Concepts
To explain O’Donnell’s (2010b) decomposition of multiplicatively complete TFP
indices various components, we need to define conventional efficiency concepts
in terms of some of the output and input aggregates. Thus, in this section,
following O’Donnell (2010b), the ratio measures of technical, scale and mix
efficiency for a firm that decides on the input-output combination ( xt , yt ) from the
production possibilities set in period t will be defined. Accordingly, measures of
technical and pure scale efficiency will be described on the subject of technicallyfeasible input and output vectors that can be written as scalar multiples of xt and
yt that specifically assures the input and output mixes are held fixed. Then, mix
efficiency measures will be defined in terms of input and output vectors that are
technically feasible while the mixes of input and output are free to vary.

Technical Efficiency
Since the work of Farrell (1957), the most-generally conventional output-oriented
technical efficiency (OTE) measure has been defined as the ratio of observed
aggregate output to the maximum aggregate output possible, while holding the
input vector and the output mix fixed. In the same way, the measure of inputoriented technical efficiency (ITE) can be described as the inverse of the ratio of
the observed aggregate input divided by the minimum aggregate input feasible,
holding the output vector and the input mix fixed. The scalar aggregates related to
the vectors xt and yt are X t = X ( xt ) and Yt = Y ( yt ) , where X and Y are nonnegative linearly homogeneous aggregator functions.
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Therefore, the maximum aggregate output that is technically feasible when using
xt to fabricate a scalar multiple of yt is Yt ≡ Yt / DOt ( xt , yt ) , but the minimum
aggregate input possible when using a scalar multiple of xt to fabricate yt is
X t ≡ X t / DIt ( xt , yt ) . Consequently, Farrell-type technical efficiency measures can

be properly written as:
OTE=
t

Xt
Yt
=
= DIt ( xt , yt ) −1 .
= DOt ( xt , yt ) and ITE
t
Xt
Yt

(4.39)

As has been mentioned before the output distance function Dot ( xt , yt ) is the
relative technical efficiency of production point ( xt , yt ) compared to the frontier
of period t , when a firm can radially expand its output vector while using the
same inputs. Inversely, DIt ( xt , yt ) −1 gives the maximum factor by which a firm can
radially reduce its input vector and still produce the same outputs.

O’Donnell (2010b) also presents these concepts graphically. He first considers a
special case where the firm applies xt = ( x1t , x2t )′ to produce yt = ( y1t , y2t )′ , and
the input and output aggregator functions are both linear:
yt ) α1 y1t + α 2 y2t .
X (=
xt ) β1 x1t + β 2 x2t , and, Y (=

(4.40)

Figure 4.2 shows this special case in two-output space. In this figure, the curved
line which passes through point C is a production possibilities frontier, and the
dashed line which passes through point A outlines all points having the same
aggregate output as firm A (as=
y2 t

Y ( yt )

α2

−

α1
y ). Firm A can boost its
α 2 1t

aggregate output by (radially) expanding outputs until it achieves point C. Hence,
the output-oriented measure of technical efficiency (OTE) is defined as:
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OTE=
t

Yt
=
Yt

OA
.
OC

(4.41)

Figure 4.2: Output-oriented Technical Efficiency.

Source: O’Donnell (2010b, p.534), edited by the author.

Although Figure 4.2 provides useful view of technical efficiency measurement in
the two-output case, for firms which use many inputs to produce many outputs a
different graphical representation is required. Thus, O’Donnell (2010b) mapped
feasible input-output combinations into aggregate quantity space. Figure 4.3
indicates such input-output combinations represented by points A, B and C in
Figures 4.2. In this figure the curved lined which passes through points B and C
denotes the frontier of a restricted production possibilities set, and point A stands
for the input-output combination ( xt , yt ) . This production possibilities set is
named restricted since it includes only input and output aggregate vectors, which
can be written as scalar multiples of xt and yt . In this figure, the vertical distance
from point A to point C shows the measure of output-oriented technical
efficiency.
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Figure 4.3: Output-oriented Technical Efficiency for a Multiple-input
Multiple-output Firm.

Source: O’Donnell (2010b, p.535), edited by the author.

As mentioned by O’Donnell (2010b), Figure 4.3 is notably important, firstly
because it illustrates those measures of technical efficiency that can be written as
ratios of TFP measures, and consequently as ratios of tangent functions of angles
underpinning the TFP decompositions presented by O’Donnell (2010b). Secondly,
it is important because it explains how one can represent the production choices
available to a multiple-input multiple-output firm on a single graph.

Scale Efficiency
It is obvious from Figure 4.3 that any improvements in technical efficiency imply
expansions in TFP, however the TFP of Firm A is not maximized by shifting to
the technically efficient points B or C. When the input-output mixes are held
fixed, firm A can maximize its TFP by shifting to a point where a line through the
origin is tangent to the restricted production possibilities frontier. This point is
denoted as point D in Figure 4.4, and named as the point of mix-invariant optimal
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scale (MIOS) by O’Donnell (2010b). Subsequently, pure scale efficiency is a
quantity of the difference between TFP at C, which is the technically efficient
point, and TFP at D that is the point of MIOS. The term pure is used since input
and output mixes are being held fixed, thus the change in TFP is a pure scale
effect. Soon after, another scale efficiency measure will be defined that is related
to changes in the output and/or input mix. For the moment, a pure output-oriented
scale efficiency (OSE) measure is given by:

OSE
=

Yt / X t tan c
.
=
Yt / X t tan d

(4.42)

where X t and Yt denote the aggregate input and output quantities at the MIOS
point. It is obvious from Figure 4.4 that these scale efficiency measures can also
be written as a ratio of TFP measures.

Figure 4.4: Output-oriented Scale Efficiency for a Multiple-input Multipleoutput Firm.

Source: O’Donnell (2010b, p.535), edited by the author.
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Mix efficiency
The efficiency measures discussed so far have been defined relating to a restricted
production frontier. Mix efficiency is measure of the change in productivity when
the input and output mixes are free from the restrictions. 28 In Figure 4.4 the
curved line passing through points V is the unrestricted production frontier which
is the boundary of the production possibilities set when all mix restrictions are
relaxed.

Figure 4.5: Output-oriented Mix Efficiency for a Two-output Firm.

Source: O’Donnell (2010b, p.535), edited by the author.

To exemplify the way that the production possibilities set develops, consider
again

the

special

case

where

firm

A

utilizes

xt = ( x1t , x2t )′

to

produce yt = ( y1t , y2t )′ , and both input and output aggregator functions are linear.
Figure 4.5 gives a picture of a similar expansion in output space. When the input
vector and the output mix are supposed to be fixed, moving to point C is the best
that firm A can do in Figure 4.5. On the other hand, if the restrictions on output
mix are relaxed, Firm A can further expand aggregate output by moving to point
28

The term mix efficiency is used instead of allocative efficiency by O’Donnell (2008).
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V in Figure 4.5. This corresponds to a vertical movement to a point that lies above
point C in Figure 4.4. Figure 4.6 is an adaptation of Figure 4.4 representing the
unrestricted production frontier that is the curved line which passes through point
V.

Figure 4.6: Output-oriented Mix Efficiency for a Multiple-input Multipleoutput Firm.

Source: O’Donnell (2010b, p.535), edited by the author.

Pure mix efficiency is defined by O’Donnell (2010b) as a measure of the
difference between TFP at a technically efficient point on the mix-restricted
frontier and TFP at a point on the unrestricted frontier, under the situation that
either the input vector or the output vector are held fixed. The term pure is used
again here since either the input vector or the output vector (to be exact the scale)
are held fixed, thus the change in TFP is a pure mix effect. In relation to Figure
4.6 the difference between TFP at points C and V represents the pure outputoriented mix efficiency (OME). Mathematically:

OME=
t

Yt Yt / X t tan c
=
=
Yˆt Yˆt / X t tan v

(4.43)

141

where Yˆt = Y ( yˆt ) is the
aggregate of yˆt arg max {Y ( y ) : ( xt , y ) ∈ T t } , T t is
=
y 0

period-t production possibility set).

Residual Scale efficiency
It is obvious from Figure 4.6 that any improvement in technical and mix
efficiency implies enhancements of TFP; however the TFP of firm A is not
maximized by shifting to the technically- and mix-efficient point V. More exactly,
its TFP will be maximized only by moving to the point E where a straight line
through the origin is tangent to the unrestricted production possibilities frontier
(see Figure 4.7). Point E is named as the point of maximum productivity (MP).
Residual scale efficiency as introduced by O’Donnell (2010b), is the difference
between the TFP amount at a technically- and mix-efficient point and TFP at the
point of Maximum productivity. The term scale is used since any change around
an unrestricted production possibility set is a movement from one mix-efficient
point to another mix-efficient point, thus any expansion in TFP is fundamentally a
scale effect. The term residual is used since although all of the points on the
unrestricted frontier are mix-efficient, they may have altered input and output
mixes (such as point V). Consequently, what is fundamentally a measure of scale
efficiency may include a residual mix effect. A measure of residual outputoriented scale efficiency (ROSE) is:
=
ROSEt

Yˆt / X t
tan v
=
*
*
Y t / X t tan e

(4.44)

where Y *t = Y ( y*t ) and X *t = X ( x*t ) are the aggregate of:

=
( xt* , yt* ) arg max {Y ( y ) / X ( x) : ( x, y ) ∈ T t } .
y  0, y  0
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Figure 4.7: Residual Output-oriented Scale Efficiency for a Multiple-input
Multiple-output firm.

Source: O’Donnell (2010b, p.535), edited by the author.

Yt *
TFP at the maximum productivity point is denoted as TFP = * , where
Xt
*
t

Yt * and X t* are the aggregate output and input quantities at this point.

Residual Mix Efficiency
As defined by O’Donnell (2010b, p.535) Residual mix efficiency (RME) is a
measure of the difference between TFP at the mix-invariant optimal scale (MIOS)
point and TFP at the maximum productivity (MP) point:
=
RMEt

Yt / X t
tan d
=
*
*
Yt / X t
tan e

(4.45)

This difference can be represented in Figure 4.8 as a movement from point D on
the mix-invariant restricted production boundary to point E on the unrestricted
production boundary.
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Figure 4.8: Residual Mix Efficiency for a Multiple-input Multiple-output
Firm.

Source: O’Donnell (2010b, p.535), edited by the author.

This thesis has only explained the output-oriented measures of efficiency;
however, the input-oriented approach can be defined in the same way, which is
demonstrated by O’Donnell (2010b).

4.5.3 Decomposing Productivity Change
So far, the case of a firm that uses the input-output combination ( xt , yt ) from the
period-t production possibilities set T t is examined. That firm was shown to be at
point A in Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8. Thus, in relation to aggregate
quantities and angles, the following TFP indices of this firm can be measured:
Yt
= tan a : TFP of firm A,
Xt

Yt
= tan c : Maximum TFP possible holding the input vector and output mix
Xt
fixed,
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Yˆt
= tan v : Maximum TFP possible holding the input vector fixed and output mix
Xt
free to vary,
Yt *
= tan e : Maximum TFP possible using any technically feasible inputs and
X t*
outputs.

According to these definitions, O’Donnell (2010b) decomposed the change
between TFP at the point ( xt , yt ) and TFP at the point of maximum productivity
as:
TFP efficiency = TFPE
=
t

TFPt tan a tan a tan c tan v
= =
.
TFPt * tan e tan e tan v tan e

(4.46)

This is a decomposition of TFP efficiency that calculates the proportionate
increase in TFP as the firm moves all the way from point A to point E (see Figure
4.8). As can be seen in Figure 4.8 there are many pathways from A to E, thus
there are many ways to decompose TFP efficiency. Pathway ACVE is used for
TFPEt . Thus, another way that can be traced by this firm is ACDE, so TFP
efficiency can also be defined as:
TFPE
=
t

tan a tan a tan c tan d
=
.
tan e tan e tan d tan e

(4.47)

In relation to the efficiency measures defined in this section, Equations (4.39) to
(4.45), these two output-oriented decompositions can be defined:
Yt
TFP
X
TFPEt = t* = *t =OTEt × OMEt × ROSEt
Yt
TFPt
X t*

and
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(4.48)

Yt
TFPt
X
= *t =OTEt × OSEt × RMEt .
TFPEt =
*
Yt
TFPt
X t*

(4.49)

These two decompositions can be used as a basis for an output-oriented
decomposition of a multiplicatively complete TFP index. The best way to see this
decomposition is to rephrase Equations (4.48) and (4.49) as:
TFPt =TFPt * × (OTEt × OMEt × ROSEt )

(4.50)

and
TFPt = TFPt * × (OTEt × OSEt × RMEt )

(4.51)

A similar equation holds for any other firm like m in period s. Thus, the index
number that compares the TFP of firm n in period t with the TFP of firm m in
period s is defined as:

 TFPt *   OTEnt OMEnt ROSEnt 
TFPnt
TFPms ,nt =
=
×
×
×

* 
TFPms
TFP
OTE
OME
ROSEms 
s 
ms
ms



 

Technical change

(4.52)

Overall efficiency change

and

TFPms ,nt

 TFPt *   OTEnt OSEnt RMEnt 
TFPnt
=
= 
×
×
×

* 
TFPms
TFP
OTE
OSE
RMEms  .
s 
ms
ms



 


Technical change

(4.53)

Overall efficiency change

The first parentheses on the right-hand sides of these equations are measures of
technical changes since they measure the difference between the maximum TFP
possible using the technology feasible in period t, and the maximum TFP possible
using the technology feasible in period s. Thus, the industry experiences technical
improvement or decline as TFPt * / TFPs* is greater than or less than 1.
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In terms of Figure 4.8, TFPt * / TFPs* measures the change in the slope of the line
which passes through point E. On the contrary, in the decomposition of the
Malmquist TFP index, Fare et al. (1994) compute the change in the slope of the
line passing through point D. Consequently, this technical change includes a mix
effect and will typically differ from firm to firm. The second ratios in parentheses
on the right-hand sides are understandable measures of technical efficiency
change, (residual) mix efficiency change and (residual) scale efficiency change.

O’Donnell (2010b) provides the details for decomposition of multiplicatively
complete TFP indices, and mentions that in theory any other multiplicatively
complete TFP index also can be decomposed in a similar way, (and it is also
possible to decompose any additively complete TFP in a similar way). O’Donnell
(2010b) also provides slightly different DEA problems needed to compute and
decompose the Hicks-Moorsteen index. For a complete explanation of the liner
programmes see the work by O’Donnell (2010b).

4.6 DEA in Comparison with Parametric Approaches
As mentioned by several studies e.g. Isik and Hassan (2003b) and Tortosa-Ausina
et al. (2008), there is no consensus in the banking literature on the preferred
approach for estimating efficiency. In general, there are two modelling methods to
deal with the comparative performance measurement in the literature; parametric
and nonparametric methods. Pasiouras (2008b) states that the empirical evidence
demonstrates that the efficiency scores obtained from parametric and nonparametric approaches are quite similar. Furthermore, Berger and Humphrey
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(1997) reach the same conclusion in their survey of 69 nonparametric and 61
parametric studies that applied frontier efficiency in 21 countries.

The parametric approaches, such as the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA),
Dynamic Financial Analysis (DFA), and Thick Frontier Approach (TFA), usually
involve econometric estimation of a functional form. This approach hypothesises
a functional form to link inputs and outputs, and tries to separate inefficiency from
random error. However, the parametric approaches suffer from their own
deficiencies. Berger and Humphrey (1997) argue that the main problem is that one
has to specify a functional form to be estimated (linear, nonlinear, logarithmic
etc.), so it is quite possible to deal with a mis-specified model. According to
Thanassoulis (2001, p.11) another problem is that “we cannot cope with multiple
inputs and outputs”.

Nevertheless, these problems can be overcome by the use of nonparametric
methods such as DEA. Thanassoulis (2001, p.11) states that, unlike parametric
approaches, when DEA is adopted “the user is relieved of the need to specify a
priori the general shape of the boundary and run the risk of mis-specifying”. DEA
does not hypothesise the functional form linking inputs to outputs, instead, under
this approach, one attempts to construct a production possibility set from the
units’ input-output correspondences which is enveloped by a piecewise linear
boundary. On this subject, Seiford (1990) argues that estimation of the efficient
frontier in DEA is relatively easier and more robust. Furthermore, DEA enables us
to find role models that inefficient units can emulate to improve their
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performance. Sathye (2001, p.665) believes that “[t]he ability to identify possible
peers or role models as well as simple efficiency scores gives it an edge over other
methods”. Not only is this method valuable to estimating the efficient boundary
and finding the role models for inefficient units, but it also helps explore much
more useful information in managing the performance of the operating units, such
as:
-

Decomposing efficiency into different layers of management and agents
involved in the operation of the units,

-

Measuring optimal scale size,

-

Assessing applied policies and disentangling managerial from policy effects,

-

Measurement of productivity over the time,

Furthermore, Sathye (2001) believes that DEA is a superior methodology in
preference to parametric ones, since it has been applied in prior studies when the
sample size was small. Another advantage of using DEA is that different units for
units for inputs and outputs can be applied. For example, X1 can be asset size in
dollars and X2 can be the number of staff without requiring a priori exchange
between them (Coelli et al., 2005). Therefore, DEA has nowadays become a
popular technique to analyse the performance of DMUs, bringing together theory
and practice in a “mutually reinforcing and beneficial dynamic” (Thanassoulis,
2001, p.13).

4.7 Specification of Inputs and Outputs
To facilitate measurement of efficiency scores and productivity change, initially
sets of inputs and outputs for the banks in the sample must be specified. However,
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there is no consensus as to how to specify inputs and outputs. Using bootstrapping
technique, this thesis employs the popular intermediation approach. The
intermediation approach focuses on bank services. Under this approach banks are
viewed as financial intermediaries with outputs measured in local currency, and
with labour, capital, and various funding sources as inputs.

This approach has several variants; asset, value-added and user cost views. Sealy
and Lindley (1977) focus on the role of banks as financial intermediaries between
depositors and final users of bank assets, and classify deposits and other
liabilities, together with real resources (labour and capital), as inputs, and only
bank assets such as loans as outputs. Berger et al. (1987) classify loans and all
types of deposits as "important" outputs since these balance sheet categories
contribute to bank value added, and labour, capital, and purchased funds they
classify as inputs. Alternatively, Aly et al. (1990) and Hancock (1991) implement
a user-cost framework to determine whether a financial product is an input or an
output owing to its net contribution to bank revenue. Utilising this approach a
bank asset can be categorized as an output if the financial return on the asset
exceeds the opportunity cost of the investment, and a liability can be categorized
as an output if the financial cost of the liability is less than its opportunity cost.

Following Aly et al. (1990), as well as Wheelock and Wilson (1999) and Burgess
and Wilson (1995), three inputs are included; labour ( x1 ) measured by the
number of full-time equivalent employees on the payroll at the end of each period,
physical capital ( x2 ) measured by the book value of premises and fixed assets,
and purchased funds ( x3 ) including all time and savings deposits and other
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borrowed funds (not including demand deposits). Three outputs which are
included are total demand deposits ( y1 ) , public sector loans ( y2 ) including loans
for agriculture, manufacturing, mining and services, and non-public loans ( y3 ) .
Since the private banks jointed the market effectively from 2003 and also the
significant technological changes and economic reforms took place in 2004 and
2005, the sample period 2003-2008 deems appropriate. Besides due to the
unavailability of the data, the sample expansion is not feasible. All data were
obtained from Iran’s Central Bank archives (CBI 2005; CBI 2008). All banks
operating in the Iranian banking industry considered except three banks (Post
Bank, Pasargad Bank, and Bank Sarmayeh) that are not homogenous in input and
output mixes. Hence a balanced panel data for 14 banks and 6 years (2003-2008)
is used in this study.

In terms of Hicks-Moorsteen approach, since there was no available software for
bootstrapping this model at the time of writing this thesis, the operating approach
is employed in conjunction with the operating approach to make the results more
reliable. The Operating approach or income-based approach is views banks as
business-decision-making units with the final objective of generating maximum
revenue from the total cost incurred from running the business. Accordingly, it
defines banks’ output as the total revenue (interest and non-interest) and inputs as
the total expenses such as interest and operating expenses (see; Avkiran 1999;
Drake et al. 2006; Fethi and Pasiouras 2010; Sturm and Williams 2004). In the
operating approach, three specific inputs have been employed: [i.e. interest
expenses; employee expenses; and other operating expenses] and two specific
outputs: [i.e. interest income; and Non-interest income]. All the data employed
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were obtained from Iran’s Central Bank archives (CBI, 2005a, CBI, 2008). All
estimated indices were obtained by using the DPIN software programmed by
O'Donnell (2010a).

4.8 Summary
DEA approach is chosen as it allows this study to fulfil its objectives since it helps
to distinguish between different types of efficiency, such as pure technical, scale
efficiencies and mix efficiency, which parametric methods fail to address. Not
only this method is valuable to estimate the efficient boundary and finding the
role models for inefficient units, but it also helps explore much more useful
information in managing the performance of the operating units, such as:
decomposing efficiency into different layers of management and agents involved
in the operation of the units, measuring optimal scale size, assessing applied
policies and disentangling managerial from policy effects, and measurement of
productivity over the time.

In this chapter an overview of the theoretical framework that underpins efficiency
and productivity measurement has been presented. In terms of DEA models, both
CRS and VRS technology and also the input-oriented and output-oriented
versions of these models have been described. Then, as minimizing input and
output slacks, which are weaknesses of traditional DEA and cause a biased
measurement of efficiency, is very important, a number of methods have been
discussed in this chapter; two-stage method proposed by Ali and Seiford (1993)
and multi-stage method proposed by Coelli (1998) are discussed and finally it is
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concluded that the multi-stage method will be employed by this study to avoid
slack-related problems.

The concept of productivity analysis has also been discussed in this chapter. For
this part, details of the Malmquist approach which is the most popular index of
productivity change, its weaknesses, and also two alternative approaches;
Bootstrapped Malmquist TFP index assuming VRS, and Hicks-Moorsteen TFP
index are provided in this chapter. Our study is unique in the sense that the
bootstrap technique has not previously been applied to the alternative
decomposition of Malmquist indices in the evaluation of a developing country’s
banking system. Also, this thesis has employed a new decomposition of the
Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index developed by O’Donnell (2010b) to analyse
efficiency and productivity changes for the first time in a banking context. Finally,
regarding data and softwares, the longest possible time period (2003-2008) will be
included in this study’s data set. All of the required data are available in the
banks’ annual reports which are collected from the Iran’s Central Bank archives.
The latest version of DEAP, DPIN, and FEAR softwares will also be used in this
study to analyse different measures of efficiency and Malmquist indices.

Having explained how DEA performs in estimating efficiency and productivity
indices, the following chapter applies this technique to investigate the efficiency
and productivity of financial institutions in Iran. This includes running the data on
DEA software and obtaining the consequential indices.
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Chapter Five
Empirical Results and Analysis*

5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents empirical findings on the various issues outlined in the
previous chapters. In Chapter Four various efficiency scores and bootstrapped
Malmquist indices along with the alternative decomposition of the Malmquist
index introduced by Simar and Wilson (Simar and Wilson, 1998a) were
discussed. Also discussed was O’Donnell’s (2008) new decomposition of the
Hicks-Moorsteen index in Chapter Four. Using this information, in Sections 5.2
and 5.3 of this chapter, two primary issues are addressed in the computation of
efficiency indices under the intermediation approach; 1) technical efficiency, and
2) Malmquist indices of productivity growth. The advantage of this approach over
the popular decomposition of the Färe et al. (1994) of the Malmquist productivity
index is that technological changes can be decomposed into the changes of pure
technology and changes in scale of technology (which shows the shape of the
technology).

Furthermore, in order to corroborate the findings of the bootstrapped Malmquist
indices and also decompose the efficiency changes further into changes of pure
technical efficiency, scale efficiency and mix efficiency. Following O’Donnell’s
(2008) new decomposition of the Hicks-Moorsteen index, efficiency estimates

*

Modified versions of this chapter have been published/submitted for publication in the Journal of
Productivity Analysis [ERA=A], Journal of studies in Economic and Finance [ERA=B], and
Australasian Accounting Business and Finance Journal [ERA=B].
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and different components of the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index are provided in
Sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively.

To improve the robustness and sensitivity of the results under this method, the
operating approach which focuses on the revenue maximization of a financial
institution is also employed. A combination of these approaches can facilitate a
robust and comprehensive analysis of Iranian banking industry performance. The
results of all sections are classified into three main groups; commercial banks,
specialised banks, and private banks. The empirical results obtained in this
chapter help address the four research questions stated in Chapter One:
1. What is the mean efficiency score of financial institutions in Iran?
2. What is the total factor productivity change for Iran’s financial institutions?
3. Have financial reforms been successful in improving the performance of the
banking sector, and has the performance of Iranian banks become more
efficient after the regulatory changes?
4. What are the major sources of inefficiency in the context of Iran’s financial
institutions?
In particular, this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the
bootstrapped efficiency of financial institutions in Iran. In Section 5.3, the
productivity growth of Iran’s financial institutions is estimated using
Bootstrapped Malmquist productivity indices. The Hicks-Moorsteen approach is
employed to investigate efficiency and productivity changes of the banking
system in Section 5.4 and Section 5.5, respectively. Section 5.6 concludes with a
summary of the major findings of this chapter.

155

5.2 Bootstrapped Output-Oriented Technical Efficiency Scores of
Iranian Banks
To estimate output-oriented technical efficiency for the banks, the linear
programming problems in Equation (4.20) of Chapter Four must be solved for

ov is equal to unity
each bank in each period. The interpretation is simple. When D
it t

it indicates that the i-th firm lies on the boundary of the production set of period t,
and accordingly is technically efficient. When Ditovt is below unity it indicates that
the firm is positioned under the frontier and is technically inefficient.

Table 5.1 summarizes annual mean efficiency for the banking industry over the
period 2003-2008. Column 2 of Table 5.1 lists the mean efficiency estimates, and
columns 3 to 6 list the bias-corrected estimates, bootstrap bias estimates, and the
efficiency’s lower and upper bounds for the 95 per cent confidence intervals
(annual means), respectively, for each year. Table 5.1 shows that although the
industry is inefficient over all years, the industry efficiency level improves over
the period 2003-2006, and declines considerably after 2006. Note that in all cases
the mean of estimated efficiency lies to the right of the estimated confidence
intervals; this result obviously reflects the theory behind the construction of the
confidence intervals presented by Simar and Wilson (1998b) presented in Section
4.4 of Chapter 4.

In addition, the estimates of technical efficiency differ from the bias-corrected
estimates. In some periods this difference (the bias) is quite small. For instance,
the difference was less than 0.03 between 2004 and 2007, while in 2003 the
difference was about 0.07. The means of the estimated confidence intervals,
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which define statistical location of the true efficiency, were relatively narrow over
2005, 2006 and 2007. The minor bias of VRS estimates and the relatively smaller
confidence intervals in these years imply that the results are relatively stable.
However, results from this table are very general and do not help us to distinguish
between the performance of individual banks. Hence, the bootstraps of the
efficiency scores for individual banks are displayed in three major categories of
commercial, specialised and private banks in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. For the sake of
brevity, only the bootstrap of efficiency scores for the years 2003 and 2008 are
presented in these tables. 30
Table 5.1: Annual Average Efficiency Estimates for the Whole Banking
Industry Based on the Bootstrap Method (2003-2008).
Year
Estimated Eff Bias-Corrected
2003
0.8940
0.8258
2004
0.9542
0.9284
2005
0.9793
0.9685
2006
0.9911
0.9877
2007
0.8928
0.8826
2008
0.9382
0.9028
Mean
0.9416
0.9160
Source: Author’s calculations.

Bias
0.0681
0.0258
0.0107
0.0033
0.0103
0.0354
0.0256

Lower Bound
0.4890
0.8305
0.9309
0.9777
0.8623
0.6285
0.7865

Upper Bound
0.8908
0.9542
0.9793
0.9911
0.8926
0.9378
0.9409

A comparison of Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 shows that the specialised banks are the
most efficient banks in both years. The results are mixed for commercial and
private banks. A number of banks show similar efficiencies in both periods, but a
few banks show substantial disparities over the periods. For instance, among the
commercial banks, National Bank and Trade Bank were efficient in both periods,
whereas Bank Refah, which is quite inefficient in 2003, becomes efficient in 2008.
On the other hand, the situation of Export Bank (Bank Saderat) becomes worse in
2008, and its efficiency deteriorates from 0.95 in 2003 to 0.74 in 2008. Private

30

The results for all years are available from the author upon request.
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banks also show similar disparities; Parsian Bank and Eghtesad Novin Bank (EN
Bank) appear to be relatively efficient in both periods. Karafarin Bank improves
its efficiency significantly in 2008 and reaches an efficiency score of 1.0, but
Saman Bank’s position perform exactly the opposite. According to Tables 5.2 and
5.3, in 2003 and 2008 specialised banks and private banks were the most efficient
banks, respectively, and commercial banks (i.e. Bank Sepah, Export Bank and
Trade Bank) can be recognized as the most inefficient banks in the market.
However, these results only provide a general guide to identify the most and the
least technically efficient banks in the market. A comprehensive investigation of
why some banks are more efficient than others will requires a further in-depth
analysis of changes in government or banks’ policies within a historical
perspective.

Table 5.2: Individual Efficiency Estimates Based on the Bootstrap Method
(2003).
Financial Institutions
Commercial Banks (Public)
National Bank
Bank Sepah
Export Bank
Trade Bank
Bank Mellat
Bank Refah
Specialised Banks (Public)
Agricultural Bank
Housing Bank
Export development Bank (ED
Bank)
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM)
Private Banks
Karafarin Bank
Saman Bank
Parsian Bank
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank)
Mean
Source: Author’s calculations.

Estimated
Efficiency

BiasCorrected

Bias

Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

1.0000
0.8995
0.9538
0.8188
1.0000
0.6665

0.9155
0.8440
0.8972
0.7727
0.9087
0.6266

0.0845
0.0555
0.0566
0.0461
0.0913
0.0399

0.5082
0.7062
0.7382
0.6212
0.5457
0.5084

0.9962
0.8965
0.9506
0.8160
0.9954
0.6639

1.0000
1.0000

0.9181
0.9164

0.0819
0.0836

0.5197
0.0013

0.9962
0.9971

1.0000
1.0000

0.9102
0.9221

0.0898
0.0779

0.5745
0.4090

0.9954
0.9970

0.5122
0.6651
1.0000
1.0000
0.8940

0.4816
0.6234
0.9116
0.9139
0.8258

0.0307
0.0417
0.0884
0.0861
0.0681

0.3996
0.4967
0.4200
0.3983
0.4891

0.5108
0.6629
0.9962
0.9970
0.8908
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Table 5.3: Individual Efficiency Estimates Based on the Bootstrap Method
(2008).
Financial Institutions
Commercial Banks (Public)
National Bank
Bank Sepah
Export Bank
Trade Bank
Bank Mellat
Bank Refah
Specialised Banks (Public)
Agricultural Bank
Housing Bank
Export development Bank (ED
Bank)
Bank of Industry and Mines
(BIM)
Private Banks
Karafarin Bank
Saman Bank
Parsian Bank
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN
Bank)
Mean
Source: Author’s calculations.

Estimated
Efficiency

BiasCorrected

Bias

Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

1.0000
0.9097
0.7382
0.9617
1.0000
1.0000

0.9603
0.8796
0.7153
0.9341
0.9583
0.9589

0.0397
0.0301
0.0229
0.0275
0.0418
0.0411

0.5574
0.7794
0.6177
0.8150
0.6862
0.5616

0.9997
0.9093
0.7380
0.9613
0.9995
0.9995

1.0000
1.0000

0.9574
0.9584

0.0426
0.0416

0.8045
0.7654

0.9994
0.9994

1.0000

0.9794

0.0206

0.5642

0.9991

1.0000

0.9592

0.0408

0.4282

0.9996

1.0000
0.5252
1.0000

0.9571
0.5085
0.9554

0.0429
0.0167
0.0446

0.5071
0.4349
0.4749

0.9910
0.5250
0.9993

1.0000
0.9382

0.9576
0.9028

0.0424
0.0354

0.8026
0.6285

0.9990
0.9371

As stated by Simar and Wilson (1998b), relative comparisons of the performance
among firms based on the estimated efficiency scores should be made with
caution. Of special note, Housing Bank is efficient in both periods (as its
estimated efficiency is 1.0 in both periods), and its estimated confidence intervals
for 2003 and 2008 overlap. However the estimated lower bound in 2008 was
much higher than that of 2003, suggesting that its true efficiency may have
improved in 2008. In this case the bias-corrected efficiency scores can be very
helpful in distinguishing between decision units. For instance, the bias-corrected
efficiency of Housing Bank increases from 0.916 in 2003 to 0.958 in 2008,
suggesting that this bank was not equally efficient in 2003 and 2008. The bias for
some banks is very small, hence, their bias-corrected efficiency score is very close
to the original estimate (e.g. Saman Bank in 2008), but a few banks show large
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differences (e.g. Bank Mellat in 2003). The bias estimates, in general, are higher
for the most efficient banks (with the estimated efficiency of 1.0) in both years.
There are also substantial dissimilarities between banks’ confidence intervals.
Both Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show that a number of estimated confidence intervals are
quite wide (e.g. Housing Bank and EN Bank in Table 5.2 and BIM and Parsian in
Table 5.3), while others are rather narrow (e.g. Bank Refah and Karafarin Bank in
Table 5.2 and Bank Refah and Saman Bank in Table 5.3).

5.3 The Decomposition of the Malmquist TFP Index
Concentrating only on efficiency estimates can provide an incomplete view of the
performance of banks over time. It is for this reason that changes in distance
function values over time could be caused by either 1) movement of banks within
the input-output space (efficiency changes), or 2) progress/regress of the boundary
of the production set over time (technological changes). The decomposition of the
Malmquist index, as explained in Section 2, makes it possible to distinguish
changes in productivity, efficiency and technological change.

Table 5.4 reports various estimates of productivity changes for banks in the three
categories over five pairs of years between 2003 and 2008. Almost all of the
estimates are significantly different from unity at the 90 per cent or 95 per cent
level of significance. Only BIM is insignificantly different from unity for one pair
of years (2007-2008). Over 2003-2004 - the period after the private banks came
into existence – of all 14 estimates of productivity changes only 5 banks show
productivity gains. In this period, two of the specialised banks, Agricultural Bank
and Housing Bank, had the highest levels of productivity losses. On average, the
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industry showed an 11 per cent productivity loss (i.e. 0.98 productivity changes).
The results for the three pairs of years, however, were quite the opposite.
During the period 2004-2005 all of the banks (with two exceptions) show
moderate gains and all specialised banks show productivity expansions. In the
period 2005-2006 the results indicate significant gains for ten banks, and
significant decreases in productivity for four banks (two specialised banks and
two private banks). All commercial banks show rather large productivity gains
over this period. During the period 2006-2007 the industry showed a significant
increase in productivity; about 28 per cent on average. All banks but one showed
productivity gains, and among these banks two of the specialised banks (i.e. ED
Bank and BIM), demonstrated massive productivity advances of 2.29 and 2.67,
respectively. The results for 2007-2008, however, were largely different. Most of
the banks experienced large productivity losses and none of the commercial banks
were productive. BIM, which showed the highest level of productivity gain in
2006-2007, exhibited a 33 per cent productivity loss in 2007-2008. This pattern
was also true for some of the commercial and private banks (Export Bank, Trade
Bank, Bank Mellat and EN Bank). Using the four components explained in
section 2, we can now trace the main causes of the productivity changes over the
sample period. Tables 5.5-5.8 present estimates of the changes in pure efficiency,
scale efficiency, pure technology and scale of technology, respectively.
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Table 5.4: Estimated Malmquist Indices (Changes in Productivity) for
individual Banks (2003-2008).
Financial Institutions
2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
Commercial Banks (Public)
National Bank
0.8208*
1.0740*
1.1795*
1.1426*
0.9083*
Bank Sepah
0.6920**
1.0804*
1.3003*
1.0548*
0.7610*
Export Bank
1.1310*
0.7633*
1.0915*
1.2199*
0.7202*
Trade Bank
0.8487*
1.0972*
1.0695*
1.2057*
0.8988*
Bank Mellat
0.6510*
1.1616*
1.2716*
1.2565*
0.9020*
Bank Refah
1.0179*
1.0818*
1.2881*
1.0993*
0.7688*
Specialised Banks (Public)
Agricultural Bank
0.5847*
1.1201*
1.1231*
1.0357*
0.9371*
Housing Bank
0.4532*
1.2940*
1.3102*
1.1968*
1.1560*
Export development Bank (ED Bank)
0.8865*
1.0110*
0.6927*
2.2992*
1.2269*
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM)
1.3221*
1.0966*
0.8645*
2.6721*
0.6755
Private Banks
Karafarin Bank
1.2538*
1.0707*
1.1854*
1.0004*
0.8405**
Saman Bank
1.1387*
1.1847*
1.4870*
0.5171*
0.8969*
Parsian Bank
0.8804*
0.9007*
0.9943*
1.0232*
1.0139*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank)
0.8332*
1.1086*
0.8291*
1.2109*
0.9565*
Mean
0.8939
1.0746
1.1067
1.2810
0.9045
Note: Numbers greater than unity indicate improvements and less than unity indicate declines.
Single asterisk (*) denote significant differences from unity at 90%; double asterisk (**) denote
significant differences from unity at 95%
Source: Author’s calculations.

Table 5.5: Estimated Changes in Pure Efficiency for Individual Banks (20032008).
Financial Institutions
2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
Commercial Banks(Public)
National Bank
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
Bank Sepah
0.9910*
0.9994*
1.0000
1.00*
0.9046*
Export Bank
1.0477*
1.00*
0.9568*
1.0140*
0.7610*
Trade Bank
1.2196*
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
0.9615*
Bank Mellat
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
Bank Refah
1.4970*
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
Specialised Banks (Public)
Agricultural Bank
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
0.9883*
1.0118*
Housing Bank
0.7051*
1.1618*
1.1770*
0.9850*
1.0528*
Export development Bank (ED Bank)
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM)
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
Private Banks
Karafarin Bank
1.5435*
1.3415*
1.00*
1.00*
1.00**
Saman Bank
1.4351*
1.00*
1.00*
0.5883*
0.8879*
Parsian Bank
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
1.00*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank)
1.00*
1.00*
0.9588*
1.0429*
1.00*
Mean
1.1028
1.0359
1.0066
0.9728
0.9677
Note: Numbers greater than unity indicate improvements and less than unity indicate declines.
Single asterisk (*) denote significant differences from unity at 90%; double asterisk (**) denote
significant differences from unity at 95%
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table 5.6: Estimated Changes in Scale Efficiency for Individual Banks (20032008).
Financial Institutions
2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007
Commercial Banks (Public)
National Bank
1.0940*
1.00*
0.9916*
0.5217*
Bank Sepah
0.9437*
0.9856*
0.9111*
0.7321*
Export Bank
1.2852*
0.9868*
0.8594*
0.4986*
Trade Bank
0.9586*
1.0120*
0.9962*
0.6048*
Bank Mellat
0.9552*
1.0401*
1.0065*
0.6837*
Bank Refah
1.0029*
1.00**
1.0000
1.00***
Specialised Banks (Public)
Agricultural Bank
0.8808*
0.9940*
1.0521*
0.5659*
Housing Bank
0.7966*
0.9547*
0.9785*
0.9392*
Export development Bank (ED Bank)
1.00*
0.9041*
0.7461*
1.1078*
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM)
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
Private Banks
Karafarin Bank
0.9078*
0.8151*
1.1262*
0.9555*
Saman Bank
0.8895*
1.1712*
1.00*
0.9458*
Parsian Bank
1.00***
1.0000
1.0000
1.00*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank)
1.00*
1.00*
0.9849*
1.0152*
Mean
0.9796
0.9903
0.9752
0.8265
Note: Numbers greater than unity indicate improvements and less than unity indicate declines.
Single asterisk (*) denote significant differences from unity at 90%; triple asterisk (***) denote
significant differences from unity at 99%.
Source: Author’s calculations.

Estimated changes in pure efficiency have been reported in Table 5.5. In sum, for
consecutive years, out of the 70 estimates of changes in pure efficiency, only 24
estimates were different from unity while all of them were statistically significant.
A number of banks showed no changes in pure efficiency for all reported years
(e.g. National Bank, Bank Mellat, Agricultural Bank, ED Bank, BIM, and Parsian
Bank). During 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 (i.e in the post regulation era) when
interest rates and the allocation of direct lending facilities were regulated, the
number of banks with losses in pure efficiency increased to four and five banks,
respectively. Hence, the industry, on average, showed negative changes in
technical efficiency after 2006 as a result of inappropriate policies.

Table 5.6 reveals the estimated changes in scale efficiency where all changes from
unity are statistically significant. Results for BIM are not significant in any of the
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2007/2008
1.7376*
1.0454*
1.8684*
1.6495*
1.4624*
1.00***
1.2925*
0.9916*
1.3207*
1.0000
0.8010*
0.9559*
1.00*
0.9373*
1.2187

reported periods. The results for 2003-2004, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 are mixed.
Over these three periods most of the banks experienced negative changes in scale
efficiency (i.e. the estimates are less than unity) or very low levels of positive
changes. Over the period 2006-2007, the results deteriorated and only two banks
show some improvements in scale efficiency (i.e. ED Bank and EN Bank). Other
banks either experienced negative changes or their scale efficiency remains more
or less unchanged (e.g. Bank Refah, BIM and Parsian Bank). Hence, these results,
in conjunction with those for changes in pure efficiency, indicate that the
considerable positive changes in bank productivity for 2006-2007 cannot be
attributable to efficiency change components (pure efficiency change or scale
efficiency change); they can be explained only by technological changes. The
results for 2007-2008 were enhanced as nearly all of the public banks showed
considerable positive changes in scale efficiency. However, the situation for
private banks deteriorated as demonstrated by larger declines. As can be seen by
the last row of Table 5.6, only the final period shows positive changes in scale
efficiency, suggesting that scale inefficiency was a major source of inefficiency
among the Iranian banks.

Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show the estimated changes in pure technology in production
possibilities and scale of technology, respectively. The estimated changes are
significantly different from unity in all cases at different significance levels. In a
number of cases these changes for specialised banks and private banks could not
be computed due to the constraints imposed in the linear programming to estimate
cross-period distance functions. These cases have been indicated by INF in Tables
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5.7 and 5.8, indicating that they were infeasible to compute. 31 The results from
Table 5.7 reveal that in 2003-2004 technology among the public banks shifted
inwards for all but Export Bank. However, in 2004-2005, 2005-2006, and 20062007, the estimated changes in pure technology were greater than unity for nearly
all firms with the only exception being Export Bank in 2004-2005, suggesting an
overall technological progress in the industry. This is most probably due to the
technological advances in the banking industry which commenced in 2004 such as
increased numbers of automated teller machines (ATM), credit cards, debit cards
and online-branches. Almost all banks also showed large decreases in technology
for the period 2007-2008. For the private banks all these changes, except for EN
Bank in the last period, were significantly greater than unity in the sample period.

Finally, as to the shape of technology, the estimated changes in the scale of
technology are presented in Table 5.8. The estimated changes in the private banks
are significantly less than unity in almost every case, indicating that the
technological region of these banks in the input-output space was moving toward
constant returns to scale between 2004 and 2008.

31

This difficulty is also experienced by Gilbert and Wilson (1998).
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Table 5.7: Estimated Changes in Pure Technology for Individual Banks
(2003-2008).
Financial Institutions
2003/2004
2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
Commercial Banks (Public)
National Bank
0.9636*
1.1555*
1.1698*
1.1883*
0.9340*
Bank Sepah
0.8489*
1.0850*
1.1528*
1.1672**
0.9145*
Export Bank
1.0988*
0.7439*
1.2648*
1.2298*** 0.9431*
Trade Bank
0.8309*
1.1080*
1.0750*
1.0640*
0.8204*
Bank Mellat
0.9138*
1.0802*
1.1977*
1.1675*
0.9043*
Bank Refah
0.6698*
1.0794*
1.2865*
1.1072*** 0.7392*
Specialised Banks(Public)
Agricultural Bank
0.7891*
1.0766*
1.0232*
1.0932**
0.9049*
Housing Bank
0.9454*
1.2338*
1.1366*
1.2158**
1.1001*
Export development Bank (ED Bank) INF
INF
INF
1.3235*** INF
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM)
INF
INF
INF
INF
INF
Private Banks
Karafarin Bank
INF
INF
INF
INF
INF
Saman Bank
INF
1.1151*** 1.6001*** INF
1.0815*
Parsian Bank
INF
1.1631*
1.0889*
1.1016*
1.0615*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank)
INF
INF
INF
1.1260**
0.9374*
Mean
0.8825
1.0841
1.1996
1.1622
0.9401
Note: Estimates greater than unity indicate an increase in pure technology and estimates less than
unity indicate a decrease in pure technology. INF=Infeasible to compute. Single asterisk (*) denote
significant differences from unity at 90%; double asterisk (**) denote significant differences from
unity at 95%; triple (***) asterisk denote significant differences from unity at 99%.
Source: Author’s calculations.

Table 5.8: Estimated Changes in Scale of Technology for Individual Banks
(2003-2008).
Financial Institutions
2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007
Commercial Banks (Public)
National Bank
0.7785*
0.9294*
1.0168*
1.8428*
Bank Sepah
0.8715*
1.0108*
1.1041*
1.2343*
Export Bank
0.7642*
1.0396*
1.0493*
1.9619*
Trade Bank
0.8736*
0.9784*
0.9985*
1.8736*
Bank Mellat
0.7458*
1.0338*
1.0548*
1.5739*
Bank Refah
1.0121*
1.0022*
1.0012*
0.9928*
Specialised Banks (Public)
Agricultural Bank
0.8412*
1.0466*
1.0432*
1.6936*
Housing Bank
0.8534*
0.9454*
1.0008*
1.0640*
Export development Bank (ED Bank)
INF
INF
INF
1.5681*
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM)
INF
INF
INF
INF
Private Banks
Karafarin Bank
INF
INF
INF
INF
Saman Bank
INF
INF
0.9070*
0.9288*
Parsian Bank
INF
0.7744*
0.9130*
0.9288*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank)
INF
INF
INF
INF
Mean
0.8425
0.9668
1.0111
1.4734
Note: Estimates greater than unity show that the technology is moving farther from constant
returns to scale, and estimates less than unity indicate that the technology is moving toward
constant returns to scale. INF=Infeasible to compute. Single asterisk (*) denote significant
differences from unity at 90%.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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2007/2008
0.5596*
0.8799*
0.5370*
0.6908*
0.6820*
1.0400*
0.7918*
1.0064*
INF
INF
INF
0.9769*
0.9551*
1.0885*
0.8371

Among the public banks the results are the opposite in three periods; 2004-2005,
2005-2006, and 2006-2007, meaning that returns to scale of technology were
becoming increasingly convex and more variable. Given that the private banks are
much smaller than the public banks, these results seem to imply that the most
efficient scale size is falling over these periods. However, the technology faced by
public banks in the last period moved toward constant returns to scale; since the
estimated changes showed values less than unity for most of them. In brief, the
results in Tables 5.6 and 5.8 emphasize that the portion of the technology
confronting public banks seems to have moved substantially further from constant
returns to scale, and the banks have performed under decreasing returns to scale
for a long period.

In general, the results in Tables 5.4 to 5.8 indicate that while government
ownership resulted in large advances in the technology of commercial and
specialised banks over time, it also caused scale inefficiencies and kept the most
efficient scale size smaller than that which otherwise would have prevailed. Public
banks show no positive changes in pure technical efficiency during the sample
period. Also, after the regulation, three of the largest commercial banks have
become considerably inefficient. This may be attributed to the significant growth
of NPLs since 2006. However, the technology advances of public banks offset the
increase in scale and pure technical inefficiencies over 2004-2005, 2005-2006,
and 2006-2007, and hence, productivity increases in almost all public banks. But,
over the period 2007-2008 large increases in the scale efficiency of these banks do
not offset the rise in pure technical inefficiency and the reduction in pure
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technology (in production possibilities). Hence, on average, their productivity
deteriorates considerably through time.

5.4 Output-Oriented Technical Efficiency, Scale Efficiency and
Mix Efficiency Scores of Iranian Banks under Hicks-Moorsteen
Approach
As the Hicks-Moorsteen technique is also a distance-based index, the DEA
methodology developed by O’Donnell (2010b, 2010c) is applied for estimating
the distances under VRS. Bank performances have been examined by both the
intermediation approach and the revenue maximization approach (operating
approach). The estimated output-oriented efficiency levels for various types of
bank-specific efficiencies, (i.e. pure technical efficiency, scale efficiency and mix
efficiency) and over three selected years (2004, 2006, and 2008) are reported in
Table 5.9. 32 The interpretation is straightforward as an efficiency estimate of one
indicates that the bank lies on the boundary of the production set and thus is
relatively efficient. An estimate below unity indicates that the bank is positioned
under the frontier and is technically inefficient. A firm that has technical
efficiency equal to 1 and has scale and mix efficiency less than 1 is still on the
frontier but at a relatively unproductive point on the frontier. Summary results of
different estimated output-oriented efficiency levels are presented in Table 5.10.
In this table the results are categorised into four groups; commercial banks,
specialised banks, private banks and mean efficiency for the banking industry
over the period 2003 and 2008. Attention is now directed to a more detailed
discussion of our results.

32

The results for all years are available from the authors upon request. As methods for estimating
residual mix and residual scale efficiency levels are not presently available, hence, only estimates
of pure technical efficiency, scale efficiency and mix efficiency are provided.
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Table 5.9: Different Output-Oriented Efficiency Levels for Individual Banks:
Technical Efficiency, Scale Efficiency and Mix Efficiency (2004-2008).

Financial Institutions
Commercial Banks (Public)
National Bank
Bank Sepah
Export Bank
Trade Bank
Bank Mellat
Bank Refah
Specialised Banks (Public)
Agricultural Bank
Housing Bank
Export Development Bank
Bank of Industry and Mines
Private Banks
Karafarin Bank
Saman Bank
Parsian Bank
Bank Eghtesad Novin

Intermediation Approach
2004
2006
2008
OTE OSE OME OTE
OSE
OME
OTE OSE OME
1
0.892
1
1
1
1

1
0.941
1
0.944
0.955
1

1
0.948
1
0.989
1
1

1
1
0.956
1
1
1

0.991
0.845
0.848
0.952
1
1

1
0.933
0.918
0.937
1
1

1
0.909
0.738
0.961
1
1

0.899
0.644
0.790
0.950
1
1

1
0.900
0.974
0.902
1
1

1
0.705
1
1

0.880
0.796
1
1

1
0.631
1
1

1
0.964
1
1

0.921
0.744
0.674
1

1
0.641
1
1

1
1
1
1

0.674
0.693
0.987
1

1
0.612
1
1

0.745
1
1
1

0.899
0.853
1
1

0.872
1
1
1

1
1
1
0.958

0.825
1
1
0.984

1
1
1
0.932

1
0.522
1
1

0.632
0.904
1
0.937

1
0.742
1
0.905

Operating Approach
2004
2006
OTE OSE OME OTE
OSE
OME

Financial Institutions
Commercial Banks (Public)
National Bank
1
Bank Sepah
1
Export Bank
1
Trade Bank
1
Bank Mellat
1
Bank Refah
1
Specialised Banks (Public)
Agricultural Bank
1
Housing Bank
1
Export Development Bank 1
Bank of Industry and Mines 0.723
Private Banks
Karafarin Bank
1
Saman Bank
1
Parsian Bank
1
Bank Eghtesad Novin
1
Source: Author’s calculation.

2008
OTE OSE OME

1
0.964
0.938
1
0.950
1

1
0.955
0.796
0.845
0.975
1

1
1
1
0.939
1
1

1
1
0.995
0.999
0.970
1

1
1
0.942
0.984
1
1

1
1
1
0.978
0.969
0.966

1
1
0.945
0.999
0.999
0.943

1
1
0.941
0.997
0.989
0.914

1
0.912
0.857
0.867

0.997
1
1
0.619

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
0.885
1
0.952

1
0.897
1
1

1
0.996
1
1

1
0.987
1
1

1
0.928
0.944
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
0.900

0.889
1
1
0.979

1
1
1
0.900

1
1
1
1

0.809
1
1
0.985

1
1
1
1

Table 5.9 shows that a number of banks in certain years have been fully
technically-, mix- and scale-efficient under both of the approaches, e.g. National
Bank, Bank Refah and Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) in 2004, Bank Refah,
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Parsian Bank and Saman Bank in 2006, and, Parsian Bank and Bank of Industry
and Mines (BIM) in 2008. This indicates that these banks produced more of any
outputs per unit of any inputs than any other banks, and they were the most
efficient banks in the industry during the corresponding years.

As can be seen in Table 5.9, Parsian Bank (which is the largest Iranian private
bank) was the only fully efficient bank in terms of the provision of intermediation
services and the attainment of revenue maximization in 2006 and 2008. Regarding
banks’ output oriented technical efficiency (OTE), the results vary between the
alternative approaches (Table 5.9). For instance, in 2004 Bank of Industry and
Mines (BIM) was fully efficient under the intermediation approach but very
inefficient under the operating approach (OTE=0.72). Similar results are obtained
for Trade Bank (Bank Tejarat) in 2006, and Bank Mellat, Bank Refah and
Housing Bank in 2008. These banks performed more efficiently in terms of
providing intermediation services rather than maximizing their revenue. This
reflects the difference between the two approaches in the evaluation of banks’
efficiency. The interesting finding is that all of such banks are among public
banks. Conversely, Table 5.9 also shows that in 2004 Bank Sepah, Housing bank
and Karafarin Bank were found to be fully technically-efficient under the
operating approach and largely inefficient under intermediation approach
(OTE=0.89, 0.70 and 0.74, respectively). The same thing can be said for Export
Bank and Housing Bank in 2006, and Export Bank, Bank Sepah and Saman Bank
in 2008. Therefore, one can conclude that for both public banks and private banks
it is possible to be fully technically-efficient under the operating approach but
mostly inefficient under intermediation approach.
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In relation to banks’ scale efficiency, a number of banks were found to be scale
inefficient under both the approaches in 2006 and 2008 (e.g. Export Bank, Trade
Bank, Bank Eghtesad Novin, and Karafarin bank) indicating significant room for
scale optimization to facilitate higher levels of revenue and services. Also, Table
5.9 shows that five public banks were less efficient under the intermediation
approach, but among the most efficient banks under the operating approach in
2006 and 2008. These banks are National Bank, Bank Sepah, Agricultural Bank,
Housing Bank, and Export development Bank (ED Bank), which need to optimize
their size to provide more intermediation services. In general it appears that under
the intermediation approach scale inefficiency is an obvious problem of the public
banks.

As to the mix efficiency estimates reported in Table 5.9, perhaps the most
important result is that all the private banks were fully mix-efficient banks under
operating approach in the selected years (except for Bank Eghtesad Novin in
2006), suggesting that the revenue maximization is the highest priority of all
private banks, hence they select those mixes of inputs which lead to the
achievement of the highest possible revenue. But this is not completely possible
for public banks as they are obliged to follow government policies. Also, it can be
seen from Table 5.9 that under the intermediation approach Housing Bank is the
most mix-inefficient bank over a three year period. This may suggest that this
bank is heavily influenced by government policies and priorities in terms of
providing housing facilities to low-income groups.
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Table 5.10: Various Output-Oriented Measures: Technical, Scale and Mix
Efficiency (2003-2008).
Financial Institutions

Year

Intermediation Approach
OTE
OSE
OME

Operating Approach
OTE
OSE
OME

Commercial Banks

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

0.8905
0.9821
0.9820
0.9928
0.9950
0.9349

0.9454
0.9736
0.9775
0.9397
0.6366
0.8806

0.9379
0.9896
0.9804
0.9650
0.9532
0.9629

0.9896
1.0000
0.9887
0.9900
0.9734
0.9857

0.9794
0.9755
0.9852
0.9942
0.9873
0.9815

0.9347
0.9287
0.9589
0.9877
0.9886
0.9739

Specialised Banks

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

1.0000
0.9263
0.9548
0.9911
0.9846
1.0000

1.0000
0.9194
0.8851
0.8351
0.7420
0.8386

0.9648
0.9078
0.9211
0.9105
0.8844
0.9030

0.8087
0.9310
0.9572
1.0000
0.9607
0.9743

0.7565
0.9093
0.9992
1.0000
0.9926
0.9992

0.7511
0.9044
0.9451
0.9594
0.9945
0.9970

Private Banks

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

0.7949
0.9364
1.0000
0.9897
0.8971
0.8806

0.9876
0.9383
0.9333
0.9527
0.9336
0.8684

0.9502
0.9681
1.0000
0.9831
0.9016
0.9122

1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.9752
1.0000
1.0000

0.9740
0.9682
0.9877
0.9671
0.9816
0.9487

0.8592
1.0000
0.9572
0.9750
1.0000
1.0000

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Source: Author's calculation.

0.8951
0.9482
0.9789
0.9912
0.9589
0.9385

0.9777
0.9438
0.9319
0.9091
0.7707
0.8625

0.9510
0.9552
0.9671
0.9528
0.9130
0.9260

0.9328
0.9770
0.9820
0.9884
0.9780
0.9867

0.9033
0.9510
0.9907
0.9871
0.9871
0.9765

0.8483
0.9444
0.9537
0.9740
0.9944
0.9903

Industry

Table 5.10 reveals that, as a whole, the industry is inefficient over the entire
period under both the intermediation and operating approaches. However, under
the intermediation approach, it is found that the average pure technical efficiency
(OTE) of the public banks is associated with higher pure efficiency levels in the
post-regulation era (2006-2008). Unlike public banks, the OTE for private banks
shows a considerable decline over the same period. These changes coincided with
major banking reforms initiated in 2005 by the then newly-elected government.
As a result of these government initiatives, public banks were obliged to provide
more direct credit facilities, grant lower interest rates and subsidised-banking
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services to a number of less privileged areas. It may be argued that due to a large
expansion of public banks’ advances on the non-public sector, public banks
became more purely efficient than private banks in terms of intermediation
services. On the other hand, a significantly lower pure efficiency of private banks
after 2005 can be attributed to their poor management of deposits. Put otherwise,
since the interest rates given to deposits by private banks were higher than those
of public banks, they attracted large deposits but they initially could not utilise
them efficiently in investment projects (CBI, 2007a). 33

Table 5.10 also reveals that under the intermediation approach, on average, public
banks became highly scale and mix inefficient after the government regulations
were imposed in 2005, and scale inefficiency does appear to be a serious problem
for the industry. In general, average scale efficiency estimates of the commercial
and specialised banks were quite low, varying below 94 per cent and 84 per cent,
respectively in the post-regulation era (2006-2008). Thus, with respect to their
current scale of operations, commercial banks, and specialised banks in particular
are highly likely to generate less than optimal output. These sub-optimal levels of
banks’ scale efficiency and mix efficiency can be attributed to inefficient scale
size and the lack of independence of these banks from the government in terms of
managing their inputs-outputs, respectively.

A cursory look at the results under the operating approach shows that private
banks performed fully technically-efficient over each and every year during the
sample period 2003-2008, with the only exception being the year 2006 (see the
33

The ratio of private banks’ deposits on total deposits in the banking system increased
considerably from 7 per cent in 2004 to 23.8 per cent in 2008.
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sixth column in Table 5.10). The results also indicate that private banks were the
most efficient banks in terms of the allocation of inputs and outputs (fully mixefficient) over 2006 and 2007, and public banks were much less mix efficient
during these years. Hence, one may argue that the government ownership has had
an adverse impact on technical and mix efficiency of the public banks under the
operating approach. There are at least two reasons behind this: (1) public banks
focus on profitability as well as creating employment opportunities in rural areas
and among people with low skills; (2) by providing artificially kept-low interest
rates, public banks are also obliged to follow the government policy objectives
and the strategy of advancing larger quantity of loans to a number of sectors
considered as high priorities.

5.5 The Decomposition of the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 provide measures of total factor productivity changes
(∆TFP) and its components, technical changes (∆Tech) and efficiency changes
(∆Eff) for individual banks in the pre- (2004-2005) and post-regulation (20062007) periods, respectively.

In addition three components of the ∆Eff are

reported: (i) changes in output-oriented pure technical efficiency (∆OTE); (ii) the
residual scale efficiency (∆ROSE); and (iii) mix efficiency (∆OME). Once again,
the estimated values greater than unity indicate an improvement in the
corresponding measures, and the ones below unity are indicative of a deterioration
in them. Similar to Table 5.10, summary results of different estimated total factor
productivity indices are presented in Table 5.13.
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Table 5.11:TFP Changes and its Decomposition for Individual Banks in
2004-2005.

Financial Institutions
Commercial Banks (Public)
National Bank
Bank Sepah
Export Bank
Trade Bank
Bank Mellat
Bank Refah
Specialised Banks (Public)
Agricultural Bank
Housing Bank
Export Development Bank
Bank of Industry and Mines
Private Banks
Karafarin Bank
Saman Bank
Parsian Bank
Bank Eghtesad Novin

Intermediation Approach
ΔTFP
ΔTech
ΔEff

∆OTE

∆ROSE

∆OME

1.149
1.077
0.636
1.111
1.062
1.087

1.425
1.425
1.425
1.425
1.425
1.425

0.806
0.755
0.446
0.779
0.745
0.762

1
0.999
1
1
1
1

0.806
0.757
0.477
0.771
0.745
0.762

1
0.998
0.935
1.010
1
1

1.050
1.346
0.952
1.124

1.425
1.425
1.425
1.425

0.737
0.944
0.668
0.788

1
1.161
1
1

0.737
0.750
0.668
0.788

1
1.083
1
1

0.930
1.425
0.652
1.248
1.425
0.876
0.834
1.425
0.585
1.279
1.425
0.897
Operating Approach
ΔTFP
ΔTech
ΔEff

1.341
1
1
1

0.424
0.876
0.585
0.897

1.146
1
1
1

∆OTE

∆ROSE

∆OME

1
1
1
0.9324
1
1

1.023
1.044
1.002
0.969
1.024
0.913

1
1.046
0.955
1.174
1.024
1

1
1
1
1.1451

1.024
1.185
1.509
0.823

1.002
1
1
1.258

1
1
1
1

1.116
1.190
0.964
0.968

0.941
1
0.938
0.949

Financial Institutions
Commercial Banks (Public)
National Bank
1.033
1.009
1.023
Bank Sepah
1.103
1.009
1.093
Export Bank
0.967
1.009
0.958
Trade Bank
1.072
1.009
1.061
Bank Mellat
1.06
1.009
1.049
Bank Refah
0.921
1.009
0.913
Specialised Banks (Public)
Agricultural Bank
1.036
1.009
1.026
Export Development Bank
1.196
1.009
1.185
Housing Bank
1.523
1.009
1.509
Bank of Industry and Mines
1.198
1.009
1.186
Private Banks
Karafarin Bank
1.060
1.009
1.050
Saman Bank
1.202
1.009
1.190
Parsian Bank
0.914
1.009
0.905
Bank Eghtesad Novin
0.927
1.009
0.919
Note: ΔTFP= ΔTech×ΔEff, and ΔEff=ΔOTE×ΔROSE×ΔOME.
Source: Author’s calculation.

As shown in Tables 5.11 and 5.12 technical changes (∆Tech) are the same for
each bank in any period, suggesting that banks have access to the same production
possibilities set. Thus, all banks will be affected equally by expansions or
contractions in the production possibilities set; this result obviously reflects the

175

theory behind the technical changes presented by O’Donnell (2008). A change in
the production possibilities set (∆Tech) can be attributable to any changes in the
environment. Thus, ∆Tech captures the effect of technological changes as well as
the impact of government regulations and central bank policies.

Table 5.12: TFP Changes and its Decomposition for Individual Banks in
2006-2007.
Financial Institutions
Commercial Banks (Public)
National Bank
Bank Sepah
Export Bank
Trade Bank
Bank Mellat
Bank Refah
Specialised Banks (Public)
Agricultural Bank
Housing Bank
Export Development Bank
Bank of Industry and Mines
Private Banks
Karafarin Bank
Saman Bank
Parsian Bank
Bank Eghtesad Novin

ΔTFP

Intermediation Approach
ΔTech
ΔEff
∆OTE

∆ROSE

∆OME

1.1863
1.1735
1.2285
1.0674
1.1148
1.0796

2.2734
2.2734
2.2734
2.2734
2.2734
2.2734

0.5218
0.5162
0.5404
0.4695
0.4903
0.4749

1
1.1212
0.9569
1
1
1

0.5218
0.5113
0.5974
0.4601
0.4903
0.4749

1
1.0095
0.8922
1.0204
1
1

1.0663
1.1733
2.296
2.9442

2.2734
2.2734
2.2734
2.2734

0.469
0.5161
1.0099
1.2951

1
1.177
1
1

0.4905
0.5902
1.0099
1.2951

0.9675
0.8877
1
1

1
1
1
0.9588

0.3863
0.6639
0.4766
0.5318

1
0.6934
1
0.9793

∆OTE

∆ROSE

∆OME

1
1
1
0.978
0.9211
1

1.0881
1.2889
1.0172
1.0261
1.0456
0.9016

1
1
1.0612
0.9592
0.9875
1

1
0.8427
1
1

1.0334
1.0574
1.1093
1.0076

0.9987
1.106
1
1.0504

1
1
1
1.11

1.1291
1.1242
2.4996
1.3488

1
1
1
1.111

0.8781
0.6158
1.0834
1.2347

2.2734
0.3863
2.2734
0.2709
2.2734
0.4766
2.2734
0.5431
Operating Approach
ΔTech
ΔEff

Financial Institutions
ΔTFP
Commercial Banks (Public)
National Bank
1.0876
0.9995
1.0881
Bank Sepah
1.2883
0.9995
1.2889
Export Bank
1.079
0.9995
1.0795
Trade Bank
0.9622
0.9995
0.9626
Bank Mellat
0.9507
0.9995
0.9511
Bank Refah
0.9012
0.9995
0.9016
Specialised Banks (Public)
Agricultural Bank
1.0316
0.9995
1.0321
Housing Bank
0.9851
0.9995
0.9856
Export Development Bank 1.1088
0.9995
1.1093
Bank of Industry and Mines 1.0579
0.9995
1.0584
Private Banks
Karafarin Bank
1.1286
0.9995
1.1291
Saman Bank
1.1236
0.9995
1.1242
Parsian Bank
2.4984
0.9995
2.4996
Bank Eghtesad Novin
1.6626
0.9995
1.6634
Note: ΔTFP= ΔTech×ΔEff, and ΔEff=ΔOTE×ΔROSE×ΔOME.
Source: Author’s calculation.
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Tables 5.11 and 5.12 also show considerable expansion of the efficient frontier
(∆Tech) under the intermediation approach but intangible variation in ∆Tech
under the operating approach.

Under the intermediation approach, the estimates of productivity changes (∆TFP)
in Tables 5.11 and 5.12 show the same fluctuations as changes in technology
(∆Tech). In spite of significant positive technical changes (∆Tech >1) in both
periods, changes of total factor productivity (∆TFP) for most of the banks were
less than 2 per cent (i.e. ∆TFP<1.2) or negative (i.e. ∆TFP<1). This is attributable
to huge negative changes of the banks’ efficiency (∆Eff<1), as most banks and all
commercial banks experienced more than 20 per cent negative changes in
efficiency (∆Eff<0.80). According to Tables 5.11 and 5.12, these negative
efficiency changes are as a result of considerable negative changes of the banks’
scale efficiency (∆ROSE). For example, each commercial bank experienced more
than 20 per cent (2004-2005) and 40 per cent (2006-2007) negative changes of
scale efficiency.

Table 5.13 lists the total factor productivity changes (∆TFP) and its different
components for aggregate groupings of individual banks, during the period 20042008. In general, according to our results, under both approaches the banking
industry experienced improvements in terms of ∆TFP in all years except for 20032004 and 2007-2008. The decline of ∆TFP in 2007-2008 was quite noticeable as
all of the groups experienced negative TFP changes especially under the operating
approach. A general comparison of various indices presented in Table 5.13
reveals that under the operating approach, changes in residual output-oriented
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scale efficiency (∆ROSE) has been the significant component of changes in total
factor productivity changes (∆TFP) of the industry. But under the intermediation
approach, the key components of ∆TFP in the industry were ∆ROSE and technical
changes (∆Tech). These findings are useful because under both approaches the
scale inefficiency is definitely a major reason behind TFP shortfalls in the
industry. For example, in 2006-2007 under the intermediation approach,
commercial banks, specialised banks and private banks experienced the extensive
technology advance by 127 per cent (see the fourth column in Table 5.13 where
∆Tech=2.27 for all banks. However, a considerable deterioration of scale
efficiency (∆ROSE) negates significant positive changes of ∆Tech, thus limiting
the extent of TFP growth over this period. Hence, TFP changes for commercial
banks, specialised banks and private banks showed net changes of 14 per cent
(commercial banks), 87 per cent (specialised banks), and -5 per cent (private
banks). This result, under the intermediation approach, may not necessarily be
undesirable for private banks due to the fact that private banks do not have to
allocate and manage their funds according to the government priorities. On the
other hand under the operating approach, private banks showed 60 per cent
positive change in TFP in 2006-2007.

Finally regarding ∆Tech it should be noted that by looking at the upper section of
Table 5.13 in 2004-2005, 2005-2006, and 2006-2007, the industry’s estimates of
∆Tech were greater than unity, suggesting that an overall technological progress
in the industry is apparent. However, from a revenue-optimisation perspective (the
lower part of Table 5.13) the estimates of ∆Tech were relatively smaller in 20042005 and 2005-2006 and even negative in 2006-2007. This is most probably due
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to the technological advances in the banking industry, which commenced in 2004,
such as the usage of automated teller machines (ATM), credit cards, debit cards,
and online-branches, as well as the increased pressure on commercial banks to
expand credit facilities in 2006.

One may argue that these changes led to an expansion of the intermediation
services and operating costs simultaneously. In 2007-2008, the industry
experienced a large fall in technical change (∆Tech) under both approaches and
this was probable as a result of a substantial rise in the public banks’ NPLs.
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Table 5.13: TFP Changes and its Decomposition for Different Bank Groups
between 2003 and 2008.
Intermediation Approach
ΔTFP
ΔTech ΔEff

∆OTE

∆ROSE

∆OME

0.9209
0.7133
1.1234
0.5039
0.9765

1.1259
0.9999
1.0130
1.0023
0.9387

0.7734
0.7201
1.1266
0.5093
1.0254

1.0576
0.9908
0.9843
0.9870
1.0146

0.8252
1.4253
1.0605
2.2734
0.8432

1.0597
0.7820
0.8553
0.8104
1.1448

0.9263
1.0404
1.0443
0.9934
1.0162

1.2225
0.7362
0.8319
0.8464
1.0971

0.9358
1.0209
0.9846
0.9638
1.0269

0.8252
1.4253
1.0605
2.2734
0.8432

1.1298
0.7830
1.1107
0.4290
1.1437

1.2447
1.0854
0.9897
0.9078
0.9720

0.8877
0.6959
1.1417
0.5147
1.1582

1.0226
1.0366
0.9831
0.9182
1.0159

1.0989
1.0419
1.0157
0.9678
0.9756

0.9612
0.7174
1.0334
0.6235
1.0935

1.0053
1.0161
0.9840
0.9563
1.0191

2003/2004
2004/2005
2005/2006
2006/2007
2007/2008

0.8494 0.8252 1.0619
1.0708 1.4253 0.7595
1.0950 1.0605 1.0327
1.3215 2.2734 0.5771
0.9164 0.8432 1.0873
Operating Approach
0.8291 0.6976 1.1885
1.0265 1.0097 1.0167
1.0311 1.0341 0.9971
1.0448 0.9995 1.0453
0.9874 0.9888 0.9986

1.0108
0.9887
1.0013
0.9832
1.0139

1.1758
0.9963
0.9654
1.0613
1.0002

1.0157
1.0336
1.0383
1.0013
0.9859

Specialised Banks

2003/2004
2004/2005
2005/2006
2006/2007
2007/2008

1.1908
1.2389
0.9750
1.0459
0.7907

0.6976
1.0097
1.0341
0.9995
0.9888

1.7071
1.2270
0.9429
1.0464
0.7996

1.5203
1.0363
1.0516
0.9607
1.0162

1.0056
1.1355
0.8798
1.0519
0.7822

1.2140
1.0653
1.0264
1.0388
1.0025

Private Banks

2003/2004
2004/2005
2005/2006
2006/2007
2007/2008

0.9373
1.0262
1.0661
1.6033
0.8619

0.6976
1.0097
1.0341
0.9995
0.9888

1.3435
1.0163
1.0309
1.6041
0.8717

1.0000
1.0000
0.9752
1.0275
1.0000

1.1357
1.0598
1.0342
1.5254
0.8717

1.1979
0.9572
1.0191
1.0278
1.0000

2003/2004 0.9857 0.6976 1.4130
2004/2005 1.0972 1.0097 1.0867
2005/2006 1.0241 1.0341 0.9903
2006/2007 1.2313 0.9995 1.2319
2007/2008 0.8800 0.9888 0.8900
Note: ΔTFP= ΔTech×ΔEff, and ΔEff=ΔoTE×ΔROSE×ΔOME.
Source: Author's calculation.

1.1770
1.0083
1.0094
0.9905
1.0100

1.1057
1.0639
0.9598
1.2129
0.8847

1.1426
1.0187
1.0279
1.0226
0.9961

Financial Institutions

Year

Commercial Banks

2003/2004
2004/2005
2005/2006
2006/2007
2007/2008

0.7656
1.0206
1.1901
1.1417
0.8179

0.8252
1.4253
1.0605
2.2734
0.8432

Specialised Banks

2003/2004
2004/2005
2005/2006
2006/2007
2007/2008

0.8762
1.1186
0.9110
1.8700
0.9682

Private Banks

2003/2004
2004/2005
2005/2006
2006/2007
2007/2008

0.9065
1.0733
1.1838
0.9530
0.9633

Industry

2003/2004
2004/2005
2005/2006
2006/2007
2007/2008

Commercial Banks

Industry
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5.6 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter empirically analysed the technical efficiency and productivity of
financial institutions in Iran using two different DEA-based approaches. In the
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of this chapter, results obtained from the bootstrapped
Malmquist indices and efficiency scores were been analysed. The bootstrap
approach emphasises that the majority of our estimates are statistically significant.
In the Sections 5.4 and 5.5 of this chapter, empirical results of the HicksMoorsteen TFP indices and efficiency scores have been provided. In order to
improve the robustness and sensitivity of the results under this method, two
approaches, namely, the intermediation approach and the operating approach,
have been employed in defining the inputs and outputs of the institutions.

Based on our results, in terms of banks’ intermediation services, the industry
efficiency level has improved over the period 2003-2006, and deteriorated
considerably soon after the regulatory changes were introduced. The results also
show that under intermediation approach, pure efficiency level of public banks
rose in the post regulation era (2006-2008). However, over the same period
private banks experienced significantly smaller positive efficiency changes. This
is likely due to the fact that public banks, by virtue of undertaking most of the
government borrowing programs, could generate significant advances and thus
being more pure efficient based on the extent of intermediation services. On the
other hand, the significantly lower pure efficiency of private banks after 2005
could be attributed to their poor management of deposits which increased
markedly due to the interest rate differentials between public and private banks,
and a lacklustre performance in investment projects. However, from the revenue
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aspect under the operating approach, private banks were fully technically- and
mix-efficient banks in 2007 and 2008. They were also fully technically-efficient
banks in the post-regulation era. This could be due to the fact that private banks in
Iran are not obliged to follow government guidelines for lending. For such banks
productivity maximization is considered the highest priority. Hence, the
government ownership and the associated normative-funding measures might
have adversely impacted on the technical and mix efficiency of public banks
under the operating approach.

According to our results, under the intermediation approach, on average, public
banks have become highly scale and mix inefficient during the post-regulation
period (2006-2008). One may attribute the acute scale inefficiency and mix
inefficiency to the sub-optimal usage of inputs by financial institutions and their
lack of independence from the government and its regulatory intervention in the
way in which inputs and outputs are managed in the banking system. Our results
show that technological changes and government regulations could largely shift
the production possibility frontiers upwards by providing intermediation services.
However, sizable negative changes in scale efficiency have dramatically
contributed to the diminishing efficiency and TFP growth of financial institutions
particularly during the 2006-2007 period. Scale inefficiency was also a
contributing factor behind banks’ negative TFP changes under the operating
approach. Therefore, there is a significant room for improvement in the Iranian
banking system in terms of scale efficiency. Furthermore, our findings show that
the estimates of the market productivity changes exhibit almost same fluctuations
as changes in pure technology/technological changes. Hence, some improvements
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in productivity during the period 2004-2007 can be observed followed by
significant productivity fall in 2007-2008. Since changes in the production
possibilities set can be attributable to any changes in factors such as technological
changes and/or government regulations. Hence, the overall technological progress
in the industry during 2004-2007 was most probably due to the technological
advances in the banking industry, which commenced in 2004 and the regulatory
changes introduced in 2005. These advances, inter alia, include the rising
use/number of automated teller machines (ATM), credit cards, debit cards, and
online-branches, as well as the increased pressure on commercial banks to expand
credit in 2005. The large decrease in the banks’ absolute efficiency (regress of the
production possibilities set) in 2007-2008 to a large extent can be attributable to
the substantial rise in the banks’ NPLs. In general, it seems that government
control of public banks tends to limit incentives and the ability of managers to
operate efficiently. As a result, public banks move farther from constant returns to
scale, and the banks perform under decreasing returns to scale for a long period.
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Chapter Six
Policy Implications of the Study

6.1 Introduction
The previous Chapter empirically analysed the technical efficiency and
productivity changes of Iranian banks using different DEA-based approaches for
the period 2003-2008. Most of the inefficiency identified stemmed from the
banks’ current scale of operation (scale inefficiency), as well as the lack of
independence of the banks in terms of managing their inputs-outputs (mix
inefficiency). The empirical results also indicate that no matter which approach is
taken into consideration, scale inefficiency was a major source of inefficiency
among Iranian banks, in particular public banks, and this problem became worse
after the regulatory changes introduced in 2005. Also, the industry showed
negative changes in technical efficiency and productivity over 2007-2008, a
period in which the level of NPLs increased dramatically. These findings place a
responsibility on the Central Bank of Iran’s (CBI) policy analysts to initiate
innovative methods to improve overall economic efficiency levels in the financial
sector. This should eventually lead to an increase in the contribution of the formal
financial sector to the attainment of sustainable economic development and
growth.

There are also reported differences in the efficiency performance of institutions
arising from different ownership status (see Chapter Five). It appears that highly
efficient institutions are either private-owned or government-owned banks. The
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empirical results in Chapter Five of this thesis also demonstrated that although
under the intermediation approach public banks were relatively more technically
efficient than private banks, from the revenue aspect private banks were
significantly more technically efficient than their public counterparts. This
suggests that the productivity maximization is the highest priority of all private
banks. In fact, private banks were fully technically-efficient over each and every
year during the sample period 2003-2008, with the only exception being the year
2006. The results also indicate that, under the operating approach, private banks
were the most efficient banks in terms of allocation of inputs and outputs (fully
mix-efficient) over 2006 and 2007, and public banks were much less mix efficient
during these years.

One may argue therefore, that government ownership has had an adverse impact
on the technical and mix efficiency of public banks. There are at least two reasons
behind this: (1) public banks focus on profitability as well as creating employment
opportunities in rural areas and among people with low skills; (2) by providing
artificially kept-low interest rates, public banks are also obliged to follow
government policy objectives and the strategy of advancing a larger quantity of
loans to a number of sectors considered as high priorities but which are less
profitable. Since private banks are relatively new, these banks, by means of their
leaner and more skilled workforce, can implement advanced credit management
methods and operational innovations, and are also well equipped to internalise
recent innovations in banking practices. Therefore, in the future, the financial
sector has the potential to become more efficient as these institutions mature and
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increase their scale of operation. However, the older institutions (public banks)
also need to improve their performance.

In terms of productivity analysis the results reveal that under the operating
approach, changes in scale efficiency has been the significant component of
changes in total factor productivity (∆TFP) of the industry. Under the
intermediation approach the key components of ∆TFP in the industry were
changes in scale efficiency in addition to technical changes (∆Tech). These
findings are useful because under both approaches scale inefficiency is a major
reason behind TFP shortfalls in the industry. In the period just after the regulatory
changes (2006-2007) under the intermediation approach, public banks
experienced a significant positive growth of TFP but private banks experienced
negative TFP changes. This result under the intermediation approach may not
necessarily be undesirable for private banks, due to the fact that private banks do
not have to allocate and manage their funds according to government priorities.
On the other hand, under the operating approach private banks showed large
improvements in TFP in 2006-2007. Under both approaches the industry showed
negative changes in productivity over 2007-2008, which was coincident with the
significant growth of NPLs during this period.

There are a number of important policy implications arising from the results of
this study. The overall deterioration of the efficiency and productivity
performance of Iran’s banking industry, after the regulatory changes in particular,
is a cause for concern, as it is likely to constrain the growth and development of
the overall economy. While it will never be practicable to aim for full efficiency
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there is a strong case that Iranian banks should be striving for much higher levels
of efficiency. As a result the government will need to rethink and redesign their
reform measures with the objective of increasing banks’ independence from
government’s policies, and motivating more competition in the marketplace.

6.2 Implications of the Results
There are several consequences arising from the inefficient performance of
financial institutions. When a firm is not efficient this jeopardise not only its
profitability but also its continued existence in a competitive market. An
inefficient firm is a prime target for takeovers, or may be forced out of the market
with more efficient firms. Also, from a policy point of view, inefficiency can
cause a waste of scarce resources in the economy. Hence, the challenge for policy
makers is to generate an environment in which financial institutions have
opportunities to grow in order to be more productive and efficient. There are
several policy implications that flow out of this research and could lead to
efficiency gains for the banking system.

Developing strategies to make the financial sector more efficient, and thereby
increase its contribution to the overall economy, could follow a number of
different courses (or a combination of them). Broadly, four main approaches
could be considered:
1)

Adjustment in Bank Size;

2)

Portfolio Management and Monitoring;

3)

Technological Innovation; and

4)

Regulatory Reform.
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6.2.1 Bank-Size Adjustment
The results for scale efficiency changes and the shape of technology for the
Iranian banking system are important indicators of the challenges facing the
sector. From the results presented in Chapter Five, scale inefficiency is a major
problem for most Iranian banks. Also, our results reveal that the portion of the
technology confronting public banks seems to have moved substantially further
from constant returns to scale, and these banks have performed under decreasing
returns to scale for a long period asserting their great size but non-efficient
economic performance. Therefore, they need to trim down their size to overcome
their technical inefficiency. On the contrary, the technological region of private
banks in input-output space was found to be moving toward constant returns to
scale, indicating a need to increase their size to reap sustained efficiency gains.
Besides, sub-optimal levels of private banks’ mix efficiency after 2006 show that
they have not performed well to deal with the considerable rise in deposits during
this period. Thus, their performance would be more efficient through institutional
growth and an increased number of branches.

6.2.2 Portfolio Management and Monitoring
According to this study’s findings, under the intermediation approach, on average,
public banks became not only scale inefficient but also highly mix inefficient after
the government regulations were imposed in 2005. This can be attributed to the
lack of independence of these banks from the government in terms of managing
their inputs-outputs. For instance, as explained in Chapter Two, according to CBI
(2007b) these banks were obliged to allocate up to 35 per cent of their credits to
188

support the expansion of SMEs. As a result, public banks experienced a rapid
accumulation of their NPLs after 2006. Therefore, the government will need to
rethink and redesign their reform measures with the objective of increasing banks’
independence.

Concerning commercial banks, expanding privatization would be the best way to
decrease direct facilities and increase management’s ability to control risky
factors. Corresponding to the Fourth 5-Year Development Plan (2005-2010) all
commercial state-owned banks (except the National Bank and Bank Sepah) are
scheduled for privatization. Consequently, eighty per cent of the shares of these
banks will be ceded to the private sector, joint stock cooperative companies and
non-state publicly-held companies. The privatization of the commercial banks has
to be carried out with caution as these banks will eventually remain under
government control. Therefore, to reduce banks’ dependency on government they
will need significant restructuring and establishment of clear criteria for
privatization before being sold. From another point of view, privatization of the
public banks would increase competition in the market and should improve their
performance and efficiency through better mobilization and allocation of
resources. Ataullah and Le (2006) and Chen et al. (2005) found competition to be
one of the most imperative factors enhancing firm efficiency and productivity.

Regarding specialised banks, which are not scheduled for privatization, they
strongly need to be more independent and improve their management to have
better process assessment and monitoring of individual loans. From another
aspect, sub-optimal efficiency levels facing public banks could also be caused
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internally. As Berger and DeYoung (1997) asserted, sub-par managers do not
adequately monitor and control their portfolio, and do not practise sufficient loan
underwriting, monitoring and control. Therefore, these banks may need to
upgrade their internal skills and technology and be exposed to latest management
practices. This can be achieved through exerting pressure by stakeholders to
improve the performance of institutions. Besides, better mechanisms to monitor
and enforce repayment can also improve repayment levels.

6.2.3 Technological Innovation Can Improve Efficiency
Taking advantage of the opportunities offered by new technology can help the
banking industry in overcoming some of the problems relating to inefficiency.
Our results under the intermediation approach, show that technological changes
could largely shift the production possibility frontiers upwards by providing better
transaction services and geographical expansion of the banks’ services between
2004 and 2006. This is consistent with the findings of Avkiran (2000) in the
context of Australian banks who demonstrated that technological innovation takes
a principal part in shaping financial service delivery. In terms of banks’
profitability, based on our results, technological changes had some positive effects
on Iranian banks’ profitability by reducing processing, transaction and labour
costs. Private banks, under operating approach, were fully technically efficient
banks, while there was significant room for improvement of the public banks. An
important factor driving this result might be the fact that private banks, with their
skilled employees, are better placed to apply sophisticated portfolio management
techniques and operational innovations and are also better placed to internalize
recent innovations in banking practices. Also, well established private banks have
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made significant inroads into the banking market through introduction of
sophisticated financial products and banking practices and, as a consequence,
have built up a dedicated client base.

Therefore, faster deployment of automated teller machines (ATM), credit cards,
debit cards, online-branches, and cell-phone banking, would result in lower cost
banking and financial services for the public banks. Beside the investments in
technology, focusing on staff technical training and encouraging customers to
benefit from new technologies would also go far in assisting public banks to
become more efficient. Avkiran (2000) argued that technological innovation is a
sign of dynamic efficiency in Australian retail banking, where banks gain benefits
from new cost effective technologies and pursue product and market development
to be efficient.

6.2.4 Regulatory Reform
The financial sector in Iran, as in many other countries, is one of the most heavily
regulated sectors of economic activity. The Central Bank of Iran is charged with
regulating and putting into practice monetary and credit policy, based on the
government’s general economic policy plan. Thus, the Central Bank is responsible
for providing the desired environment for economic growth of the country by
implementing appropriate monetary and credit policy, and to support government
in accomplishing stabilization and economic development programs (CBI,
2006b). However, its regulatory framework is based on government regulations
and its lack of independence has resulted in the implementation of financial
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policies with inadequate attention to their impact on the sensitivity of financial
markets and the current market structure.

For instance, the use of the banking sector to provide direct financing to mostly
private beneficiaries through Central Bank credit with limited tools to monitor
credit risk and credit quality, fuelled a credit boom in the economy. Moreover, the
direct government obligation regarding low deposit and loan interest rates in a
high inflation situation led to negative real interest rates and financial repression
in Iran’s economy. These policies also caused a decline in capital adequacy ratios
and a significant increase in nonperforming assets after 2005. Hence, it seems that
while the current regulatory structure has served the government plans well, the
imposed different deposit interest rates and conditions on public and private
banks, and the decline in the spread between lending and deposit rates, would
hamper banks’ efficiency and productivity in the future. In general, these sorts of
policies increase market risk and lead to higher volatility in asset markets and
adversely affect the efficiency of financial institutions.

Therefore, there are reasons to believe that the current regulatory structure of the
banking industry should be reformed but without introducing unnecessary or
excessive risks. The significant deterioration of banks’ efficiency and
productivity, after 2007, needs to be addressed upfront by restructuring the
banking system’s regulatory and supervisory framework, and gradually
liberalizing interest rates. Delays in adopting appropriate policies to strengthen the
banking sector could jeopardize public confidence and banks’ capacity to provide
efficient intermediation services. In this regard, a close dialogue with World Bank
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authorities on improving the privatization process and implementing other macro
and micro-critical reforms would be very helpful. Equally critical are further
efforts to enhance the regulatory framework on asset and liability management.
Liquidity management to control inflation is very crucial for CBI. In summary, a
regulatory structure that offers efficiency to the financial sector should encompass
the following;
-

Liberalizing interest rates,

-

Improving the existing financial infrastructure,

-

Improving banks’ independence from government policies,

-

Improving banks’ liability management,

-

Working closely with the World Bank staff to improve the privatization
process.
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Table 6.1: Summary of Recommendations.
Challenges and Obstacles

Recommendations

Scale inefficiency is a major reason behind TFP
shortfalls in the industry.

a) Public banks need to trim down their size
to overcome their technical inefficiency.
b)Private banks need to increase their size to
reap sustained efficiency gains. Their
performance would be more efficient
through institutional growth and increase
of branches.

Mix inefficiency of public banks increased after
regulation.

a) The government needs to rethink and
redesign their reform measures with the
objective of increasing public banks’
independence.
b)Expand privatization of commercial banks
aimed at decreasing direct facilities and
increasing management’s ability to control
risky factors.
c) To reduce these banks’ dependency on
government will require significant
restructuring and establishment of clear
criteria for privatization before being sold.
d)Regarding specialised banks, they strongly
need to improve their management to have
better process assessment and monitoring
of individual loans. Better mechanisms to
monitor and enforce repayment can also
improve repayment levels.
e) They need to upgrade their internal skills
and technology and be exposed to latest
management practices.

Private banks, under the operating approach
(income based approach), were fully technical
efficient banks while there was significant room
for improvement of the public banks.

a) Faster development of automated teller
machines (ATM), credit cards, debit cards,
online-branches, and cell-phone banking,
will result in lower cost banking and
financial services of the public banks.
b)Investment in technology, focusing on staff
technical training and encouraging
customers to benefit from new
technologies would also go far in assisting
public banks to become more efficient.

It seems that while the current regulatory
structure has served the government plans well,
they will hamper banks’ efficiency and
productivity in the future.

a) Liberalizing interest rates.
b)Improving the existing financial
infrastructure.
c) Improving banks’ independence from
government policies.
d)Improving banks’ liability management.
e) Working closely with World Bank staff to
improve the privatization process.
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Chapter Seven
Summary and Conclusions

7.1 Introduction
The productivity and efficiency of the banking system is pivotal to attain and
sustain economic growth and development in both developed and developing
economies, and is of particular interest in the wake of financial sector reform and
restructuring. Over the last decade the Iranian banking industry has undergone
substantial changes due to increased different government regulations and
technological advances, all of which have resulted in an extensive restructuring of
the industry. Changes in policy have affected both state-owned banks (including
commercial and specialised banks) and private banks in Iran. The former have
been the most successful in acquiring market share, mainly due to the fact that
private banks did not exist prior to 2001.

However, it seems that public banks were more noticeably affected by the Iranian
government regulatory initiatives launched in 2005, which obliged all banks to
considerably reduce deposit and loan interest rates. The government also imposed
differing interest rates and conditions on public and private banks. For example,
there was an obligation on public banks to assign higher priority in their lending
operations to areas such as advanced technology projects, small and medium
enterprises, and housing projects for low income earners (CBI, 2007b). As a result
the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) of public banks increased dramatically
after 2006. According to the statistics provided by the CBI (2005a, 2008) the
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annual growth rate of public banks’ NPLs was less than 30 per cent before 2005,
but increased to a staggering 129 per cent in 2006. The highest share of NPLs
being attributed to the manufacturing and mining (20.1 per cent) and construction
(19.5 per cent) sectors (CBI, 2007a). The growth rate of public banks’ NPLs was
about 40 per cent in 2007 (CBI 2005; 2008). For these reasons, in particular, this
study investigates the effect of government policies on the productivity of the
Iranian banking industry. To date, no study has been carried out to assess the
impact of these reforms on the efficiency of financial institutions in Iran.

The main aim of this study has been to conduct an empirical investigation of
financial institutions in Iran, with a view to assessing their technical efficiency
and productivity. By investigating technical efficiency and productivity among
financial institutions in Iran, this study addressed the following three questions: a)
What is the mean efficiency score of financial institutions in Iran b) What is the
total factor productivity change for Iran’s financial institutions c) Have financial
reforms been successful in improving the performance of the banking sector, and
has the efficiency performance of Iranian banks improved after the regulatory
changes d) What are the major sources of inefficiency in the context of Iran’s
financial institutions. This chapter summarises this study and the findings for each
of these research questions. In particular, this final chapter is organised as follows.
Section 7.2 summarises the study and the main findings from the previous
chapters. Policy implications are highlighted in Section 7.3. Section 7.4 outlines
the specific contributions made by this study. Section 7.5 highlights some
limitations of this study. Suggestions for future research are presented in the last
section.
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7.2 Summary of Major Empirical Findings
DEA, which is a non-parametric approach, was employed in this study to analyse
empirically the technical efficiency and productivity changes of financial
institutions in Iran. For the first time in developing countries, this study employed
a Bootstrapped Malmquist technique under VRS assumptions to analyse
efficiency and productivity changes of a banking industry. The bootstrap approach
demonstrates that the majority of estimates obtained in this study are statistically
significant. A comprehensive decomposition of the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index
developed by O’Donnell (2010b) is applied in this thesis to analyse efficiency and
productivity changes in the banking system. This study is the first to use the new
decomposition of the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index to analyse efficiency and
productivity changes in a banking context. The advantage of this approach over
the popular Malmquist productivity index is that it does not make any assumption
concerning a firm’s optimising behaviour, the structure of markets, or the type of
returns to scale. In order to improve the robustness and sensitivity of the results
under this method, two approaches, namely the intermediation approach and the
operating approach, have been employed in defining the inputs and outputs of
these institutions.

Based on our empirical results the major findings of this chapter can be
summarised as follows: First, although the industry is inefficient over all years,
under the intermediation approach the industry efficiency level improved over the
period 2003-2006 but declined considerably after 2006. Second, under all
approaches, the industry showed negative changes in technical efficiency and
productivity over 2007-2008. Third, while the state ownership of public banks
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helped to reduce the extent of inefficiency of public banks by providing banking
services to government-specified areas, the lack of independence of public banks,
in particular specialised banks, from government controls led to considerable
scale and mix inefficiency particularly after the regulatory measures were
introduced in 2005. Fourth, public banks were also significantly more mix- and
technically inefficient than private banks under the operating approach, suggesting
that productivity maximization is the highest priority of all private banks. Finally,
The empirical results indicate that no matter which approach is taken into
consideration, scale inefficiency was a major source of inefficiency among the
Iranian banks, in particular public banks, indicating significant room for scale
optimization to facilitate higher levels of revenue and services.

7.3 Policy Implications
There are a number of important policy implications arising from the results of
this study. First, the overall poor productivity performance of Iran’s financial
sector after 2007 is a cause for concern, as it is likely to constrain the growth and
development of the overall economy. It seems that while the current regulatory
structure has served government plans well, they will hamper banks’ efficiency
and productivity in the future. As a consequence, the authorities will need to
rethink their reform measures to deal with the objective of stimulating more
competition in the marketplace. This could be achieved by liberalizing interest
rates; improving the existing financial infrastructure; improving banks’
independence from government policies; improving banks’ liability management;
and working closely with World Bank staff to improve the privatization process.
Second, our analysis suggests that scale inefficiency is the main reason behind
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efficiency and TFP shortfalls in the industry. Therefore, public banks need to trim
down their size to overcome their technical inefficiency. On the other hand,
private banks would need to increase their size to reap sustained efficiency gains.
Their performance would be more efficient through institutional growth and an
increased number of branches.

In order to improve mix efficiency levels of the public banks, the government
needs to rethink and redesign their reform measures with the objective of
increasing public banks’ independence; expanding privatization of commercial
banks would be the best way to decrease direct facilities and increase
management’s ability to control risk factors. To reduce these banks’ dependency
on government they will need significant restructuring and establishment of clear
criteria for privatization before being sold. In terms of specialised banks, which
are not scheduled for privatization, they strongly need to be more independent
from government and improve their management to have better process
assessment and monitoring for individual loans. Better mechanisms to monitor
and enforce repayment can also improve repayment levels. They may also need to
upgrade their internal skills and technology and be exposed to latest management
practices.

Finally, to increase the efficiency level of public banks under the revenue
approach, they should be encouraged to accelerate their adoption of self-service
technologies, such as automated teller machines (ATM), credit cards, debit cards,
online-branches, and cell-phone banking, which would result in lower cost
banking and financial services of the public banks. According to Avkiran (2000)
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the adoption of new information technology is among the most cost effective
ways for the delivery of financial services. Focusing on staff technical training
and encouraging customers to benefit from new technologies would also go far in
assisting public banks to become more efficient.

7.4 Contributions of the Study
This thesis has made four significant contributions to the analysis of efficiency in
financial institutions. First, this is the first study to address the issue of efficiency
and productivity in Iran’s financial institutions using DEA and TFP indices for the
period 2003-2008. After conducting an inclusive review, all previous studies of
Iranian banks suffer from neglect of the importance of market structure (all have
been conducted under CRS), productivity changes over time and the entry of new
private banks. Thus, this study conducts an in-depth assessment of banking sector
efficiency and productivity by means of adopting different techniques. This study
employed a larger category of financial institutions than that of other studies. The
sample data included in this study comes from commercial banks, specialised
banks and private bank. All these categories were homogenous in terms of inputs
and outputs and hence it was possible to apply DEA methodology. Second, this is
the first study to analyse Iranian banking efficiency over a period riddled with
significant financial reforms or government interventions. Third, for the first time
in a developing country, this study employed a Bootstrapped Malmquist technique
under VRS assumptions to analyse efficiency and productivity changes of a
banking industry. Finally, this study is the first to use the comprehensive
decomposition of the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index to analyse efficiency and
productivity changes in a banking context.
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7.5 Limitations of the Study
This study can be improved on several grounds. First, there is one technical
problem with the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index. This index is a DEA-based method
and, therefore, it makes no allowance for measurement or specification errors.
Due to the lack of an appropriate software program it was not possible to apply
the bootstrapping technique to this model. This programming goes beyond the
scope of this thesis. Another limitation is the failure to carry out a multivariate
analysis of the determinants of efficiency. In this study the sample size was very
small, making this impossible. The univariate approach does not satisfactorily
address the inter-relationship among technical efficiency and bank financial
parameters, since most bank characteristics considered in the study could be
correlated with each other.

7.6 Areas for Future Research
The results and limitations of this study suggest some avenues for further research
to deepen the understanding of financial institution efficiency in Iran. This study
has assessed the efficiency of the financial sector by applying the DEA model.
One possibility for future research is to address one of the limitations of this study
involving the writing of a new program to employ the bootstrap technique to the
Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index.

Another possibility (if there were many different kinds of financial institutions in
Iran) would be to carry out the tests for different sub-groups of financial
institutions, such as commercial banks, specialised banks and private banks using
the same approach rather than aggregating them as one group. This would
201

highlight the relative patterns of efficiency and productivity changes in these
related groups of institutions. Also, if data for the period 2007-2009 were
available, a longer series of observations on these financial institutions would
make possible a closer investigation of efficiency and productivity changes in
financial services. This would yield more detailed and specific information about
the impact of financial reforms.

The results reported in this study could be benchmarked with those of other
developing economies at a similar stage of economic development, with the
objective of identifying areas in which financial sector performance could be
improved and what policies should be changed in order to attain this. Therefore, it
would be of interest to develop the methodology to other developing economies at
a similar stage of economic development, to evaluate relative outcomes.
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